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The Institute 01 Development Management 
has sponsored a series of studies in Development 
Management* These have a two-fold purpose; first, 
to provide much needed additional materials based 
on local experience for use in 3DM training 
courses and seminars; and second, to assist members 
of the IDM and others concerned in analysing 
development policies and program and their 
implementation*
This study of the Mogobane Dam and Irrigation 
Scheme is the first in the series to be issued* It 
was begun in 1975 for the IDM by Mr* Frank W* Taylor 
of Gabane, Botswana under the direction of 
Lr0 S»EeG* Peterson* The study was completed in 
1976*
The author assumes full responsibility for the 
contents of the study* Provided acknowledgement is 
made part or all of the study may be reproduced*
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CHAPTER I 
MQGOBANE DAM AND IRRIGATION SCHEME
Early in 1936 Chief Seboko of the Bamalete approached the 
colonial administration 1 for help in the construction of a dam in 
the hills near Mog^bane for uhe purpose of watering cattle. The 
area was inspected by the Director of Public Works who found a suit­
able site for a very substantial dam by the Territory*s standard.
The Chief agreed to supply oxen and regiments of tribesmen to work 
on the construction under the supervision of a Public Works 
Department (PWD) officer. The administration undertook to pay the 
labourer? 6 pence per day plus rations and teams of 16 oxen with a 
leader and driver the sum of 7/6 d. per day. Wagons also were hired 
to mo'.'e sand, stone and shale for the dam wall.
Work on the site started in September and progressed favoura­
bly for a while but soon there came the first of several delays. On 
the first very cold morning difficulty was experienced in getting
the labourers to start work. Three days later there was a dispute2over the mealiemeal rations issued to the labourers and the chief 
had to be called to arbitrate. A short while later one week*s hold 
up was experienced because 7,500 oxen in the area, including those 
working on the site, could not work due to inoculations. One month 
later the superintendent reported better progress with the dam after 
vseveral of the lazy natives were dispensed with. *-* He - estimatedr that 
it would take another months to complete the work. The’following 
week he paid off more "useless" workers and advised the Director of 
Public Dorks that the^previous month*s wages were unpaid due to money 
shortage in Gaborone. He also reported that labour was drifting off
'i
-t-r do ploughing as the rams 0 had come.
In mid-November floods struck the partly completed dan, pa­
ssing 6 feet over the wall causing serious damage. The superintendent 
decided to work round the clock, including weekends, in order to 
complete the dam before more damage could be caused and, at the same 
time, have it partly filled for the first season’s crop. The chief 
was asked for more men and up to 10 teams of oxen but none were forth­
coming a? the ploughing season by this time was in full swing.
The Administration was forced to purchase 150 head of cattle and also 
had to contribute further men and machinery to expedite the work* A 
Consulting Engineer from Johannesburg visited the site and agreed 
that utmost pressure should be exerted to get the dam completed by 
working continuously day and night "at top speed". The DPW arranged 
for a policeman to be stationed at the dam (no reason given) until 
it was completed in mid January of 1937*
In February the Resident Commissioner advised the High Commiss­
ioner that, "By the erection of the Mogobane Dam, a lake estimated 
to contain over three hundred million gallons of water has been 
created and that numbers of duck and waterfowl hitherto rarely 
encountered in the Southern Protectorate are beginning to appear. 
Determined efforts already have been made by some of the local inhab­
itants to exterminate the more edible waterfowl, as they arrive. The 
lake promises to become a popular local resort for picnic and bathing 
parties and I think it is desirable that the area should for the time 
being, be declared a bird sanctuary. The Chief of the Bamalete raises 
no objection and I accordingly enclose for Your Excellency’s consid­
eration, a draft Notice for publication in the Gazette if approved."
The Notice stated that all game bi:>ds which included geese, 
duck and guineafowl, were protected within a 4 mile radius of the 
Dam* The High Commissioner agreed to the proposal. The Chief was 
instructed to inform the tribe of the regulations and also to advise 
the Headman at Mogobane.
Chief Seboko died shortly after the dam was completed in 1937 
and he was succeeded by Acting Chief Ketshwerebothata Ikaneng who was 
regent for the next 7 years during the minority of Chief Mokgosi.
Chief Ketshwerebothata was regarded as a "weak" chief by the then 
Resident Commissioner but within a few years he had a reputation of 
being "efficient, willing and helpful" as testified by later District 
Commissioners
At the end of 1938 Thornton, the Agricultural Advisor to the 
High Commissioner for the High Commission Territories (Bechuanaland 
Protectorate, Basutoland and Swaziland), visited the Mogobane Dam and 
realized its potential as a substantial irrigation scheme. In a 
letter to the High Commissioner in Pretoria, copied to the Resident 
Commissioner for Bechuanaland Protectorate in Mafeking, he proposed 
that a substantial irrigation scheme bg set up at Mogobane and that 
it be operated as a tribal scheme.
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The proposal was accepted in principle but for various reasons,
to be discussed later, the construction of the scheme did not start 
till 1943.
During these intervening years, there were a number of develop­
ments which, added to the r cent history in the Territory, were to 
have a significant bearing on future developments of the proposed 
schema.
For some time the tribesmen had a growing sense of suspicion and 
frustration with the Administration, in particular with the Agricul­
tural Department with which they had most contact. Some of the sus- 
icicn had its roots in tribal conservativism and the dominance by 
Europeans in the administrati n, with memories of the Boers and the 
continuing attempts of the South African Government to incorporate 
Bechuanaland Protectorate into the Union of South Africa. Much of 
the so-called tribal development was a result of imposed ideas and 
arbitray decisions by the Administration in spite of the official 
policy of consultation, Frustration often was caused by this lack of 
consultation, or even when it had taken place, there would be subse­
quent changes from the original decisions, frequently without fur­
ther consultation©
The Batswana sensed a feeling of no confidence by the Admini­
tration in their being able to conduct themselves in a changing 
World* The attitudes of the Administration* Chiefs and leading tribes­
men may be seen in some of the examples given below.
In February 1938, at the meeting of the Native Advisory Council 
the Resident Commissioner presented a Memorandum on Water Development 
which mainly dealt with dam construction and borehole drilling. He 
s ai d s
Government has no wish to force a water development program on 
any tribe*,. ........ The chiefs and tribesmen must realise that
Government will not undertake any development work unless it is 
^•sutedof the full co-operation and willing assistance of the tribe
 ...... Where I find this assistance and co-operation are not
forthcoming, I shall have no hisitation in ordering the immediate 
cessation of development work in the Reserve concerned." To which 
Chief Tshekedi replied :
" I may be wrong, but it seems the responsibility will be on 
the Chime's shoulders.
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We are prepared to co-operate with anyone sent by the Government 
to help us, but we also consider that we should be helped and advised, 
and that is where I suggest that in connection with this matter of 
water, the heads of the various Departments, whether it be the head 
of the Agricultural Department or the head of the Public Works De­
partment before they start with their work, should invite us to discuss 
with them where and how these schemes should be carried on, They 
should not only consult with us, but after consulting, they should 
put down in writing the procedure which will be adopted in connection 
with each particular scheme. In this way, we will know how to 
utilize these boreholes (and dams) and the water found in them. That 
is all I wish to say."
At this same meeting, the members voiced their strong dislike of 
the term "Native" and wished it to be struck out of all Laws and
Ordinances. The Resident Commissioner had no Objection to changing 
the name of the Native Advisory Council to the "African Advisory Coun­
cil but he said that it would be "too difficult" to change the name 
in all laws, etc.
Some of the members of the Council were frank about their peo­
ple's shortcomings as is instanced by the remarks of Dr. Molema at a 
meeting in 1940 when the Resident Commissioner had spoken about 
the lack of co-operation by the tribes in producing grain on "War 
Lands" in support of the War Effort in each tribal area. Dr. Molema 
said :
"You took us to task, Sir, in reference to our agricultural 
activities. You spoke of our backwardness on account of our conser­
vatism, apathy and ignorance. : We 11, ■.it is a pity but it is true.
But we have to realise that this apathy* this ignorance and conserva' 
tion are part of a vicious circle and part of our poverty, and poor 
people usually are ignorant people, and one thing, you might say,
breeds another. We can only ask, Sir, ..........  that you bear
patiently with.us."
Details of the "War Effort" and its virtual total failure are 
described in Appendix II.
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CHAPTER 2 
PLANNING AND LAND PREPARATION
As mentioned earlier, the proposal for an irrigation scheme at 
Mogobane was first put forward towards the end of 1938 when the 
Agricultural Adviser wrote to the High Commissioner and recommended 
"the development and establishment at the earliest possible date of 
the irrigation of 500 acres of land below the Mogobane Dam for the 
immediate use by natives". With regard to preparation of such a 
project he stated.
"In submitting a project, several important factors must be borne in
mind and clearly shown:
(i) The objects to be achieved.
(ii) The period of time through which the project will operate.
(iii) The approximate annual cost and total cost.
(iv) Hew the execution of the project will fit into the existing 
organisation from the Government*s point of view in regard 
to staff facilities and future financial responsibilities.
(v) Further9 how the project will fit into the life and 
responsibilities of the community after the period of 
introduction and Government’s responsibility to the project 
has wholly or partly elapsed."
Before any effective steps could be taken to follow up these 
pioposals, the Second World War broke out and all development funds 
were frozen on orders from London. It was not till May 1941 that 
the situation changed. The Secretary of State for the Colonies sent 
a dispatch to the High Commissioner emphasising
"the obligation to raise the standard of living of all those classes 
in colonial Empire whose standard is at present below the minimum 
that can be regarded as adequate and imperative duty of doing all 
that is practically possible to fulfil this obligation even during 
the waro Schemes under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 
as well as similar schemes which may be financed from local fimds, 
should therefore not be entirely held up, and you may proceed on the 
ba:_,is that I shall be very willing to give sympathetic consideration 
to any schemes under the Act which can be undertaken without 
extensive use of manpower or material resources from outside the 
territory under your administration".
In October of that year the Annual Resident Commissioners9 Conference 
took place under the chairmanship of the High Commissioner. The 
Agricultural Adviser proposed that as part of the War Effort and the 
need for increased agricultural production, irrigation schemes should 
be attached to the hogobana and Bathcen^dams. The proposal was 
accepted in principle and it was resolved that 5'........jo..**.* the
dams and their consequential irrigation schemes shall be completed59• 
The Resident Commissioners then expressed their concern at the 
serious lack of experienced technical officers in their 
administrations and it was resolved that authority be sought from the 
Secretary of State to allow higher salaries to be offered in order to 
attract better qualified officers* It was also noted that funds for 
agricultural work should not be curtailed even during war time*
The proposals and resolutions were forwarded to the Secretary of 
State in London who replied to the High Commissioner as follows:
55 My Lord,
With reference to my predecessor's despatch No. 17 of the 17th 
January, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the detailed 
questions discussed at >our conference with the Resident 
Cominis si oners last October have now been considered in consultation 
with the Colonial Office. The following comments will, I hope be of 
assistance to you.
As regards food production, it is agreed that it would be short­
sighted policy to cut down expenditure on agriculture during war­
time and this would be entirely contrary to the policy adopted in 
Colonial Dependencies. In view of the obvious importance of water 
supplies in the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, it is hoped 
that so far as possible water surveys etc. can be proceeded with 
during the war. The observations on the possibilities of irrigation 
in the Bechuanaland Protectorate have been noted with special 
interest. It is observed that some difficulty has been experienced 
in obtaining qualified technical officers and that it is suggested 
that this is partly due to the fact that the scale of pay in the 
High Co£jaT!ission Territories has not kept pace with the recent 
increase of scales in the Union (of South Africa). This is a point 
■shich you will no doubt be considering. I generally entirely concur 
with the view which you expressed at the meeting that, as a matter
1. The Resident Commissioners from Bechuanaland Protectorate, 
Swaziland and Bosutoland.
2. The Bathoen Dam is situated about 50 miles by road south west 
of Mogobane.
of principle, the European staff should consist of a few better paid 
and better qualified men, the less skilled tasks being undertaken by 
increased native staff.
I have the honour to be,
My Lord,
Your Lordship’s most obedient, humble servant, 
(Signed) C.R. ATTLEE.
HIGH COMMISSIONER 
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
LORD HARLECH, G.G.M.G., 
etc., etc., etc.
On his return from the Resident Commissioners’ Conference, the 
Resident Commissioner issued the following directive to the 
Government Secretary:
1!development Schernes to be undertaken immediately:
The utilization of the Mogobane and Kanye Dams to irrigate land for 
suitable crops. Please write to the Agricultural Adviser and say 
that I should like him to visit us in January to advise about the 
irrigation projects and assist in the preparation of the estimates 
of cost, and ask him to suggest a date. The DPW should meanwhile 
have any necessary maps with contours or levels prepared."
The Agricultural Advisor replied that he would arrive in mid 
January. 1942, and stated,
i;I am also anxious to discuss with His Honour the question of future 
agricultural development, using the term “Agriculture” in its 
broadest sense. The point I wish to get at is what the goal will be
towards which we will work to ensure the greatest measure of
nrosperity which can be attained for the people under the climatic 
conditions which apply to most of the inhabited area of the 
■rotectorace. For a long time past I have expended a great deal of 
thought on the Protectorate and know that it is difficult to find 
a solution to the economic problem which faces us. There is no
doubt that a great deal of work has been accomplished and it seems
to me that the time has arrived when we must consider what we expect 
to achieve finally in the shape of a completely planned 
agricultural economy for the people."
The Agricultural Advisor then suggested either of two systems for 
the irrigation"schemes: the Russian Collective system or individual
tenure ol plots. The Government Secretary commented, “I do not 
think eitner scheme as proposed would suit our condition. I do 
think that we work the lands on a sort of commission basis, i.e.
cultivatcbrs taking a portion of the crop and the rest going to the 
tribal granaries. Citrus orchards might be established by paid 
labour. 15 The Resident Commissioner said he preferred individual 
tenure and recomr .nded ,!the planting of a minimum number of fruit
trees and a proportion of specified crops t50 Plots would have to be
set aside for demonstration and to raise fodder for the school dairy.
At the end of December 1941, a new DC was appointed to Gaborone and 
he was delegated to present preliminary proposals for the irrigation 
scheme to the Bamalete. At a Tribal Kgotla he gave a general 
outline of the proposals and explained that a ”very small ground55 
would be required and that it would be fenced. The following 
extracts are taken from his rough notes made at that meeting:
Gei Will Government take the grain?
DC No
Sekgane Government has made many promises and not carried them
out. We gave land for the Dull Camp being told v/e 'Iwould get lands elsewhere. Where is it? War Lands : 
we were told it was tribal land and now we are told it 
is a War Land. I am afraid Government will take the
lands at Mogobane from us.
Chief Re: Sekgane5s statement. He expressed the views
expressed by the Bamalete the other day. He was
oright. We gave the farm on the distinct understanding 
that we would get a share of the Bangwaketsi Reserve. 
Mackenzie told us clearly that we would get other4land. Clark corroborated. Later Mackenzie said the 
opposite. These things should be recorded in writing.
I personally have no objection to the irrigation scheme 
at Mogobane.
Mokgona Size of land to be irrigated must be defined. „«G.
limits of fence must be defined in presence of Chief?etc 
Raditshatsana I agree with message read out by the Chief. Khale
was taken from us on understanding we would get other 
land. V/e have lost the use of that farm. Pegs have 
been put in recently (by the surveyor at Mogobane),...* 
the work is in hand and yet you come and ask us to 
agree to irrigation.
War Lands were tribal lands set apart for cultivation of crops to 
support the territory5s war effort. Refer Appendix II for details.pKhale Farm was tribal land but given to Administration for setting 
up St. Joseph5s College, a secondary school. The Tribe claims 
that the administration promised to give them additional land for 
loan of Khale.
^Mackenzie was the previous DC.
^Clark was the Resident Commissioner.
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Lesang There was only one fault —  Mackenzie* We don’t know
how to express ourselves#
Chepete i was very glad to hear that water is to be used for
irrigation to help us all. I agree about irrigation...
Kgosibadiba The statement read by the Chief represents our views.
I agree with irrigation as long as cattle have access 
to the water. We want vegetables.
Bo thole Irrigation will be an education to us —  and profitable,
Conclusion Tribe agrees to accept proposal. Must be agreement.
There is no record of any minutes of the Kgotla meeting being 
circulated by the D C.
The Cheif, some of his headman and the D C then visited the Dam to 
allocate the area for the Scheme. It was agreed that it should 
extend as far as a place called Ralemfara. Shortly afterwards the 
Agricultural Advisor arrived in the Territory and, together with the 
Resident Commissioner, the D C and the Chief, visited the dam and 
then discussed the various possibilities for the development of the 
Scheme* Afterwards draft proposals were drawn up by the Department 
ol? Agriculture and sent to the D C who was asked to discuss them 
with the Tribe. The proposals were:
That fOO acres of irrigible land be divided into one acre plots.
2* That irrigation should only take place for 6 months each year, 
viz., from September 1 to March 31.
3o That staple foods only are to be grown: maize, sorghum, beans,
ecc.
4^ That the Certificate of Occupancy will lay down conditions of 
annual rental and crop rotation as directed by the Agricultural 
Department aid that the land is to be cultivated in a proper aid 
husbandlike manner.
; * Plots must be allocated by the Native Administration for 
demonstration and seed purposes.
f. Failuie to learn or use proper methods will involve termination 
of occupaicy.
7. Livestock will be prohibited in the area.
S. Any balaice of land not taken up by individuals will be
cultivated by the Native Administration, expenditure being met 
by revenue accruing to the Native Treasury.
9» All capital works will be done and paid for by the PWD.
10* The Native Administration will be responsible for all costs of
maintenance and for the conduct and administration of the scheme 
under the guidance of the Agriculture Department,,
11. Tribesmen presently cultivating within the scheme area should be 
allocated sufficient irrigated land to ensure they reap each 
year the same amount of grain as they would have reaped from 
their existing land in a good year.
1 2 . It is anticipated that in the first year a large portion of the'
irrigated land will have to be cultivated by the Native Authorit 
as sufficient applications will not be forthcoming*
Since it is unlikely that the Tribe v/ill undertake clearing and 
ploughing, this would have to be done by individual plot holders 
within a specific period, and by labour paid by the Native 
Authority.
It was almost one month later that the D C presented these 
proposals to the Tribe at a Kgctla meeting at Ramotswa with about 
100 people present. The proceedings of the meeting were recorded 
by the D C!s rough notes, extracts of which are given below:
D C :  '’Problems of poor agriculture and men going to the mines
leaving burden on women and children* Therefore, people weak and 
undernourished. 50% of the men between 20 and 40 (years old) were 
rejected from the Pioneer Corps because of poor physique* You have 
copied the white man in the past; his clothes, wagon* education, 
treasury, courts, currency, etc, A wise man follows the success of 
others, therefore, you should follow Irrigation in South Africa.
You will get 10-12 bags per acre of corn off irrigated land. You 
will have more food, better food, be healthier people and be 
wealthy. The men will return from the mines and you will be a 
bigger and united tribe. You should be able to raise enough grain 
for yourselves and all be rich."
1. The African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps was established in 1941 
as part of the drive to raise 14,000 native recruits in the 
High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland* Basutoland and 
Swaziland, to be used for sweat work benind the allied lines*
In order to increase recruitment for the AAPC* the recruitment 
of miners for the South African mines was temporarily suspended. 
The pay was about two shillings per day.
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The Chief then spoke to the Tribe about a recent meeting he had with 
the Resident Commissioner at Mogobane when the Resident Commissioner 
i ndj.cated that more land would be required to be put under 
irrigation. 500 plots of 1 acre each was needed. He said that he 
had told the Resident Commissioner that there were not 500 Bamalete 
to take up the 500 plots but the Resident Commissioner had replied 
that the Native Authority must work the plots not taken up by 
members of the Tribe and went on to say that it was not Government’s 
intention to take more land tut to help the Tribe. The Resident 
Commissioner had said the water must be used for the benefit of all 
and there was sufficient water for irrigation and the watering of 
cattle. The Resident Commissioner had then asked the Chief for his 
views but the Chief replied that he needed time to consult with the 
•Tribe5 which he now was doing.
An analysis of the D C’s record of the meeting reveals that of the 
100 people present only 13 voiced their opinion, the most outspoken 
person being the head of a family having '’half a dozen” lands in 
the proposed irrigation area. He wanted to be assured of 
alternative lands being allocated and asked if these would be 
cleared for him. No firm answer was recorded.
Seven of the speakers expressed concern about the 17 people who had 
lands in the area and whether there was any alternative available 
for them as the reserve was a very small one. One of the speakers 
said he would only give up his land in the irrigation area if the 
tribe agreed to the scheme. The Chief said that if the Tribe 
accepced the scheme they would have to give up their lands and 
could get irrigated plots where one acre would yield more than a 
”big land” which depended on rain.
Five speakers gave support to the scheme though some of them 
qualified their support by mentioning difficulties.
Three speakers were concerned about the payment of rent for the 
P^ots as the tribesmen’s commitment already included Tax, Tribal 
Levy, War Levy, fees for dipping and vaccination, etc.
Two speakers thought there was not enough water for all the 
irrigation and another two suggested that the irrigation scheme 
start in a small way.
Two speakers expressed concern that the original boundary had been 
■extended. The Chief replied that originally the tribe had given 
both siaes of ^he valley to as far as Relemfana but now the 
government decided that it wanted only one side of this valley to be 
irrigated and that the new boundary extended to Ramonogeng.
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Several speakers were against the traditional bush fences as they 
were ”an endless source of trouble” and one person suggested that 
1/- levy be imposed on all Eamalete men to meet the expense of a 
proper fence.
At the end of the discussions the D C asked the tribe for their 
decision. The Tribe agreed to the proposal provided that those who 
lost their lands be given lands elsewhere. They also wanted the 
area to be fenced and they wanted to know what the rent would be. 
The Chief closed the meeting by asking all interested tribesmen who 
wanted plots to give their names to him.
After the meeting the D C prepared a memorandum on the meeting 
which he sent to the Government Secretary and the Chief 
Agricultural Officer. It included the following statement:
”It was evident that a very considerable body of the Tribe 
realises the benefits to be derived from the scheme and even 
in the first year there should be a good many applications 
for plots”.
"Whether the Chief could allot other lands (to those evicted) 
is doubtful, but I do not think this point will give rise to 
any difficulties”.
”........ several speakers went so far as to suggest
a 1/- levy to bring fencing material”,
(The D C failed to transcribe the following points from his rough 
notes into his memorandum:
(i) That the Tribe agreed to the proposal "provided that those
who lose their lands are given their lands elsewhere” as
recommended in his original notes.
(ii) No mention was made of the Tribe®s misgivings and doubts
about giving more land, etc*)
After reading the above memorandum, the Government Secretary 
suggested that a 5/- annual rent per plot shall be sufficient.
The Director of Public Works said it would cost £100 for 4 miles 
of fencing, but one month later he modified this estimate to £320  
due to war costs and therefore recommended a thorn fence.
In March 194?, a "Memorandum on Development Plans in Bechuanaland®1 
v/as circulated. The Memorandum noted that the Dam was completed 
under the pre -war development programme and that once the capital 
costs of bringing the water to the land had been met, the proposed 
irrigation scheme would be self supporting. It also mentioned a 
similar and smaller irrigation scheme was planned for the Bathoen 
dam in Kanye.
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In the same month at a meeting of the European Advisory Council 
the Resident Commissioner estimated that it would take 2 or 3 
years to win the African population over to the new ideas. He 
strongly recommended that only food crops be grown and fodder not 
be considered for several years.
At the end of April 1942, the Government Secretary wrote to the 
South African Department of Agriculture to ask whether they could 
send an expert to make a report on the proposed Mogobane and 
Bathoen Schemes regarding practical and technical details. The 
South African authorities were very short staffed but they managed 
to send their Chief Construction Engineer at the beginning of June. 
Ten days after his arrival, he presented a detailed technical 
report with recommendations, some of which were:
(i) That an experienced man would be required to peg out the
canal system;
(ii) That he strongly recommended against the use of unlined 
channels and furrows (which had been planned by the 
Agricultural Department) as these caused heavy losses 
through seepage, and required heavy maintenance, etc.
(iii) That an experienced man would be required to supervise the 
lining of the canals;
(iv) That there v/as an "unlimited area of good sandy soils" for 
irrigation;
(v) That raising of the dam wall should be considered as the 
catchment area was believed to exceed 35 square miles. He 
recommended that the catchment area be measured accurately 
and if it were 35 sq. miles then it would allow for a very 
considerable area to be under irrigation;
(vi) That it was an outstanding site which should have the best 
use made of it.
As a result of this Report it was agreed that the services of 
suitably experienced personnel be obtained to peg out the channel 
system and to line it with cement.
Meanwhile the Resident Commissioner wrote to the Agricultural 
Advisor stating that he was "uneasy about the high working costs 
of the Bathoen and Mogobane Irrigation Schemes compared with the 
return from them", and asking if he could get "the working costs of 
a similar scheme in the Union (of South Africa) for comparison 
purposes." The Agricultural Advisor made enquiries but replied 
that no satisfactory figures were available.
. 1
At about this time it was decided that it would be unrealistic to 
put 500 acres under irrigation for half the year but rather to put 
a reduced acreage under irrigation for a full year. This decision 
had the general concurrence of all the administrative officials 
concerned, but there was some confusion as to what acreage was 
agreed upon. The Resident Commissioner referred to 230 acres on 
some occasions and 250 on others while the Chief Agricultural 
Officer referred to 300 acres. After several months of confusion 
it was finally agreed that it should be 300 acres.
It was not till the middle of July 1942 that it v/as realised that 
there was no-one in the Agricultural Department who had any 
irrigation experience, and so the High Commissioner was asked if an 
additional Agricultural Officer with suitable experience could be 
recruited. The staff at that time consisted of one Agricultural 
Officer and two Dairy Officers. One month later, the Agriciiltural 
Adviser wrote to the High Commissioner suggesting that some 
Agricultural Demonstrators should go to South Africa for training. 
Neither of these proposals was agreed to and there is no record 
of any reasons being given for this decision.
During September, two engineers arrived to survey the site in 
preparation for drawing up plans for the channels, etc. At the end 
of October the Resident Commissioner asked the D C what progress 
the tribe had made in clearing the lands to be irrigated. ”If no 
start has been made, you are to consult with the Chief and endeavour 
to secure tribal labour to make an immediate start.” The D C 
visited the Chief, who was surprised to hear that the tribal labour 
was expected to do the work of clearing. He had understood that 
individual plot holders would clear the plots as stated by the 
Resident Commissioner in January 1942* The Chief added that it 
would be impossible to supply labour at this time as some men were 
clearing lands for another Government scheme and at any rate the 
ploughing season was starting. The D C advised the Resident 
Commissioner of the Chief’s views and added that it was improbable 
that there would be any irrigation that season.
The Resident Commissioner replied in a memo on the 1 3th cf November,
’’that plot holders whc have elected to hold such plots should begin 
to clear them in readiness for planting of crops. If individual 
plot holders do not clear their plots within a specified period 
and if the tribe do not undertake the clearing and ploughing of 
all land, other means will have to be devised, but it is not 
desired that more money than necessary be spent from tribal funds 
since it simply creates an extra burden for the Native Treasury”. 
Three days later the Resident Commissioner cancelled his directive 
in the above memo and stated that ’'•the work of clearing the land
will be paid for out of a loan to the Native Treasury and will be 
supervised by the Agricultural Department”.
This change of plan was brought about because it was realised that 
the cost of preparing the land might be too much of a strain on the 
Native Treasury, so a decision v/as made to lend £2000 to the Tribe. 
A Loan Agreement was drawn up which stated that the money was to 
be used for clearing and ploughing 500 acres including all furrows, 
ditches, etc., other than the main channel which would be paid for 
and constructed by the PWD. The construction of all ditches, 
furrows, etc., (other than the main channel) would be carried out 
by the Tribe under the supervision of the Agricultural Department. 
Government would reserve the right to purchase any plant and 
equipment for completing the work out of this money, and all such 
plant and equipment would remain the property of the tribe but on 
completion may be sold back to the Government (if they require it) 
thus reducing the loan. No interest would be payable on the loan, 
and repayments would commence at the end of the third year after 
the works had been completed, or sooner if the Tribe so decided.
On the 14th of December 1942, the Loan Agreement was agreed to and 
signed by the Chief after discussion of it at the Kgotla. Four 
months later the Chief received his copy of the Agreement.
The Resident Commissioner proposed that the Chief Agricultural 
Officer (CAO) i:be in chagre of the £2000. but will spend it in 
consiiltation with the DC and the Chief”. However the Government 
Secretary suggested,
-that it would be more suitable for the DC to control payments 
and keep accounts as it is the DC who should watch the interests 
of the Tribe. He is on the spot and can make all payments, etc. 
The CAO has sufficient other financial commitments on his hands.
We should not risk the dissatisfaction of the Tribe afterwards”.
But rhe Resident Commissioner disagreed and directed that the 
arrangements should not be altered as "advantages outweigh 
disadvantages”. This was a decision he v/as to regret in the coming 
months. Subsequently the Chief Agricultural Officer confirmed that 
he would be in charge of the £2000 but added he would use his 
discretion without consulting the others for urgent purchases up 
to £25. He said the Chief agreed to this arrangement. At a late 
stage it was agreed that daily labour would be paid by the DC’s 
Office in Gaborone, on vouchers drawn by the Regional Agricultural 
Officer (RAO) and charged to the Tribal account.
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As bush clearing on the Scheme was not being undertaken by the 
Tribe, the Resident Commissioner arranged for a company of African 
Auxiliary Pioneer Corps (AAPC) to be sent to Mogobane to do the 
clearing. The IX, was instructed by the Resident Commissioner to 
meet the AAPC on their arrival at the dam together with the Chief 
and the AO when decisions would be made concerning the purchase of 
tools and equipment to clear the land. The Chief was a bit upset 
as he had no fore-knowledge of this arrangement but he agreed that 
the AAPC should do the clearing as there were no tribesmen 
available to do the work# The Agricultural Department agreed to 
supply a tractor and plough and other such heavy equipment as might 
be required for ploughing, levelling and cultivation 011 condition 
that repairs, replacements and fuel costs were met by the Tribal 
Adminis tr at ion.
The Chief suggested that any land ready for planting by the end of 
January should be put down to sorghum or maize, and land got ready 
after that date to be prepared for wheat. The chief Agricultural 
Officer reported that the Chief, "desired that the Agricultural 
Department should grow, reap and sell the sorghum or maize crop, 
any profits to go to the Tribal Aministration* He is also 
considering whether or not the initial wheat crop should not be 
similarly dealt with".
At the end of the AAFC's second week at Mogobane the Chief 
Agricultural Officer reported to the Government Secretrry that they 
had cleared approximately 160 acres and estimated that all 300 
acres would be cleared by the end of February. The ploughing and 
levelling of the cleared land was being aone under the direct 
supervision of Wande, the RAD.
The Agricultural Department’s 1942 Annual Report stated that 
"the clearing work*...,.... has been finished and ploughing 
commenced. Jt is proposed to plant 100 acres of wheat in 19 4 3*
The Tribal Administration will cultivate the land on an approved 
rotation of crops under the direction of this Department. The 
Tribe is employing two African Agricultural Demonstrators who will 
also be directed by this Department".
In January 1943 the Resident Commissioner sent a minute to the 
Government Secretary, with copies to the DC and Chief Agricultural 
Officer. He stated that he considered the delay in developing all 
500 acres for the tribesmen to be advantageous.
"As it is unlikely that natives without any previous experience of 
irrigation......... will immediately take up plots * They will
first require to see what the advantages of cultivation by 
irrigation are".
”In order to develop the plot as quiclcly as possible and get a 
return I consider it desirable that during the first year the 
cultivation should be undertaken tribally under the direction of 
the Agricultural Department and that in successive years natives 
should be encouraged to take up plots on their own account.
(The question as to whether one acre is sufficiently big requires 
further investigation. I myself do not consider an acre is 
enough) «».
”The African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps have been able to supply 
labour to clear the land and an area of approximately 200 acres 
has been cleared by them. This represents a considerable saving 
in labour. A further 30 acres will be cleared under the direction 
of the Chief Agricultural Officer”,
”The Chief Agricultural Officer has now submitted plans for the 
planting of crops tribally on these 230 acres, to which I agree 
in principle. It must be remembered, however, that a sum of 
money estimated roughly at £450 will be required to cement 
the furrows during the first year. The Chief Agricultural 
Officer should discuss immediately the new proposals with the 
Chief and District Commissioner and if they are agreed they 
should be submitted to the Agricultural Advisor to the High 
Commissioner for observations.”
This is the first indication that all 300 acres had not been
cleared. The Government Secretary asked the Director of Public
Works to check up on the acreage to establish the true situation.
It was then found that in fact only 125 acres had been cleared.
At the end of January there was a meeting at Mogobane Dam.
CHAPTER 3
INITIAL OPERATIONS
At the end of June 1943, the Agricultural Adviser replied to the 
Resident Commissioner’s memo of the previous month, stating that he 
definitely did not recommend two crops per year for individual 
holders "as it would be very difficult for Africans to succeed, 
let alone European farmers". However he concluded the letter by 
saying that he was most anxious that two summer crops be taken off 
the land in the first season "as this will impress the people, but it 
must only be attempted if we are sure of making a success, otherwise 
we will receive a setback as far as the prestige of the scheme is 
concerned in the eyes of the people".
In the middle of August a meeting was held to discuss policies 
and development plans at the Mogobane and Bathoed' Irrigation Schemes, 
Present were the Resident Commissioner, the Agricultural Advisor, 
the Chief Agricultural Officer, the DC’s of Gaborone and Lobatse, 
Chiefs Ikaneng and Bathoen, and one or two others. The following 
conclusions were reached concerning the Mogobene Irrigation Scheme:
(1 ) Two crops a year should be sown on the land.
(2) To begin with tractors will be used but in time these will be 
replaced by good spans of tribally-owned oxen.
(3) Aims:
(i) to demonstrate the feasibility of growing crops 
under irrigation, and
(ii) to get an adequate financial return from the 
operations.
(4) Fruit trees will be planted later v/hen the scheme is 
established.
(5) A shed and three huts will be erected at the Scheme. The 
huts will be for the Agricultural Officer (AO) who was to be
in charge of the Scheme.
(6 ) A tractor and grader will be purchased and hired to the
Tribe for the clearing and levelling of the area to be
irrigated.
At the end of September the Resident Commissioner sent a memo to 
the Government Secretary, copied to the Chief Agricultural officer 
and Director of Public Works, summing up the work to be done and 
the funds still available in the Tribal Treasury. Inter alia he 
stated that -
"300 acres originally to be cleared, of which
125 acres have been cleared.
175 acres still to be cleared.
^His full title was Agricultural and Livestock Officer as his duties 
covered both spheres of operations.
"Of the £2000 loan to the Bamalete approximately £1200 remains, 
for planting of crops etc., of this £500 is required leaving a 
balance of £700."
"The clearing and levelling will be undertaken by the Public 
Works Department when the tractor and grader arrive, and the 
work charged against the balance of £700. Such charges will as 
far as possible include depreciation costs of the tractor and 
grader."
It was proposed to purchase a tractor to be used on the Mogobane 
and Bathcen schemes and other irrigation projects.
The Director of Public Works replied that he wished to put it on 
record that the PWD could not complete the clearing, levelling and 
preparation for £700. The £2000 loan was for clearing and levelling 
the 300 acres and therefore requested that the £1200 be transferred 
to the PWD as originally agreed to with the Chief Africultural 
Officer. The Resident Commissioner refused the request and advised 
both the Director of Public Works and the Chief Agricultural Officer 
that under no circumstances were the allocations to be overspent 
without his permission. The Director of Public Works agreed to 
keep a careful record of expenses.
The Tribal Aministration agreed to erect the large storage shed and 
three huts for the AO at Mogobane, at a total cost of £200.
Permission had to be sought through the Resident Commissioner to the 
High Commissioner for this expenditure as it had not been in the 
original estimates of the Scheme. This was in September but 
permission to use the funds was not given for two months by which 
time the AO, a Hollander by the name of A.P. Bydendyk, was appointed,
Bydendyk had been working for the PWD on the preparation of the 
land for the Scheme and, as he had some agricultural knowledge and 
the Agricultural Department was short-staffed, it was decided that 
he should also act as the AO while continuing to be in the PWD.
By April of the following year (1944) neither the shed nor the 
huts for Bydendyk had been erected. When the Government Secretary 
wrote to the DC in this regard he replied that there had been certain 
difficulties such as obtaining timber for rafters but "steps have 
been taken to have the building erected as soon as possible". On 
the same day he placed orders for the poles. The huts were finally 
completed in July 1944. Bydendyk had assumed duty at Mogobane in 
November 1943 at which time the Government Secretary advised the 
DC that Bydendyk®s duties included the supervision of clearing, 
levelling and engineering construction and at the same time, under 
the guidance of the Agricultural Department, to supervise 
agricultural operations which would include the instruction of the
Department3s Agricultural Demonstrator, He added that,
"It is considered that it would be adequate for Byndendyk to give 
1 - 2  hours a day to agricultural operations. A second Demonstrator 
may be stationed at Mogobane if necessary."
Meanwhile another difficulty was being experienced in the 
development of the site; the Chief complained that the newly surveyed 
300 acre site extended beyond the agreed upon boundary, and 
investigation revealed that in fact the original boundary did not 
enclose 300 acres as had been estimated, with a result that the 
boundary had been extended further down the valley. The DC was 
delegated to clarify the position with the Chief and get his 
agreement to the new boundary. However, the Chief was very unhappy 
about the situation and raised the following objections: -
(a) Two cultivated lands fell into the new area;
(b) that if the lands were taken over, it would not be possible
to allocate alternative lands in the vicinity; and
(c) that he was worried that those people who were evicted would
raise constant complaints.
In spite of these objections, the DC managed to put sufficient 
pressure on the Chief that he reluctantly agreed to evict the people 
so that the entire 300 acres could be incorporated into the scheme.
In September, 1943 about 65 acres were put under maize and it was 
planned to put another 30 to 50 acres under potatoes and wheat in 
February to April of the following year. By the end of October it 
was found that much of the maize had not come up owing to the 
"rawness of the soil" and 25 acres needed to be re-planted with a 
quick growing variety, and some blank spaces were planted with 
cowpeas. A further 4 acres were planted under cowpeas and 8 under 
potatoes* Eight date palms and a small patch of oziers (for fodder) 
also were established. In late October the Resident Commissioner was 
having second thoughts about the irrigation scheme and wrote to the 
Agricultural Advisor,
'There is one thing, however, about which I am not at all easy in 
mind and that is irrigation, I am not aware v/hat experience you 
personally have had in this form of cultivation but it is quite 
clear that nobody in the Protectorate knows very much about it, and 
as you will not be able to spend very much time with us I feel we 
should obtain all the possible information before we begin".
There were heav: rains in November v/hich resulted in 7 of the 8 acres 
of potatoes being waterlogged and destroyed. A second planting of 
potatoes was made in February 1944 although the RAO admitted that it 
was too late to plant and there would be no crop. A frost in April 
wiped out the entire crop amd caused the Resident Commissioner to
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remark, "When it is known that frost can be expected in April or May 
was it not very unwise to plant potatoes in March?"
At this time the following estimates for the Mogobane scheme for
1944/45 were circulated:
Expenditure
Cost of producing wheat £ 611
Cost of producing maize 302
Cost of producing potatoes 346
Cost of producing cowpeas 64
Two Demonstrators 90
Establishing Fruit Trees 100
£ 1213
Revenue
Wheat £ 900
Maize 338
Potatoes 450
Cowpeas 100
£ 1788
Early in January 1944 the Resident Commissioner advised the DC that, 
"It is proposed to carry out an experiment in * Basin Irrigation5 
just below the present irrigation scheme. The Chief will have to be 
consulted in due course about the use of the land." This scheme was 
to be a pilot scheme to investigate the possibility of controlling 
flash foods for irrigation purposes. The DC managed to persuade the 
Chief to allocate land for this, and as time went by the scheme had 
many critics. After it had been in operation for several years it 
was closed down as it was found to be impractical.
Early in March the Resident Commissioner was informed that the 
Bengwaketse Tribal Treasury had overspent £900 on the Bathoen Dam 
without the necessary authority. On hearing this the Resident 
Commissioner caused quite a flurry amongst the officials concerned, 
including the Chief Agricultural Officer.
A type of irrigation used in the Middle East. Floodwaters are 
trapped in a shallow valley and then the land planted as the waters 
subside.
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Later in the month the Chief Agricultural Officer advised the DC and 
Director of Public Works of the Mogobane expenditure up to 23rd March, 
which was £972„ While drawing up the Statement of Expenditure it was 
noticed that the AQ had ordered certain items without the Chief 
Agricultural Officer3s or DC3s permission and this resulted in the 
following strong reminders from the Chief Agricultural Officer to the 
AO *s at Mogobane and Kanye:
"1 I would inform you that under no condition should expenditure on 
either the Mogobane cr Bathoen Dam irrigation Schemes be under­
taken except in consultation with the respective District 
C ommi s s i oner s.
2. No orders will be placed by the Chief Agricultural Officer 
unless the order, when forwarded by the relative local officer, 
bears the District Commissioner5s counter signature.
3. Officers v/ill be personally surcharged with any expenditure 
v/hich is incurred and does not conform with these instructions.
4. Kindly acknowledge receipt."
When the Director of Public Works studied his copy of the Statement 
of Expenditure at the Mogobane Scheme he noticed that there had been 
considerable over-expenditure by the Chief Agricultural Officer and 
immediately wrote to the Government Secretary through the Financial 
Secretary the following letter:
"I have seen a financial statement by the Chief Africultural 
Officer, dated 23rd March, with regard to expenditure against 
the Bamalete Loan for clearing and preparation of land for 
irrigation at Mogobane.
2. The position disclosed is, briefly, as follows:
Balance available at end of 1942/43 £1,228.15.
Expended during 1944 (up to 23rd
March)... 972.7.11
Outstanding expenditure for
March 1944- 104.19.9 1,077.7-
£ 211,7.
3. "In file 2042 II, page 206, the stun of £500 was allocated to the
Chief Agricultural Officer and £700 to the Public Worics 
Department, out of the then estimated balance of £1,200."
4. ”It seems, therefore, that the Chief Agricultural Officer has
overspent his allocation of £500 by an amount of £5 77.7.8,
(over 100% excess) leaving only £2 1 1 .7*5. instead of £700 for the 
Public Works Department.
5. "The Public Works Department expenditure to date is approximately
£120 and I am reporting the matter as it is obvious that there
will be a heavy excess if further work is undertaken. 51
6. "In view of His Honour’s instructions I am stopping all further
work in connection with clearing. 51
It took another two months for this information to filter 
through to the Government Secretary who immediately asked the Chief 
Agricultural Officer ;,to please submit a detailed statement of 
expenditure incurred by your Department (governing the Mogobane 
Irrigation Scheme) up to 31st March 1944, against the sum allocated 
to you for crops, etc. 55 The Chief Agricultural Officer failed to 
reply, and reminders were sent in May and June.
The Government Secretary asked the DC for his comments on the 
expenditure and asked for details of revenue from the scheme in order 
to assess the true position.
The Resident Commissioner did not find out about the over- 
expenditure till early July (almost 3 months after it was first 
noticed) when he immediately sent the following memo the the 
Government Secretary;
"Am I to understand that in spite of the arrangements come to on 
the instruction I gave tnat £500 should be used for crops, a sum of 
£1128 has been spent instead? This sounds like a repetition of the 
Eanye Irrigation Scheme debacle. Please ask the CAO as well as the 
DC for an explanation. 51
The DC replied with the following memo:
"According to figures furnished by the Chief Agricultural Officer, 
the following is the position
Expenditure 1942/43 £ 692. 6. 4d.
" 1943/44 1128.18. 6d.
23
£ 1821. 4.1 Od.
Amount of Loan 2000. 0. Od.
Balance £ 178.15. 2d.
2* "An amount of £66.8.4. in respect of fertiliser was wrongly
debited to the Mogobane Scheme and when the adjustment has been 
made the balance available will be £245.3.6d. 55
3, "I have not been consulted by the Chief Agricultural Officer
regarding the expenditure on the scheme from the loan of £2000 
and there is nothing on record in my file that either of my 
predecessors were consulted during the period 1st April to 31st
4* iCI have requested the chief Agriculture Officer to furnish the
explanation called for by His Honour, I regret that I am 
■unable to furnish any further information43.
Finally in July the CAO replied to the Government Secretary’s out­
standing queries in a detailed memo showing how the expenditure was 
incurred and then ended by stating:
c* I cannot find any record of any instructions from His Honour that the 
sum of £500 should not be exceeded for crop production. There ^as 
an understending that if money had been required for the grader and 
leveller that some other way of financing expenditure in excess of 
this amount would have to be found. 4
The Resident Commissioner had the Chief Agricultural Officer’s letter 
passed on to him and communicated to the Government Secretary as 
follows:
433* I regard the CAO’s explanation of the over-expenditure as
being quite inadequate and am not satisfied with it. In the 
meeting held in my office on the 12th August, 1943, at which 
various officers, including Mr, Thornton and the CAO, were 
present the question of finance was discussed. Paragraph 7 
contains a record of this discussion. It was suggested in the 
first instance that a tractor and grader should be bought for 
£700 to be provided from the Loan to the Bamalete, After 
further consideration it was decided that these units should 
be bought with Government funds, but that a sum of £700, to be 
paid from the balance of the Loan which amounted to £1,200, 
would be reqiiired for clearing operations. There was 
apparently some misunderstanding between the CAO and the DPW 
on tnis point and I toolc the trouble next month (on 28.9*43) 
to explain the matter still further to the CAO and the DP¥, 
both of whom were furnished with a copy of the notes of both 
meetings. The CAO states that he had no record of the note 
of the latter meeting. It is quite clear from page 204 that 
he received a copy of the note while still in my office. Send 
him another copy, please. I cannot see the slightest excuse 
for any misunderstanding of the arrangement reached, which 
was that £500 would be utilised by the CAO for the final 
preparation of the ground and the planting of crops, and £700 
would be utilised by the DF¥ for the clearing, etc., of the 
rest of the ground.
December, 1943*
4. I called upon both the CAO and the DC for an explanation of the
over-expenditure of the amount allocated for the planting of 
crops. The DC states in paragraph 3 page 255 that he had not 
been consul-''^ d by the CAC regarding expenditure on the scheme, 
and there is nothing on record in his files that either of his 
predecessors were consulted during the period 1st April to 31st 
December, 1943* A copy of this memorandum should be sent to 
the CAO if he had not already had it. If this statement is 
correct, why have the DC and Chief not been consulted and why 
did the DC not insist on consultation? In ease it may be urged 
that it was not known that such consultation should have taken 
place, the CAO?s attention should be called to my minute at 
page 73 and paragraph 3 (b) of his own memorandum on page 8 7. 
While it is clear that the CAO in person cannot always consult 
tht District Commissioner and Chief, there seems to be no 
adequate reason why the Agricultural Officer who is in charge of 
Mogobane should not have done so on his behalf,
5m I desire an early explanation from the CAO of the points raised
above so that I may consider what further steps may be taken in
what would appear to be the deliberate disregard of my 
instructions, 51
The Government Secretary duly wrote to the Chief Agricultural Officer 
as instructed and at the sane time wrote to the DC as follows:
tfI am directed by the Resident Commissioner to enclose for your 
information and necessary action a copy of a note by His Honour 
regarding the over-expenditure on this scheme. You should state 
whether you were consulted by the Agricultural Officer.and, if 
not, why you did not insist on consultation. It is understood 
that an arrangement was reached under which no expenditure in 
excess of £25 would be incurred without the authority of the 
District Commissioner and the Native Administration. Has this 
adhered to, and were you furnished with statements of 
expenditure from time to time? If not, you should say when you 
received the last statement indicating the financial position 
of the money available for the scheme5’.
This enquiry started a flow of acrimonious recriminations 
between the DC and Chief Agricultural Officer. First the DC stated 
that
S!(i) During the period 1st January (19 4 4) to 31st March 
I was not consulted regarding expenditure from the 
loan of £2000.”
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"(ii) As regards the period April to December, 1943, I 
am not in a position to say whether either of my 
predecessors was consulted verbally. There is 
certainly nothing on record in my files to show 
they were consulted."
"(iii) I notice in these statements certain items are 
shown as 5Paid by DC®. These payments were not 
made through this office nor, so far as I can 
ascertain, were the payments actually made by the 
District Commissioners concerned."
The Chief Agricultural Officer was shown the above memo and at the 
same time aslced to reply to the points raised by the Resident 
Commissioner. In his reply to the Government Secretary the Chief 
Agricultural Officer stated that
He had never received any instructions from the 
Resident Commissioner concerning a limit to his 
expenditure on the Scheme;
"Regarding consultation (with the DC)....... I can
express nothing but contempt for the equivocations 
contained (in his memo)". A detailed list of 
present and past DC's was then given;
"I take strong exception to the District 
Commissioner;s statement that he had not been 
consulted regarding expenditure, and can 
only state that if there is nothing on the file 
records at Gaborones regarding such consultations 
it would appear that the matter is one requiring 
more the Government Secretary's attention than 
for comments from me."
The DC received a copy of the above memo and reacted with the 
following memo to the Government Secretary:-
(i) "The chief Agricultural Officer has made a most
offensive statement in.........his memorandum
under reference which I beg to request he be 
instructed to withdraw unreservedly. If he does 
not withdraw the statement I reserve the right 
to express officially my opinion of his conduct 
in this matter.'
(ii) "As regards the question of responsibility for the
over-expenditure on the scheme, I would urge that 
a meeting of the officers concerned be arranged
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
where I have little doubt the whole position would 
be clarified,/'5
(iii) The DC then showed that the CAO’s detailed list of 
consultations® with the present DC were on matters 
totally unconnected with the matter of expenditure.
The Government Secretary replied to the DC that- the disagreement 
with the Chief Agricultural Officer should be dropped as it served 
ano good purpose0♦ He added that the DC evidently ’was not fully 
informed5 with regard to the amount of consultation between his 
office and the Agricultural Department. He accepted the DC’s 
proposal that the DC together with members of the Agricultural 
Department and Treasury staff should go through all the documents 
relating to expenditures to see if any allocation could be adjusted,
A similar letter was sent to the Chief Agricultural Officer. 
Subsequently only a minor adjustment of £29 was made.
The Government Secretary noted that the Chief Agricultural Officer 
"had rather ran away with things*, and he felt as he had felt “in 
the case of the excessive expenditure at Kanye (Bathoen Dam) more 
vigilance on the part of the Dictrict Commissioner might have brought 
the position to notice sooner47.
EARLY POLICY AND ORGANISATION ISSUES
CHAPTER 4
Meanwhile there were a number of developments with regard the 
progress of the Scheme. In April 1944 the DC wrote to the
Government Secretary requesting permission to set up a small
committee appointed by the Chief to deal in consultation with the 
AO with all questions regarding policy and management of affairs at 
Mogobane. Prior to the appointment of the AO the RAO had, in the
main, simply gone ahead on his own, making decisions as to what to
plant and when to plant, with the result that very little interest 
had been shown in the Scheme by the Tribe. The DC reported that at 
a recent Tribal meeting to discuss the estimates, speakers referred 
to the Scheme as a "Government Project".
In a memorandum to the Resident Commissioner, the Government 
Secretary recommended the DC’s proposals, but added, "a committee 
would be useful to discuss details, but policy will have to come 
from your Honour". The Resident Commissioner concurred, A draft 
of the constitution of the Committee was drawn up and presented to 
the Resident commissioner who approved it subject to a few minor 
alte3?ations. The following clauses were included in its 
constitution;
"(i) The name of Committee shall be the Bamalete
Irrigation Scheme’s Management Committee,
(ii) The Committee shall consist of 3 members as
follows:
(a) The DC, or his representative who shall be
chairman;
(b) The AO in charge of the Scheme;
(c) The Chief of the Bamalete or his deputy;
(a) Four members of the Tribe elected in
Kgotla;
(e) The Agricultural Demonstrator who shall be
Secretary.
(iii) Proper minutes shall be kept and copies be
distributed to the Resident Commissioner, the 
CAO, the District Commissioner, the Chief and
the Native (Tribal) Administration.
"(iv) The functions of the Committee are advisory and
for the purpose of submitting recommendations 
to the CAO on matters of policy, management and 
finance."
The increasing lack of interest and suspicion of the Tribe v/as the
1 •cause of much concern to members of the African Advisory Council 
Their Tribal Agricultural Production Committee (of which the Chief 
Agricultural Officer was Chairman) visited the Scheme in April, 1944, 
and put forward the following Report to the African Advisory Council*
MOGOBANE IRRIGATION SCHEME
"The Committee inspected the Mogobane Irrigation Scheme and 
expressed great interest in this -undertaking."
"There was discussion on the Scheme and comments were made on the
apparent lack of interest of the Tribe, its suspicion of the
dispossession cf certain landholders and fears of further 
dispossession if the scheme grows. The Committee also noted that 
no Tribal labour had been employed on the Scheme and that every bit 
of the work had been paid for."
2"THE CHAIRMAN put forward for discussion a suggestion, which was 
contrary to his earlier belief, that in order to allay the 
suspicions of the Tribe and as a partial solution to the Chief’s 
land problem, some people, particularly those dispossessed of their 
lands, be allowed to take up holdings in the Scheme."
"CHIEF TSHEICEDI thought that at present such people would not submit
to being told when to plough and what to sow. He thought that an 
agricultural school to educate the young Barnalete would prove 
useful in this new venture. It was suggested that for efficient 
control the full time services of a competent officer v/ere 
required at the scheme."
CfThe Committee is of the ouinion
THAT, after observing the development at Mogobane it wishes to 
consider further the future of the Scheme and its repercussions 
on the life of the Tribe. The Committee is very disturbed at 
the reaction of the Tribe to this scheme and requests that 
His Honour permit the Committee to consider the problem further'.'
Advisory to the Resident Commissioner. Refer to Appendix 1 
for details.
2The CAO, ex officio.
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I think - I hope, anyhow - that you feel that I am trying to 
work in full co-operation with you, and yet, I often have a 
feeling of frustration because I think I have reached full 
agreement with you over some particular policy, but later there 
is a complete change round on your part. There is a suggestion 
that in matters of this sort the Government is trying to impose 
its will on the people against their wishes. Now, the sooner we 
get rid of that feeling the better. If you do not want water 
you need not have it. If you do want it, I am willing to 
discuss with you the methods of development, but I do ask you 
for frankness. I am trusting you and I want you to trust me.
If you do net agree with the principles of cultivation under 
irrigation, say so. If you do not want any particular form of 
water development - say so. Do not let us prepare an 
application for money for some particular scheme and then turn 
it down. With your local knowledge of the Territory it is 
obvious that you have very strong and possibly sound views, 
and you certainly have a right to express an opinion on any 
measure which is intended for the good of the people. That I 
never object to. What I do object to is to be told one thing 
one time and another thing another time; to feel that there is 
something being held back, that I am not being trusted; to feel 
that the reason which has been given me is probably not the 
real one, Nov/, in regard to irrigation, which I notice the 
Council considers marks an epoch in the history of the 
Territory, I have on several occasions, publicly and privately, 
tried to explain that there may be far-reaching implications 
when this system is introduced. I have pointed out, for example 
that it may alter the habits of the people; a cultivator and 
his family may have to remain near his plot throughout the 
year and not spend some time at the village and some time at the 
lands. I have stressed that cultivation under irrigation is a 
highly expert process. The results can be quite remarkable in 
regard to the amount of produce grown, the times of the year at 
which it is produced and its quality; but, the damage that can 
be done to the land unless the most careful methods are 
employed, can be devastating. Therefore, certain principles 
must be observed if land is to be cultivated under irrigation. 
They must be - you cannot escape this - they must be observed, 
otherwise irrigation should not be touched. There must be a 
proper rotation of crops; there must be suitable manuring; and 
there must be a proper water service. Now understand most 
clearly these conditions cannot be departed from in any scheme 
that the Government sponsors, and, if they are likely to be
departed from, we do not have cultivation under irrigation* If
these conditions are observed your lands can go on indefinitely,
as they have on the banks of the Nile for the last three or 
four thousand years, if not the land will be ruined in a very 
few years.
“Now realise that this means the imposition of certain
regulations. People who take up plots have got to observe an
approved rotation of crops, they have got to fertilise, and 
they have got to obey the advice of the water bailiff under 
expert advice as to the amount of water they put on their 
lands,:t
“The Bathoen Dam is, in my opinion, too small for
individual plots - plots to be held by individuals. The
Mogobane Dam can even now accomodate a number of people, and
the scheme is capable of extension and can in time accomodate
many more. Chief ikaneng and the Bamalete will no doubt
1remember that Mr. Thornton , who has had wide experience m  
irriga ion matters and has been able to draw on the vast 
knowledge of the world, drew up a scheme for settling people 
on the Mogobane Dam. The scheme proposed was in the alternative 
either 3-acre plots or 1 -|-acre plots according to whether a 
summer crop only was to be grown, or a double crop each year. 
That plan is capable of being altered. Plots can be increased 
and various alterations can be made to suit local feeling and 
local conditions. The plan was discussed 011 several occasions, 
but was abandoned for the reasons which I gave at the beginning 
of this talk - because of the ignorance of the people of this 
system of agricultiire and because of a certain amount of 
suspicion. I come back to where I started. It was then agreed 
that this scheme should be run tribally so that the people 
might see how it was done. It would serve as a demonstration 
to them; they might see what was being done, and they might, in 
the course of time, wish to go in for that system of 
agriculture themselves.
“It is in a matter like this that I have the feeling of 
frustration to which I referred. The Government is accused of 
not taking any active steps to interest the people. Is that 
correct? I would ask you to think a little more about that 
statement. If you have any suggestions as to what more the 
Government can do I shall be pleased to hear them. The Chief
The Agricultural Adviser
of the Bangwaketsi is talcing a most active part in the running 
of his scheme and it is certainly the Government9 s wish that the 
Bamalete Native Authority should do the same at Mogobane. If 
they do not do so, Government can scarcely be blamed for it."
"Now, gentlemen, I have talked at some length on the 
subject of water development and on the methods which I feel 
we ought to employ in order to introduce new schemes of 
development into the country. I want you to understand that I 
ask for the frankest and fullest co-operation in the con­
sideration of any measure which we might hope to introduce.
For my part I am j^repared to give you that.1'
Shortly thereafter the newly-formed Bamalete Irrigation Scheme 
Management Committee met under the Chairmanship of the DC.
In the Minutes the following matters were recorded:
1 , The Maize crop was poorly planted as the ground v/as
uneven. Harvesting and thrashing had started and it was 
estimated that 300 bags would be reaped. Difficulties 
were being experienced in marketing as it was yellow 
maize which was not popular food amongst the tribesmen.
In order to counter any adverse reaction of the Tribe, 
the Agricultural Department agreed to purchase all the 
maize. No accurate records of costs had been kept but 
the RAO tabulated estimates which showed that the cost 
of production would just be covered by the sales. The 
Chief expressed his concern as the Tribe required 
profits in order to repay the £2000 loan. The Chairman 
concurred and impressed this fact on the RAO and it was 
stated that "the scheme must be run on economic lines 
and experiments involving expense should be avoided. One 
way in which the Chief and the Tribe would assist in 
running the scheme economically was to see that labour, 
etc., was forthcoming as cheaply as possible." It was 
agreed that v/hite maize would be planted in future.
2. It v/as reported that the first potato crop v/as flooded
by heavy rains and v/as a total failure. Another crop 
was planted in March but had been destroyed by frost.
3o The RAO produced a detailed rotation programme for year-
round production starting in November, 1944 and planned 
to last to August, 1948. Blocks of land would lie fallow 
every tv/o years for a period of nine months.
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4* Experiments were currently underway with the use of
varying quantities of manure and superphosphate.
5. It wa noted that rice was being successfully grown in 
N'gamiland and it v/as agreed that this crop be tried at 
Mogobane.
6. It was proposed that it may be of great benefit if the 
Committee visit the Bathoen Dam and Irrigation Project 
to exchange views and also to invite those in charge 
there to visit Mogobane.
7. The RAO proposed "that as a reward of good service and to 
stimulate interest in the crops now being planted, each 
permanent labourer, eight in number and the two 
Agricultural Demonstrators should be given a bag ofiyellow mealies This was unanimously approved.
In a covering letter circulated with the Minutes the DC 
suggested that a full-time agricultural officer be engaged on 
the Scheme, as Bydendylc "no longer assists and the RAO is too 
busy". Following up the latter comment, the Government 
Secretary, wrote to the DC:
"I am directed by the Resident Commissioner to request you to 
state whether the report is correct that Mr. Bydendyk informed 
you that he refused to carry on the Agricultural work at 
Mogobane? It is alleged that the statement was made in the 
presence of the RAO."
The DC replied in the following memo:
"I do not think that Mr. Bydendyk used the word 'refused'. As 
far as I can recollect he informed me that he was no longer 
supervising the Agricultural work at Mogobane as he did not 
agree with the RAO's ideas as to how agricultural work should 
be performed. 55
The Chief Agricultural Officer was brought into the picture and 
he wrote to the Government Secretary admitting that "it is 
absolutely necessary to appoint a full time officer at 
Mogobane. It v/as not known that Mr. Bydendyk no longer 
assisted in the work at Mogobane and your observations on this 
v/ould be appreciated."
The Assistant Government Secretary visited Mogobane with the 
RAO and then reported to the Government Secretary "that it v/as 
clear that there v/as very little supervision and the work was 
not good."
1 Maize or Corn.
The Resident Commissioner then aslced the Government Secretary 
to find out through the Director of Public Worlcs what the 
problem with Bydendylc was about. He also aslced “how it is 
proposed to marlcet the wheat as I understand that the Kanye 
scheme has experienced some difficulty in this regard. “
Concerning the gift of maize to the Agricultural Demonstrators, 
mentioned in the Scheme's Management Committee Minutes, he 
stated, -The emoluments of officers regularly employed, 
especially on a scale, should not be increased by honoraria 
(free gifts). They are supposed to give of their best without 
inducement. As regards labourers, if it is considered 
expedient, they can be engaged on the understanding that they 
will receive, say, a bag of mielies in addition to their pay 
if they perform good worlc for so many months. But this must be 
taken into account when fixing their rate. ' 5
A few days later in mid-July the RAO wrote to the Chief
Agricultural Officer giving his Report for May which included 
the following comments:
1 • “The Chief circumstance is that during the month of May,
a large part of my time was taken up with wheat planting -
at Mogobane, as Mr. Bydendyk had refused to be of any
assistance.t?
2. “From now onwards constant inspection of wheat at
Mogobane is necessary, to decide whether the wheat is 
growing too fast and has to be harrowed, and when and 
where irrigation is necessary, the last factor being 
of increasing importance as the hot weather approaches. ' 1
3. “The Demonstrator at Mogobane has not the experience
required to decide when to irrigate and to what extent. 
Over irrigation is as harmful as under irrigation.“
4. "I can assure you, Sir, that unless I have suitable
assistance at Mogobane, it v/ill be impossible for me 
to supervise my other work in a satisfactory manner, and 
in any case when the wheat at Mogobane has to be reaped 
I will have to spend a considerable time there. ' 5
5. “The position is most unsatisfactory. Work as one may it
is not possible to exercise any reasonable degree of 
real direction and supervision over so many scattered 
undertakings, and the results from further development 
merely result in overall worse standards of performance'.5
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6. "I must submit, therefore that either some qualified
assistance be provided to help keep going the various 
projects, or alternatively that you will indicate which 
may be curtailed or abandoned."
The Chief Agricultural Officer then wrote to the Government 
Secretary requesting that the RAO's position be put to the 
Resident Commissioner with a view to quick provision of more 
assistance, keeping in mind the "change of direction andicontrol" of the Agricultural Department.
The Chief Agricultural Officer also replied in another memo to 
the outstanding queries with regard to his Department and the 
Mogobane Scheme, Concerning the wheat crop the Chief 
Agricultural Officer admitted that it was difficult to market 
in the territory but there was no difficulty in marketing it 
in South Africa. He added that "as wheat has a high nutritive 
value, it would be policy to teach people to eat it." The 
Chief Agricultural Officer went on to admit that the granting 
of honoraria to the Demonstrators v/as fundamentally wrong but 
justified it because the Demonstrators were now employed by 
the Tribe which gave no cost of living allowance. Concerning 
Bydendyk he had the following to say:
"Revenue from Mogobane would have been considerably 
higher had the season not been so abnormal and had 
reasonable supervision been available. It was not 
possible for Mr. Uande (RAO) to devote a great deal of 
time to Mogobane, and he reports, and from my various 
visits I think there is substance in these reports, 
that Mr. Bydendykfs services have not been satisfactory 
in respect of the Agricultural side of the work. That 
this point would better have been brought to a head at 
an earlier stage is true, but Mr. Uande, under the very 
difficult arrangement existing has endeavoured to 
establish a better relationship with Mr., Bydendyk, 
rather than bring further deterioration into a situation 
which v/as impossible, and with all due respects, I 
submit unworkable, from the start.
"I submit a report from Mr. Uande on the need for 
immediate further technical assistance for Mogobane and 
the failure of the present arrangements whereby Mr. 
Bydendyk is supposed to provide certain assistance."
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The Departments of Agriculture and Veterinary Services were 
about to be amalgamated under one Director*
1
The Resident Commissioner read the CAOtfs memo and commented to 
the Government Secretary on the matter of honoraria:
"Am I to understand that honoraria have already been to 
the Demonstrators? If it was known that the payment of 
honoraria was fundamentally wrong, no action should 
have been taken 011 this matter until approval of the 
principle had been recieved from me.”
Concerning Bydendyk and the application for a qualified officer 
to be stationed at Mogobane, the Resident Commissioner directed 
that:
”Kr. Bydendyk will devote the whole of his time to 
agricultural operations there. He will now be 
entirely under the Chief Agricultural Officer.”
In the meantime the newly formed Bamalete Irrigation Scheme 
Management Committee made a visit to the Bathoen Dam 
Irrigation Scheme in order to study the relatively more 
successful project and to exchange ideas. The DC made the 
following comments in his Report covering the visit:
1. "The great advantage of having the ground properly
prepared for crop production under irrigation i.e. 
subdivisions of the land into beds watered by properly 
constructed lands and furrows. At Mogobane irrigation 
under the present conditions presents many difficultiesP
2. "The proximity of the scheme to the seat of the Native
Authority and the consequent advantages.”
3. “''The great advantage of having a residential Agricultural
Officer in immediate charge of the Scheme. I was very 
impressed with the AOJs keeness and complete grasp of 
all matters connected with the scheme including one of 
the most important, finance.”
A few days later the senior staff members of the Bathoen
Irrigation Scheme paid a reciprocal visit to Mogobane which
the DC also reported on. He wrote,
;5The main impression was that the present temporary scheme was
operating under considerable disadvantages, owing to lack of 
machinery, labour, and above all, preliminary levelling and 
layout of furrows. Ultimately, however the Scheme has great 
promise.
Towards the end of Augiist 1 944 t1 e Chief Agricultural Officer 
sent a memo to the Government Secretary outlining the 
difficulties experienced on the Scheme during the first
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season’s cropping and then put forward proposals on the future 
of the Scheme in the light of this experience. He listed the 
following as the more important adverse factors encountered 
which resu_ced in poor crops,
(a) Flood-water
(b) Soil of poor physical structure
(c) Shale outcrops
(d) Water1ogging
(e) Soil erosion
Flood-water seriously affected some 13 blocks cf irrigation 
land and the cost to control the floods and resulting high 
water table would be prohibitive. A further 9 blocks 
consisted of exposed potclay or were covered with only a few 
inches of topsoil. Crops grown on these blocks give very 
poor yields. An uninterrupted shale ridge extended through 
a substantial area and was practically unproductive while 
patchy outcrops were found elsewhere. The water-logging
existed in the lower lands for one to three weeks after floods
thus making crop production along this margin a "hazardous 
undertaking". The soil erosion was caused by the steel 
gradient of the land above and below the temporary canal.
Storm water from the land above the canal washed considerable 
quantities of sand into the canal, blocking it and causing the 
walls to be breached. Irrigation also caused some soil erosion 
in the steeper areas.
The Chief Agricultural Officer then made a number of proposals 
the most important of which are outlined below:-
1• That the area affected by flooding, erosion and poor
soils (about 70 acres) be put under fodder crops.
2. That the loss of this area to rowcrop production should
be compensated for by extending the area downstream as 
these soils are flatter and of better physical 
structure. 40 acres were already cleared in this area 
and the CAO proposed that these be put under crops as 
soon as possible. Finally he pointed out that the PWD 
engineer had indicated that it would be more economical 
to clear, terrace and cultivate 100 acres on the 
downstream side of the present scheme as the land was 
flatter there.
The Resident Commissioner had a discussion with the PWD Engineer, 
the RAO and the AO concerning the chief Educational Officer’s 
proposals. It was agreed that they be accepted in principle and 
that the Director of Public Works and the RAO work out costs of 
clearing and preparing the rest of the land. Finally the RAO was 
directed to inform the DC and Chief of the decisions taken.
At the end of August 1944 the Resident Commissioner presented a 
Report to the High Commissioner on matters in the Territory, and 
concerning the Bathoen and Magobane Irrigation Schemes he had the 
following to say:
"The Chief (Bathoen) and the tribe have taken a close interest 
in the irrigation scheme at Kanye, and have co-operated 
wholeheartedly in the operations which have been carried out 
under direction of officers of the Agricultural Department. At 
M^gobane* on the other hand, there is still a good deal of
suspicion on the part of the Chief and the Tribe regarding
this new undertaking and this, in the absence of a progressive 
Chief such as Chief Bathoen, will probably take some time to 
dispel. '*
The °ollowing month the Tribal Acricultural Production Committee 
meta Chief Tshekedi took the floor and recalled that at the 
previous meeting it had been recorded that the Committee "was very 
disturbed at the reaction of the Tribe to the Mogobane Irrigation
Scheme and it requested that His Honor permit it to consider the
matter further."
After visiting the Scheme he haa the impression that the Government 
was conducting the Scheme for the people rather than with the 
people. It was conceivable that the Bamalete were suspicious that 
the Scheme was an out and out Government Scheme. He went on to say 
that the Scheme had failed to attract adult Bamalete and therefore 
the youth should be encouraged to participate. He suggested that 
youths between 16 and 20 years of age receive training in 
agriculture and animal husbandry while at the same time providing 
labour for the Scheme. After completion they might take up plots
on their own account and by this example encourage other tribesmen
to take part in The Scheme.
Another member of the Committee, Mr. Ellenbeger, who was once the 
DC in Gaborone, supported the proposal and added that if the 
goodwill of the parents could be gained, they would not put their
children against the Scheme. He said he understood that in the
original memorandum of the Mogobane Scheme there were strict rules
3?
concerning the ownership of plots on the Scheme which "disturbed 
the people greatly". The Chairman (the Chief Agricultural Officer) 
interrupted to say that the proposals originally put forward to the 
Tribe were suggestions only. Ellenbeger continued and suggested 
that someone who knew the Tribe well and had the confidence of the 
Tribe, should spend a whole day talking to them, and he considered 
that this person could then find out what was in the minds of the 
Bamalete with regard to the Scheme.
After seme discussion it was agreed that Chief Tshekedi’s proposals 
appeared to be practical and recommended them for the Resident 
Commissioner? s consideration.
CHAPTER 5 
REORGANIZATION
During the pas^ decade there had been a great deal of suspicion 
and even outright antagonism and bitterness among both the 
tribesmen and the European farmers against the Agricultural 
Department. This was basically caused by unpopular livestock 
regulations and the strong personality clashes between the Chief 
Agricultural Officer and his peers in the Government Service.
The Resident Commissioner recognised the need to place the 
Agricultural and Veterinary Departments under one head but due 
to the strong personality of the Chief Agricultural Officer this 
could not be done unless he were removed from office. For 
reasons best known to himself the Resident Commissioner did not 
take any action till the middle of 1 944 by which time the 
credibility of the Agricultural Department had reached an all- 
time low. The credibility of the Department with the tribes was 
steadily deteriorating and suspicion was increasingly turning 
into unco-operativeness. A Director of Agriculture and Livestock 
Services v/as appointed, with the Heads of Department known as 
Principal Agricultural Officer and Principal Veterinary Officer. 
The contentious Chief Agricultural Officer resigned from 
Government Service.
In November 1944 Mr. Parish v/as appointed to the new post of 
Director of Livestock and Agricultural Services (also known as 
the Director of Agriculture or the DLAS). Before settling into 
his office he went on a tv/o week familiarization tour of the 
whole country accompanied by the Agricultural Advisor to the 
High Commissioner. At Mogobane they met with the DC and the 
Chief when the whole scheme v/as thoroughly discussed. The 
following notes were recorded by the Director of Agriculture.
1 • It v/as agreed that the ultimate object was to divide the 
land at Mogobane into individual plots.
2. To achieve this it was proposed that for a start ten
Bamalete youths of about 18 years or more be enrolled
as learner workers. Each successive year ten or more
would be enrolled depending on training resources.
3. It v/as recorded that the Chief had arranged for four boys
v/ho had just taken Std. VI examinations to be enrolled 
and he undertook to try to find six more, though he v/as 
advised that it v/as not necessary for boys to have 
schooling.
4. The boys would be known as Learner Workers during the 
course of two years*
5. A certificate would be awarded at the end of the course.
6. Pay v/ould be 15/- per month first year and £1 per month 
in second year, plus rations.
7. Training would be done by the Agricultural Department.
8. Graduates would be alloted 3 acres in which to settle.
9. Funds for this expenditure were available in the £2000 
loan.
10. It was not clear v/hat funds were to be utilised to 
install the distributory furrows.
GENERAL
It was emphasised that the success of the whole scheme 
depended almost entirely on the efficiency of the Agriculture 
Department.
The above proposals v/ere later discussed with the Resident 
Commissioner who agreed that they should be a basis of discussion 
with the Tribe. The Resident Commissioner advised that the 
distributing furrows would be paid for out of a Government grant 
of £5000. New estimates to get the Scheme operating were called 
for.
On completion of the tour, the Agricultural Advisor sent the 
following Report to the Government Secretary covering the Bathoen 
and Mogobane Schemes:
nBoth Hr. Parish and I feel that the ICanye irrigation scheme has 
reached a stage in the present management that might be described 
as out of the teething stage; in other words this project bids 
fair to be a great success. At Mogobane the picture is entirely 
different, but the position there was very fully discussed with 
His Honour* and with the changes now made in management it is 
possible that success may attend this venture in future. If 
success is to be achieved constant supervision will be necessary 
and the local officer in charge, fir. Bydendyk, will have to 
improve considerably in his outlook and from the disciplinary 
point of view. As Mr. Parish is fully aware of the position I 
have no doubt that he will see that the Project is carried out 
according to his ideas and not in accordance with the whims and 
fancies of the local resident officer.”
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The Director of Agriculture also sent the Government Secretary a 
report of his tour and in it he discussed the shortage of suitably 
qualified Agricultural Officers. He stated that he has instructed 
Bydendyk that nenceforth he was under the supervision and control 
of the Principal Agricultural Officer. Finally, he proposed a 
two year Learner Workers9 Course for ten young Bamalete on the 
Mogobane Irrigation Scheme. The Government Secretary forwarded 
the above report to the Resident Commissioner with the following 
comments:
“Mr. Parish’s comments regarding responsibility for a poor state 
of affairs are what I have felt for many months. From my ora 
observation an impossible position has been put right.
The two year learner scheme needs much planning. A proper school 
with quarters, staff, stock implements, etc. has got to be 
established and someone has got to pay for it all. It wants a 
good deal more than this done by way of full discussion."
The Resident Commissioner replied with the following comment
"An interesting report which I will discuss with you as the DLAS 
will be too occupied with general administrative problems, policy, 
etc. to give much personal attention to actual execution of 
changes•"
The DC also sent in his report of the meeting at Mogobane between 
the Director of Agriculture, the Chief and himself. The salient 
points of his report included:
1 . "It was agreed that the existing system should continue
for present i.e. land being farmed by Native 
Administration for benefit of the Tribe."
2. "To do this successfully, it is necessary for additional
equipment to be obtained and the following are considered 
the minimum requirements: 20 oxen and trekgear, one
plough and cultivator and a trailer."
3. "Mogobane School to have its plot to be run independently
of the main scheme."
4. "It was not clear what funds were to be utilised to install
the distributory irrigation furrows."
5. "It was emphasised that the success of the scheme relied
almost entirely on the efficiency of the agriculture
supervision."
The above matters later were discussed at a meeting with the 
Resident Commissioner who said that the furrows would be
installed from the Colonial Development Ftind grant of £3000.
The RAO was instructed to go through the Mogobane estimates with 
the Director of Agriculture after they had been revised and to 
submit them to the DC. The meeting was of the opinion that the 
Bamalete Tribe should not be required to pay the first instalment 
of the refund of the £2000 loan until two years after crop 
production had begun. The DC stated that if the refund instalments 
on the loan were suspended for 2 years, the oxen and trek gear, 
plough and cultivator could be purchased from (Tribal) Treasury 
Funds during the next financial year. The Resident Commissioner 
then instructed the DC to prepare and submit the estimates 
accordingly.
At the end of 1944 there was a meeting of the Tribal Agricultural 
Production Committee at which the following Minute was recorded:
r,The Resident Commissioner has expressed the view that in a meeting 
His Honour had with the District Commissioner and the Chief it was 
felt that suspicion was fast disappearing and that the Tribe was 
beginning to take a real interest in what was happening."
The Agricultural Department published the following item in their 
1 944 Annual Report:
"Mogobane: The development of the irrigation scheme at Mogobane
is not complete, but crop production is proceeding under a 
temporary system. Owing to the heavy rains early in the year 
flooding occurred and the potato and bean crops failed on this 
account. The maize crop yielded 309 bags. Sixty-two acres have 
been planted to wheat. The oziers and date palms are growing."
The Report omitted to mention that 257 bags of wheat and 5 bags 
of cowpeas had been harvested. The Resident Commissioner had the 
following comments to add to the above Annual Report which was sent 
to the High Commissioner:
.notable progress has been made in stimulating the interest 
of the Native Authorities and in gaining their co-operation. The
Principal Agricultural Officer,......  should, when adequate staff
is obtained after the war, find the field ripe for development."
'•Expectations of material progress at the Mogobane irrigation scheme 
were disappointed, but owing to the many difficulties encountered, 
not the least of which was shortage of staff, this was not 
surprising. One very satisfactory development can be reported, and 
that is the complete change of heart and outlook of the Bamalete 
towards the Scheme. They are now showing a keen interest in the 
project into which the DC has successfully drawn them."
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CHAPTER 6 
PLANS 9 PROGRESS AND POPLARS
In January, 1945, the Director of Agriculture went on another 
familiarization tour of the country, meeting with each of the tribal 
chiefs, in his memo to the Government Secretary following the tour 
he mentioned that, ”By various chiefs I was counselled to have 
patience and proceed slowly and to make certain that my desires 
or requirements were fully understood before misjudging. Such 
helpful advice was welcomed.” He went on to discuss the Mogobane 
Irrigation Scheme and strongly recommended that the annual estimates 
for the scheme should be drawn up by his Department.
The Government Secretary passed on the memo to the Resident 
Commissioner, adding the comment, '’The DC cannot be excluded from 
control. If any items appear in the Bamalete Tribal Estimates in 
respect of Mogobane it is the DC9 s right to know what is going on.
If the Agricultural Department runs the Scheme independently it is 
nevertheless in his District. Dual control is unsatisfactory in 
many ways Dut that is one of the features of native administration.”
The Resident Commissioner suggested the Director of Agriculture 
familiarise himself with the history of the Mogobane Scheme, and 
added,
"It is essential that the Bamalete should be made to feel that 
they are helping to run the Scheme - that they are, in fact, doing 
so, under the expert guidance of the Director of Agriculture and 
his officers. They prepare their estimates and they must be taught 
to spend their money properly. Similarly, the original loan of 
£2000 was made to the Bamalete Tribe. While the operations to be 
financed by this amount were being carried out the CAO was to 
control the spending of it in consultation with the DC and Chief. 
That consultation was not at all good as subsequent events proved. 
The fact is that the DC and Chief on the one hand and the 
Agricultural Department on the other must work in the closest 
collaboration,, "
The Director of Agriculture accepted the position and agreed that 
his department should participate in the preparation of the 
estimates.
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It v/as found that to clear the balance of 135 acres for irrigation 
mere funds would be required; it v/as also realised that the 
Irrigation Scheme v/as not sufficiently developed to allow the 'Tribe 
to start repayment of the £2000 loan® Therefore the Government 
sent a detailed memo1to the High Commission giving a broad outline 
of the history of the Scheme to date, detailing the difficulties 
and set-backs experienced in turning the Scheme into a viable 
proposition. He then requested that the first repayment of the 
loan by the Tribe be deferred and that a grant be made for the 
completion of the Scheme.
The High Commissioner supported the proposals and forwarded them to 
London for ratification which was duly given v/ith the proviso that 
the balance of the £2000 loan first be utilised in the clearing 
operations. On the 2.st of March, 1945 the High Commissioner5s 
office telegraphed acceptance of the proposals to the Government 
Secretary. However, it was not till two months later that the 
government Secretary realised that the telegram had not been 
answered, neither had the Director of Agriculture, the Director of 
Fublic Works nor the DC been advised of its contents. Telegrams 
were immediately despatched to the people concerned advising them 
cf the grant and that the expenditure was to be under the joint 
control of the Director of Agriculture and the Director of Public 
Works.
At the beginning of March the DC submitted the Revised Estimates' 
for 1944/45 and the Estimates for 1945/46 to the Director of 
Agriculture. In summery they were as follows:
Revised Estimates 1944/45  
Revenue: Crop Production £635
Expenditure: Wages and Production Costs £740
Estimates 1945/46  
Revenue: Crop Production £900
Expenditure: Wages and Production Costs £900
After discussion they were accepted and forwarded to the 
Gcvernrnent Secretary with the following memo by the Director of 
Agri culture:
1 Refer to Appendix 3 for full text of the memo
'’Herewith Revised Estimates of Mogobane Irrigation Scheme submitted 
by the District Commissioner, Gaborones, after discussion here on 
the 26th February with him and the Agricultural Officer concerned#
As will be realised, with the water in the Mogobane dam being 
below the level of the temporary outlet during the past summer for 
an appreciable period just when it was most badly needed, all 
estimates of revenue to date bear no relation to the anticipation#
In the circumstances, in so far as the revenue is concerned, the 
figures possess token value only# The present estimates may also 
be thrown overboard by the unprecedented rains - according to 
reports - last weekend#”
Meanwhile the poplar plantation had been slowly developing since 
its inception in 1940 when 10 acres of marginal land not suitable 
for irrigation next to the Irrigation Scheme had been allocated 
by the Tribe add fenced in# By March 1945 about 6 acres had been 
planted and were growing well, but the Tribe had shown little 
interest in the plantation and there were complaints about the 
Tribe’s lack of co-operation in tending to the weeds, clearing the 
bush, etc. The Forestry Officer brought pressure to bear on the 
Chief in having it weeded and, after some difficulty, succeeded.
At the same time he tried to persuade the Chief to demarcate 
another 50 acres for plantation development as the Tribe v/ould 
earn good revenue from the plantation and also obtain poles for 
hut construction. The Chief agreed in principle but did not want 
to make a final decision until after seeing the proposed boundaries. 
Before the meeting took place the Forestry Officer sent a memorandum 
to the DC justifying the exuansion of the plantation.
Knowing Bydendyk to be strongly against any extension of the 
plantation, the DC sent him a copy of the Forestry Officer’s memo 
and asked for comments. His comments were soon forthcoming 
and openly questioned the basic policy and priorities of the 
proposals. Basically he questioned whether the Tribe, with a 
great land shortage (both grazing and arable), should have 
marginal land developed for forestry rather than for fodder crops. 
The comments were passed on to the Forestry Officer just before 
the planned meeting at Mogobane to demarcate the 50 acre extention.
The meeting took place with the Chief1, the young Chief-Designate 
(Mokgosi), the DC, Forestry Officer, the RAO and Bydendyk being 
present.
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After a long discussion the Acting Chief and Mokgosi came to the 
conclusion that they could not agree to the proposed extension on 
the grounds that the Tribe was already very short of grazing land; 
the Irrigation Scheme had absorbed 300 agres of grazing and arable 
land and it would not be in the interests of the tribe to reduce 
the area available to communal grazing by a further 50 acres for 
the poplar plantation extension*
It v/as pointed out that the land the Forestry Officer had in mind 
was unfit for grazing unless it were cleared, and unsuitable for 
crop production because it was subject to periodical inundation by 
flood water.
The Acting Chief and Molcgosi, however, maintained that the land 
could be cleared and utilised to much better advantage by the 
growing of fodder crops and requested that this matter receive 
the attention of the Agricultural Department.
The DC and Forestry Officer noted the close similarity of the 
arguments expressed by the Acting Chief and Mokgosi to those in 
Bydendyk9s letter. A detailed report was made on the matter to 
the Government Secretary and in due course Bydendyk was carpeted 
for ‘’disloyalty to Government and his Department for suggesting 
to the Native Authority a policy which is in conflict with that 
approved by Government." However, Bydendyk9s influence remained 
and for the next two years the Tribe refused to allow any further 
extension of the poplar plantation,
The 194^/45 rainy season was proving to be a poor one and caused 
some concern. In December there was only enough water to irrigate 
10 acres and by February there v/as no water left for irrigation. 
However, good rains fell shortly thereafter filling the dam and 
fortunately the crops were not seriously affected by the drought.
By October the Director of Public Works reported that the PWD had 
cleared 135 acres of bush at a cost of only £335 from the 
allocation of £1 ,460, leaving a balance of £1 , 1 2 5 which was to be 
used for clearing and levelling under the supervision of Bydendyk. 
Most of the canal system v/as completed and the Director estimated 
that t?large area should be under production this season". The 
Resident Commissioner expressed his appreciation of the speed, 
efficiency and savings affected by the PWD's work at Mogobane.
In the middle of the clearing operation a South African soil 
expert was engaged to make a detailed study of all the soils in 
the irrigable area and to make recommendations concerning their 
use. Several months later he submitted a very detailed technical
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report but it mainly concerned analyses and contained few 
recommendations• He stated that 700 acres were suitable for 
irrigation but both the loam and clayey soils would need to have 
fertilizers added.
It was found that cattle were causing serious damage to the main 
canal's lining and the Director of Public Works suggested that the 
whole area should be fenced, particularly as crops were about to 
be planted. He estimated that the cost v/ould be £450. The 
suggestion was not taken up for several months and when it finally 
was undertaken the Principal Agricultural Officer found himself 
having to erect it as “none of the staff know the correct 
procedure'*.
The Director of Agriculture Annual Report for 1945 stated that 
“For various reasons work on the Mogobane Scheme v/as held up but 
towards the end of 1945 further development work v/as undertaken. 
Forty acres are now developed and planted to maize and a further 
twenty acres are under development. It is hoped to have the whole 
of the second area, i.e. the 160 acres cleared, levelled and 
fully developed by May 1946.“
The Mogobane Irrigation Scheme's financial statement for 1944/45 
was put before the Tribal Agricultural Production Committee, and 
it showed an excess of expenditure over revenue of £431. In 
explanation the Principal Agricultural Officer stated that, “The 
potential of Mogobane's production depends on the arrival of the 
heavy tractor (ordered two years ago).“ After further discussions 
the Committee recorded, “that work on the Irrigation Scheme is 
satisfactory.“
Towards the end of February, 1 946 the DC sent a telegram to the 
Resident Commissioner requesting an urgent meeting v/ith the 
Director of Agriculture, the Principal Agricultural Officer, the 
Chief and himself, “to consider present situation and make plans 
for future development. Imperative meeting takes place earliest 
The Director of Agriculture replied that the Government Officers 
were all very busy and that there v/as “no immediate need for any 
meeting other than to promote the interest of the Tribe, Chief,
etc. etc., in the scheme  it may be that a meeting is
warranted, but until the purpose of the meeting is defined there 
appears no urgent need other than as indicated above.“ During 
the next two years there is no record of any meeting having been 
convened to discuss the future development of the Scheme. All 
business v/as done by correspondence between the Government
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Officers involved. The Tribe was not brought into the discussion 
until decisions had been made at a higher level.
In the middle of February, 1946, Bydendylc found himself in trouble 
again with his senior officers. This time he had gone off for a 
week4s leave (and talcen two days extra). During his absence the 
Dairy Officer in Lobatse, Jack Chase, took over his duties. Chase 
discovered that there were no records of equipment on the site 
and investigations revealed that a certain amount was unaccounted 
for. On his return, Bydendyk was confronted with the matter but 
his replies were -unsatisfactory and he finally was dismissed from 
Government s ervice.
After Bydendyk9s dismissal .....  Titlestad was appointed his
SLiccessor but he could not take up the appointment for three 
months. In the meantime the Principal Agricultural Officer agreed 
to supervise the Scheme in the absence of any AO but he found 
that he had taken on more than he realised as he had to act as 
foreman for the staff, mechanic to repair the machinery and 
fencer to repair demaged fencing and erect new fencing. It would 
seem that he v/as rather daunted by the amount of work involved 
and the lack of skilled and semi-skilled personnel in the 
Department. 1-Ie wrote to the Director of Agriculture suggesting 
that all the projects of the Department ;jbe defined19 and that 
attention be concentrated on these and, in consequence, the 
dropping of other :lsuperflous'*3 projects. There is no record 
of this matter being taken up by the Director of Agriculture.
In September, 1946, the DC circulated the statement of Revenue 
and Expenditure of the Scheme covering the period 1st July 1945 
to 30th June 1946 which is shown below in summary:
Revenue Expenditure
£2 0 2 . 6 . 2  £4 5 4 . 1 9 .1 1
Note 1 . Estimated yield from dry maize crop v/hen threshed
300 bags value £52 5.
2. In addition to the above ordinary expenditure
£3 1 ,1 1 , 1 0  was spent on equipment and £230 on the 
purchase of 20 oxen.
In the memo circulated with the above Revenue and Expenditure 
Account the DC stated, ••Great credit is due to the Principal 
Agricultural Officer and Mr. Chase, Dairy Officer, for the 
present satisfactory state of affairs at Mogobane and I think 
the Bamalete should at last begin to realize the value of the 
Itr i a at i on S ch erne.;:
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CHAPTER 7
THE APPROACH TO VIABILITY
The DC then wrote to the Government Secretary requesting a further 
postponement of repayment of the £2000 loan for an additional 
two years. He showed that from 1944 to 1946 the Tribe had 
subsidised the scheme by £757* "For a small Tribe such as the 
Bamalete this represents a very large outlay and as a result the 
Tribe has been obliged to abandon or postpone other schemes of 
development, with the inevitable further result of increasing 
the Tribes feeling against the scheme. The present position at 
Mogobane shows a vast improvement''.
The Principal Agricultural Officer supported the proposed deferred 
payment of the loan and suggested that the reasonable profit 
expected on the coming season9s harvests should be utilised for 
purchasing much needed equipment to "enable immediate expansion 
to take place at a considerable lower cost of production.... Lack 
cf implements for planting, cultivating and harvesting have been 
(the Department of Agriculture's) chief concern". To which the 
Director of Agriculture added, "Progress in respect of development 
and production has been seriously handicapped by the personnel, 
and it would be unwise and unfair to the tribe concerned if 
charged with additional cost resulting therefrom, i.e. when not 
their fault*"
Before processing the application for deferral of the loan 
repayments (which ultimately was accepted by the Dominion's 
Office, London) the Resident Commissioner visited Mogobane where 
he was disturbed at the very uneven germination and growth of 
the wheat crop. The Director of Agriculture was asked to report 
on the reason for this. The Director visited the Scheme at the 
first opportunity and then replied that the lands were improperly 
prepared and in some high places the rich top soil had been 
removed to fill the hollows. In spite of the poor conditions 
of the wheat he considered it to be satisfactory and, "provided 
growth continue normally, some 400 to 500 bags of wheat should 
be harvested from the 87 acres now under wheat, plus the Basin 
area."
He reported that there were, in addition to the 87 acres under 
wheat, 1 1/3 acres under peas and 17 acres under Basin Irrigation 
Experiment, that an area of 60 acres was in preparation for 
sowing with maize, approximating therefore to 170 acres. This 
constituted practically the whole of the "Second Stage" which had
now been fenced* Beyond clearing no steps had yet been taken in 
respect of the ;;First Stage55 area.
The Director of Agriculture noted that the wages of the workers 
consisted only of cash and no food. One of the workers who had 
been there for 4 years complained that l/9d. per day v/as not 
enough to support himself and his family which included four 
children. The Director of Agriculture recommended to the DC 
that rations consisting of meal and meat to the equivalent of 
3d* per day be given to the labourer. He concluded his Report 
to the Resident Commissioner by saying,
;!I was glad to feel, as a result of my visit, that the Mogobane 
Scheme is now definitely on the up-grade and being conducted 
in a way to command the confidence of the Chief of the Bamalete. 
The credit it is realised is due initially to Mr. Chase having 
been employed there and tackling the work in a vigorous 
businesslike manner, his footsteps being followed by his 
successor, Mr. Titlestad. This officer is methodically minded, 
appreciates the value of records and 'sketches and, it is 
believed, well fitted for the post he occupies'5.
Titlestad was to prove to be a persevering Agricultural Officer 
who remained with the Scheme for the next 12 years.
At about this time (September 1946) considerable concern v/as 
being expressed at the difficulty in obtaining dependable Tribal 
labour for the Scheme. The possibility of employing labourers 
from another tribe was rejected for tribal reasons. An 
alternative suggestion, which received backing from the 
Resident Commissioner, was for prison labour to be employed 
on the farm hut this proposal was turned down by the High 
Commissioner who said,
55It v/ould be inadvisable to establish a Detention Camp at 
Mogobane before v/e are quite sure that members of the Tribe will 
not take up plots. The introduction of prison labour might 
give a wrong impression to the people and thus militate against 
the chances of taking up plots. As it is, it will take four to 
five years to prove the Scheme and to convince the doubting 
Bamalete that they can raise two crops each year.
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See map of site in Appendix 4.
"The District Commissioner at Gaborones should be asked whether 
there appears to be any interest in the Irrigation Scheme apart 
from its usefulness as a Revenue producing project for the 
Native Administration. It is just as well for Government’s 
idea 011 the subject to be conveyed to the Tribe, i.e. that the 
Scheme is for the advancement of production by members of the 
Tribe themselves".
The DC replied that,
"Until the Scheme was properly laid out, little interest was 
shown in it by members of the Tribe. In spite of efforts to 
induce them to interest themselves in it, there was a tendency 
to regard it as a Government project. It was not even regarded 
as a useful revenue producing scheme as for the first two years 
after the Tribe assumed financial responsibility, expenditure 
exceeded revenue."
"Latterly there has been an awakening of interest, and 110 
opportunity is lost of continuing to impress on the Chief and 
Tribe the great possibilities of the Scheme and the advantages 
to be gained from it."
The DC then prepared the revised Estimates for 1946/47 and the 
Estimates for 1947/48 in conjunction with the Tribe and the 
Agricultural Department. These he sent to the Government 
Secretary with a covering memo which read in part,
"The Estimates for 1947/48 show an appreciable increase due to 
the development of the scheme and although Capital Expenditure 
will amount to £950, it is estimated that there will be a 
surplus of revenue o\er expenditure of £300. Whether the 
figure of estimated revenue will be reached will naturally 
depend on the success of the crops and the market prices, and 
it is very necessary to allow a margin to cover unforseen 
contingencies."
REVISED ESTIMATES: REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE1
1946-47
EXPENDITURE
Wages, crop production, repairs,
•.cntingencies £ 1 1 2 5
5 3
1 Refer to Appendix 4 for details of the expenditure
Capital Expenditure: Building and Equipment
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410
£1535
REVENUE
Sale of crops £1230
ESTIMATES: REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
1947-48
EXPENDITURE
Recurrent Expenditure
Capital Expenditure: Buildings and Equipment
£2350
950
£3300
REVENUE
Sale of crops £3600
The Acting Resident Commissioner considered the 1947/48  
Estimates utoo extravagant55 and asked the Director of 
Agriculture for his comments* The Director’s reply is given 
below:
With reference to His Honour’s instructions, it should be 
borne in mind that production under this scheme is only now 
commencing, the experience of most irrigation schemes being 
that a period of some four to five or more years must elapse 
before full production is reached. In this case, as you are 
aware, the attainment of this object was seriously retarded by 
the incompetency of and the wrong advice given by the officer 
in charge at a vulnerable period of development, viz* Mr* P. A. 
Bydendyk. Had the present personnel been in charge from the 
commencement, the scheme would now be in full production.
Reference: Page 481 of your file No. 4 04 1/1 11
2. Concerning the estimates„ it is not considered that they
are excessive; the Scheme is very poorly supplied with
equipment and for optimum production items additional to those 
given in the estimates now being considered will have to be 
provided. During the harvesting just completed the need was 
felt of a wheat harvester, selfbinder or reaper, in descending 
order of value and cost. The area to be planted with wheat
in the future would obviously justify the capital expenditure 
involved in the purchase of this equipment, facilitating the 
harvesting. For this reason the wheat was cut by a mower, 
which must have resulted in appreciable waste.
3. The revenue also is conservative and should be exceeded 
provided the present price remains. It is based, in so far as 
the wheat is conceited, on the return for the current season. 
When the soil is properly ameliorated the yield will be higher 
than the 5 bags per acre obtained this season.
4. With regard to the tractor, unless the assurance can be
given that the Public Worlcs Department tractor v/ill be 
available when desired, the continuance of the present 
arrangement cannot be recommended, i.e. with the area under 
cultivation the Scheme will be justified in having its own 
tractor. At the present time e.g. a tractor is urgently needed 
to prepare the land for planting before the end of the current 
month, but the tractor is not now at Mogobane and cannot be 
obtained, the road to Kanye being considered to be preferent •
5. Concerning the “contingencies £250% this is less than 
10% of the expenditure and, since this is for an agricultural 
project, the allowance cannot be considered to be high. In 
farming it is the unexpected that cannot be provided for that 
happens commonly and for which provision should thus be made.
6. The capital expenditure - also very necessary for any 
permanent production - to provide quarters for the labourers, 
must be available. Experience shov/s that, if success is to be 
attained, any agricultural operations have to be performed when 
the conditions are favourable and cannot be delayed or great 
losses are likely to ensue; hence the labour required for 
Mogobane must be housed at Mogobane, if production is to be at 
the optimum. The necessity for overalls, gum boots, etc. for 
the irrigators needs no comment; the Director of Medical 
Services has unfortunately established that the labourers at 
Mogobane are infested with bilharzia, ■
1 r i i i - i i rEvidently the tractor^was being used by the PWD in the 
construction of the-new road, to Kanve. 1
7. The actual expenditure may prove to be less than the 
estimates while the revenue should, if the conditions are right, 
exceed the estimates,
(signed)
DIRECTOR OF LIVESTOCK & AGR. SERVICES
- 56
- 57 -
CHAPTER 8
THE NEW RESIDENT COMMISSIONER
A new Resident Commissioner look office at this stage (November, 
194-6 ) and when he had studied the relevant documents he 
instructed the Government Secretary to advise the DC that
"the position of this (Bamalete) Treasury seems to His Honour 
a most precarious one. It can be wrecked by failure to produce 
a crop at Mogobane and the proposed expenditure, not only at 
Mogobane, but in other directions, is most alarming. It should 
be borne in mind that a loan of £2000 owing to the Government 
is still outstanding. His Honour considers that unless we go 
carefully, Mogobane will prove too heavy a burden for the 
Banalete.”
In his Annual Report for 1946, the DC stated that, "considerable 
development has taken place. The Scheme now covers a developed 
area of approximately 200 acres as compared with 4-0 acres at 
the beginning of the year. Owing to the acute shortage of food 
in the area, £200 of green maize was sold to the Tribe. 276 bags 
of maize were reaped and sold to the tribesmen.
"During the winter an area of 87i acres was planted under wheat 
and yielded 375 bags. The low yield may be attributed to the 
fact that a large part of this area is on old lands which have 
been ploughed for over 20 years and which in some cases were 
worn out. Severe losses were also caused by birds."
"A considerable amount of investigation still requires to be done 
to improve production on the Scheme but its future appears, 
nevertheless, to be assured. The Chief and members of the tribe 
are no longer opposed to the Scheme, and are taking axi increasing 
interest in it, particularly as it has been the means of helping 
the tribe over a period of severe food shortage. Moreover from 
the economic point of view, there is every prospect that the 
Scheme will not only be self supporting,, but that it will provide 
funds for further agricultural development in the distxict*"
Early in the New Year of 1947 the new Resident Commissioner 
visited the Kanye and Mogobane irrigation schemes and on his 
return he sent the following memo to the Government Secretarys
"I saw and admired the dams at Kanye and Mogobane. They are 
splendid affairs and the schemes which depend on them are run by 
devoted and hard-working men. But it occurred to me when looking 
at them and on having the schemes explained to me, that they are 
evolving in vacuo. As far as I can ascertain, each scheme employs^
a certain number of African labourers and pays dividends to the 
Native Treasury. But, there does not seem to me to be any direct 
or even indirect benefit to the individual native who helped to 
build them. No individual native cultivator irrigates his land 
from them, nor is such a development likely in the near future.
The indirect benefit which I should expect to accrue from a scheme 
of this nature would be that the native on seeing the splendid 
results achieved by the dam ;’n the matter of crops, would 
immediately go home and build a dam himself. But these projects 
are so vast that to expect a native to be inspired by them would 
be like expecting a middle west farmer to improve his housing by 
looking at the Empire State Building! He would simply shrug his 
shoulders and realise that the thing is beyond his capacity.
I should therefore like your comments on how these magnificent 
works could be put to more direct practical use as regards 
instructing the native and bringing him into some irrigation scheme 
himself”•
The last paragraph of the Resident Commissioner’s memo brought 
forward only one practical suggestion, that of having a "Course of 
Instruction on Irrigation” at Mogobane which would be given to 
tribesmen from anywhere in the country. Letters were sent to all 
the DCfs enquiring about the possibility of candidates from their 
areas but the only reply came from one DC who produced two ”most 
unsuitable" candidates.
Both the Director of Agriculture and the Principal Agricultural 
Officer were strongly opposed both to the proposed Course of 
Instruction and to the allocation of plots to individual tribesmen. 
They wrote to the Government Secretary as follows:
*’(1 ) that production farming is a new art in so far as the 
Pechuanaland Protectorate is concerned and much demonstration and 
experience would be necessary before a success could be made of an 
area sav of 3 morgen under irrigation by the African;”
55 (2 ) it is an accepted economic theorem that the surplus 
production or* output of any farming project is greater if 
conducted as one organisation rather than as a number of small 
farms. At the present time the need in this particular Reserve is 
for the increese of food production, particularly in respect of the
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insufficient area available for arable lands (as wel.*. as veld for 
grazing)
"(3) to allocate the area to individual Africans would deprive 
the Tribe of a source of revenue sorely needed at the present 
stage, both for the development of the Reserve and to repay the 
loan necessary for the development of this scheme;9’
”(4 ) only a fraction of the people could be allocated irrigation 
holdings and, as indicated above, for many years to come this could 
not be recommended with any certainty of sufficient knowledge and 
experience to permit of successful crop production under 
irrigation*”
The Director of Agriculture admitted that he had favoured the 
proposal when he first took up his post in 1944 but ’’further 
observations in the Protectorate have justified a reversal of my 
views on this matter,”
The Resident Commissioner did not fully agree with the Director of 
Agriculture and considered that a start in individual 
participation would have to be made sometime. In a memo to the 
Director of Agriculture he asked,
"Are we after production or instruction with these dams? It is 
true that this year the prime desideratum is production but in a 
good year would it not be better to ignore immediate production 
and lay foundations for greater production in the future? Is 
revenue sorely needed just now? and are not the ultimate 
possibilities also to be considered? I agree that for the present 
we should put the scheme on the ice, since we must not interrupt 
any productive efforts, but it must not be shelved permanently as 
suggested,”
The Director of Agriculture replied with the following memos 
111Ref, LA334 
~EP/OGC“
17th Marcn, 1947*
The Government Secretary,
copy to P*A«0o Mahalapye 
Subject; Mogobane Irrigation Scheme
Reference; Page 52 of your file No, 1042/i attached.
As stated the position is that, if production is the primary 
object, irrigation should be conducted on a large scale basis, 
since irrigation is a new art in he Bechuanaland Protectorate and
practically unknown to the African, appreciable time should elapse 
before individual holdings could be recommended.
2. In respect of the revenue-producing aspect two factors are of 
importance
(a) owing to the unfortunate start made due to various causes, 
the capital to be paid off through production is appreciable 
and £2000 had to be loaned to the Bamalete for the purpose .of 
development. The condition of this loan was that it be 
repaid over a period of ten years. It is felt that, until 
repayment of this loan is well on its way, all efforts must 
be directed towards maximum production. Any proposal 
towards settlement would be unfair to the Tribe and, as 
previously indicated, until production possibilities of 
valuable food on a large scale have been demonstrated, 
settlement could not be recommended by the Department;
(b) The acquisition of confidence in the possibilities of 
irrigation is still a primary object in so far as this Scheme 
is concerned. Further, the Scheme has been and still is 
handicapped by an insufficiency of equipment for the 
acquirement of which the necessary capital has hitherto not 
been available. Revenue, therefore, must for some time be 
devoted to the purchase of the necessary equipment to permit 
of the production being as efficient as possible. Futher- 
more, the settlement would add several hundred oxen to the 
animals on the already overgrazed adjoining veld.
3. Replying to the queries seriatim
(a) Until by good farming the capital costs are well on the way 
to liquidation, it is felt that individual farming or 
settlement could not be recommended. As previously indicated 
irrigation farming requires skill and the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate will be unable to rely on the tradition of 
generations of irrigation farming. While Fort Cox in the 
Union teaches irrigation farming, the possession of a Fort 
Cox Diploma could hardly be required of the candidates for 
the Mogobane irrigation holdings when allocated. If these 
prospective holders commence without previous experience 
failure is assured. In the circumstances it is recommended 
that if and when facilities fcr training are to be offered, 
prospective applicants for holdings acquire experience at 
Mogobane for some two years before being allocated areas to 
cultivate.
(b) as indicated above production is necessary both in respect 
of the present emergency food shortages as well as to pay 
off the outstanding amount on this Scheme© The subdivision 
of the Irrigation Scheme into 3 or 4 acre plots might benefit 
seme fifty to sixty individuals at the expense of the Tribe©
A high percentage of failures is anticipated; the Tribe 
would thus derive little benefit from the Scheme after 
having sacrificed over 300 acres of the best grazing in the 
new Reserve;
(c) it is recommended that the view of the District Commissioner 
concerned be obtained© It is felt that, if the Tribe 
realised what the settlement scheme entails from the various 
angles, very strong opposition might be encountered;
(d) the supervision of the activities of plot holders would 
necessitate an increase in staff©
(signed)
DIRECTOR OF LIVESTOCK AND AGRICULTURAL SERVICES
The Government Secretary commented that "the original scheme, which 
was accepted by the Bamalete, provided for 500 x 1 acre plots; a 
few of these were to be demonstration plots and the remainder were 
to be taken up by the people© Today the Bamalete appear to be 
completely out of it©”
he Resident Commissioner then spelt out to the Government 
Secretary what was to be his policy with regard to the Irrigation 
Scheme and other "schemes” in the Protectorate© The text is given 
below:
,;G *S ©
I discussed this matter with Mr. Lawrenson (DC). It appears 
that the Bamalete are, and always have been, suspicious of the 
scheme, thinking that it is a lever for gradual encroachment on 
-cheir land, which is nonsense. Nevertheless I feel that the scheme 
has very little value in the long run unless it inducts the local 
people to better methods of cultivation. As a revenue/food 
producing scheme it is no doubt a very sound proposition, 
especially at the present time when we need all the food we can 
get© But as against the revenue aspect must be set the fact that 
we are paying for and tying down a valuable officer who might be 
employed in spreading the light in a wider sphere.
You are aware that in a country with comparatively 
elementary conditions of life, I am against ’’schemes" that are not 
calculated quickly to improve the general condition of the bulk of
the inhabitants. While I appreciate that all such schemes have a 
certain value9 in that they give us informal;ion9 I feel that 
conditions for the general run of the population are so bad that 
the people are "a no position to use such information0 I should 
prefer that our men, rather than be anchored to a place like 
Mogobane, (essentially a specialist scheme) should be on constant 
tour throughout the country, in close collcboration with, if not 
in subordination to, the District Administration, improving water 
supplies, demonstrating better farming and animal husbandry 
methods to individuals, and so on* Unless therefore the Mogobane 
scheme is calculated to induce the Bamalete in the long run to 
imitate Mr* Titlestad, I am of the view that an officer of his 
abilities would be better employed in a peripatetic, instructional 
role*
Mcgobane is in its infancy and I am prepared to let it run 
for a few years longer* But, as I have minuted elsewhere it is 
unlikely that I shall long permit two officers to run Kanye and 
Mogobane, and if, as I hope, we get a track smoothed down between 
the two places, Mr. Titlestad will ultimately have to be prepared 
to run bothy
A a S. 5/4/47
The Government Secretary circulated the contents of the above memo 
to the Director of Agriculture and the Principal Agricultural 
Officer but there is no record of its having been sent to the DC.
Two months later on instruction from the Resident Commissioner the 
Government Secretary sent the following memo to the Director of 
Agriculture to be used as a basis for proposals and discussions at 
the forthcoming African Advisory Council.
”IRRIGATION AT KANYE AND MOGOBANE
The irrigation scheme at Mogobane and Kanye have been 
running for some years. The following conclusions can now be 
drawn:
The total area under cultivation at Kanye is 52 acres and 
Mogobane 340 acres.
Only one or two acres could be allocated to each farmer; 
and, unless he is a skilled and experienced man in the difficult 
are of irrigation farming, he would be unable to make good use of 
the plot.
Until a number of African farmers acquire the skill - 
which they will do in the years to come — control by Government 
and the Native Administrations is essential.
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At present the Irrigation schemes are run by the 
Agricultural Department. The profits go to the Bangwaketse and 
Bamalete Tribal Treasuries. We are now seeking the best way of 
handing over the running of the irrigation plots to the Bangwaketse 
and Bamalete Tribal Administrations who must assume all expenses.”
The Government Secretary suggested that the Director of Agriculture 
study the original proposals under which the Tribe accepted the 
Scheme. However, the DirectOx' of Agriculture was not prepared to 
go along with the Resident Commissioner’s proposals and replied as 
follows:
ALf>334IIJ‘& LA.335 
ep/ew
The Government Secretary.
Subject; Irrigation; Mogobane & Kanye Schemes
With reference to the request to submit proposals for 
discussion at the forthcoming African. Advisory Council meeting, 
as previously stated, the Department considers it unwise to allot 
separate holdings to Africans on either of those two schemes, 
until much greater knowledge of and familiarity with irrigation 
farming in the Bechuaneland Protectorate has been gained. As 
previously stated, irrigation is a new art in so far as the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate is concerned and the experience the 
world over has fully demonstrated that failure can be expected 
unless knowledge, skill and experience are possessed by the 
indivddual concerned.
2. In Southern Africa in the Union, it has been considered 
necessary, ~ in a country that has been engaged in irrigation for 
over a century, - for the would-be irrigation farmers on 
Government schemes (European) to work as probationers under full 
direction and control in respect of their farming operations before 
they can be alloted plots.
3. In our other neighbour, namely Southern Rhodesia, farm 
training for Africans desiring to take up holdings is being 
provided, and the principle has been adopted that plots will only 
be alienated to Africans who had some farming experience or 
tuition. During the training, the tuition is free, but a charge 
of S3 is made ~:o cover the cost of board and lodgings for the
10 months period of the course on the assumption that the students 
during training would produce the bulk of their own grain 
requirements•
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4# Experience of the Department at both Kanye and Mogobane is
such that it is unable to recommend irrigation by individual 
farmers for some years to come* If some training scheme could be 
adopted in the . er.huanaland Protectorate comparable to that in the 
neighbouring territories, the period would be shortened^
5* In any case# until much more experience of irrigation
farming has been gained in the Protectorate, land in neither of
these two Schemes should be allotted to Africans, but each should 
be worked collectively by the Tribe with paid labour, until the 
operators have gained sufficient knowledge and experience of 
irrigation farming#
6# In respect of the Mogobane Scheme, until the land commanded
by the Dam has all been developed, i*e# levelled, planted under 
crop etc, the services of the Agricultural and Livestock Officer 
in charge could hardly legitimately be diverted elsewhere#
7» When the irrigable land has all been developed an
appreciable percentage, say, fifty per cent or more of the time of 
the Agricultural and Livestock Officer should be available for 
advisory service in the relative Reserve, though smaller and in 
the case of the Kanye Dam, since the area of Mogobane is so much 
larger than the Bathoen Dam scheme#
8. As indicated above the Resident Commissioner9s proposal#«#Q
hardly meets the views of the Department#
9* If the principles enuciated above are approved by you, the
note for presentation to the African Advisory Council could be 
drafted in this Office,
(signed)
DIRECTOR OF LIVESTOCK AND AGRICULTURAL SERVICES
copies to: The Principal Agricultural Officer
The Principal Veterinary Officer 
The Agricultural and Livestock Officer, 
Kanye#
Two weeks later, the Director of Agriculture modified his attitude 
to a certain extent and presented some notes on the Mogobane Scheme 
for discussion at the next African Advisory Council Meeting.
The notes gave details of the crops harvested over the past two 
seasons, and it was noted that only 200 of the 300 acres were 
prepared for irrigation. The memo ended with the following four 
points:
1 # Until the full three hundred acres has been developed in
the so-called "Second Stage Area"# it is considered that the Scheme 
should be continued as at present i#e# for the purpose of enabling 
the Tribe to pay off the loan of seme £2000 incurred in the
establishment of the Scheme0
2. When this area has been developed and more experience of
irrigation farming has been gained by the Bamalete, consideration 
could be given o the Tribe running the Scheme collectively, and 
gradually allotting small areas to be leased to the Tribesmen, 
depending on the conditions, competency, implements, etc, being 
necessary qualifications for eligibility.
3. The equipment at present available at Mogobane is wholly
insufficient for most efficient production.
4* Now that the revenue is exceeding the expenditure annually
by an appreciable amount, the equipment should be brought up to 
the requirement.
(Signed)
DIRECTOR OF LIVESTOCK AND AGRICULTURAL SERVICES
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CHAPTER 9 
TITLESTAD
At this stage a closer look will be taken at Titlestad*s management 
during the 12 years he was the AO in charge of the Scheme*
As mentioned earlier, in May 1946 Titlestad was posted as the AO 
to the Scheme where he was to remain till 1957* He was a Norwegian 
who had spent some years working on a farm in Zululand where he 
became fluent in the language before going to Botswana to join the 
Agricultural Department* He was married and had two children during 
his stay at Mogobane*
When he took up the post at Mogobane he found that the people could 
understand his Zulu with a result that he never learned to speak 
Setswana although he could understand it. The only time he spoke 
English at work was to Moganu, the Agricultural Demonstrator, with 
whom he was to develop a close working relationship, each having 
great respect for the other. The workers gave Titlestad the name 
of "Dingaan”, who was a famous Zulu Chief.
He had a great deal of patience and an easy going manner with the 
farm workers and during the 12 years he was there, there was no 
significant dispute with the workers, nor did he find them to be 
"unreliable” or "lazy” as they were to be referred to by some of 
the subsequent Agricultural Officers stationed at the Scheme.
Titlestad made a point of employing handicapped people on the 
Scheme as they had even less chance of obtaining normal employment 
•*han the rest of the Tribe. Among those he employed several were 
lame* some were T®B. sufferers and one was deaf and demb.
In 1946 Titlestad, using his personal funds, sent a Tribesman to a 
Soutn African agricultural school to study for a diploma with the 
iltimate objective that he become MQganu»s assistant. However, when 
he returned on completion of his course two years later he went to 
work for the Department of Agriculture which had "better prospects.”
He evolved an unusual system of piece work which proved to be both 
very popular and practical. First thing every morning he and 
Moganu would discuss the work for that day and reach an agreement 
on the jobs to be completed that day. Moganu would then allocate 
che work amongst the staff, stating that when so-many plots had 
been irrigated or so much land ploughed the workers on that job 
may stop work for the day. This resulted in the staff working at 
a fast pace to finish the day-s job allocation early so as to allow 
them to attend to personal matters such as tending co their own
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agricultural lands and livestock or going to a traditional beer 
party. There were about 15 staff members in this category.
The other category of workers employed on the Scheme were occasional 
workers hired for specific jobs such as manuring, weeding, 
cultivating and harvesting. They were paid on a piece-work basis, 
e.g. 1/— per worker for each load of manure collected and unloaded, 
or l/ 6  for each plot of wheat harvested. In some cases the 
occasional workers, usually wcmen, brought their children along to 
work with them as a team when harvesting wheat, and in such 
instances a family could earn 15/- or more per day. At times there 
were up to 100 occasional workers employed.
All salaries and wages, with the exception of Titlestad*s salary, 
were fixed and paid by the Tribe. Daily paid male labourers 
received 2/- per day when Titlestad started work at the Scheme and 
over the next 11 years this amount was raised to 3/- per day. Daily 
paid female labourers received only half the above amounts. After 
the first year*s employment, the labourer would receive an increment 
of 3 pence per day. If a worker broke his service he wou2d be re­
employed at the commencing wage rate. No rations were issued and 
quarters were not provided.
After Titlestad had been on the Scheme for some time, it was found 
that a number of labourers were making complaints and false reports 
to the Chief about conditions on the Scheme. This caused 
considerable inconvenience as Titlestad and Maganu often had to 
travel 15 miles to the Chief ac Ramotswa to sort these matters out. 
As a result of this, Maganu with Titlestad*s agreement, formed a 
Workers* Committee to settle disputes and other labour problems that 
cropped up from time to time. Maganu considered it essential that 
if one group had a complaint the other two groups should also be 
Involved in the discussion through the Committee which comprised of 
rhree men besides himself: the handyman, the irrigation foreman
and a labourer. The handyman and irrigation foreman represented 
the men working under them while the labourer represented all the 
other labourers on the Scheme. Maganu made a point of reporting to 
Titlestad the results of the Committee meetings. Serious complaints 
could be passed on to the Chief by the Committee if it was 
considered necessary? The Committee worked very effectively until 
Maganu left the Scheme after which it was discontinued.
One tribenman was trained by Titlestad to service and maintain all 
the farm machinery and, when the tractor arrived, to be the tractor 
driver as well. He was well trained and took his work seriously.
During Titlestad»s period of office at the Scheme there were few 
major breakdowns of machinery and equipment# He would allow no- 
one to touch "his” tractor except Titlestad and Maganu.
Titlestad also trained two foremen, one to be in charge of 
irrigation and the other to be in charge of the women whose main 
duties were seeding and harvesting.
About the time when the first crops were ready for harvesting there 
was a noticable amount of theft of crops and on Maganu's advice
Titlestad hired a number of guards to look after the crops,
especially the green maize and tools which were inclined to 
disappear® The Chief warned that strong measures would be taken 
against those who stole the produce of the Tribe. However, green 
maize was tootempting for the small boys in the village and very 
soon a number were caught and presented to the Tribal Council 
which sentenced them to a thrashing by their parents in public.
A few incidents like this soon cut down the theft of maize.
On another occasion about 50 half naked young men who were under­
going initiation in the nearby hills, swept down on the farm 
causing the women labourers to flee and helped themselves freely 
to the green maize crop. Titlestad arrived on the scene with a 
shotgun which he fired into the air. This caused some to drop 
to the ground in terror while others fled, including one who ran 
15 miles to Ramotswa to report to the Chief that some of the boys
had been killed (he saw them fall to the ground). The Chief
hurried to the Scheme but roared with laughter when he found out 
what had happened. He warned the initiates that they deserved
the fright as they were f,stealing tribal money”.
One morning it was noticed that some freshly harvested shooks 
of wheat had been removed from the fields and the thieves had left 
a trail of wheat stalks all the way to their huts where a number 
of women were found threshing it. The women were surrounded by 
the f a m  labourers and carted off to the Tribal Council which 
sentenced them to a thrashing. One of the women, a relative of the 
Chie", was given a few extra lashes as f,she should have known 
better than to act as she did”. Thereafter the theft of crops 
became negligible.
Titlestad asked the Chief to speak to the people about stealing 
the drinking \ aiier from a tank outside his farmhouse. The 
drinking water was brought all the way from Lobatse as the local 
boreholes had a dangerously high level of fluoride. The Chief 
assembled the local population and said that he had given a gun
- ('8 -
to Titlestad "to shoot anyone who stol.. his water" (the gun really 
was given to shoot birds) and thereafter no more water was stolen. 
Theft of other croods also diminished but on the rare occasions it 
occured it was quickly and effectively dealt with0 sometimes in a 
rather unconventional manner.
Once a number of picks and spades disappeared and, on the advice 
of Maganu, all the workers were told that unless the missing tools 
were returned within 24 hours the local witchdoctor would be 
called in to trace the culprit. The following day the missing 
tools reappeared in the tool shed.
On another occasion Titlestad found that a certain spanner was 
missing and he blamed Maganu for its loss as he was certain that 
Maganu was the last person to have used it© However, Maganu 
emphatically denied having used it and was most upset. The next 
morning Titlestad discovered the spanner in his truck - where he 
suddenly remembered he had left it - but he was too embarrassed 
to admit his mistake to Maganu so he contrived that the spanner 
be "found” in the storeroom. But before the spanner re-appeared 
Maganu approached Titlestad and told him that the previous evening 
he had gone to the local witchdoctor to find out what had happened 
to the spanner. The witchdoctor had thrown the bones and then 
said that someone had the spanner but was afraid to admit it but 
he would return the spanner soon. In due course the spanner 
turned up but Titlestad never had the courage to admit his guilt 
to Maganu.
Chief Mokgosi took a very active interest in agriculture and, with 
the guidance of Titlestad, gradually increased his own agricultura 
operations till he was employing over 200 people to harvest his 
crops. On the advice of Titlestad he purchased a tractor and 
other implements, which the Director of Agriculture was reported 
to be very much against as he considered that tractors were too 
expensive for Batswana farmers to use. Chief Mokgosi subsequently 
became the first Motswana Chief to become a Master Farmer.
During his first few months of working on the Scheme Titlestad 
experienced a number of misunderstandings with the staff with 
regard to their responsibilities, working hours and remuneration 
which caused him to draw up a comprehensive set of Rules and 
Regulations. These were delineated in detail for each category 
of employee and covered all aspects of their work, including 
conditions of employment such as increments, sick leave, special 
leave and protective clothing. Disputes of "complaints against
labourers,f v/ould be heard by a Board consisting of the Officer—in— 
Charge, the Agricultural Demonstrator and a Foreman* The Board 
had the power to dismiss labourers and/or to refer the case to the 
Tribal authorities for further action*
All the staff on the Scheme were called together and given a copy 
of the Rules and Regulations which Mag anu explained in detail till 
they were clearly understood© Thereafter Titlestad experienced 
virtually no further misunde^standings with the staff and very few 
staff were dismissed during his twelve years at the Scheme*
Once there was a bit of difficulty between Titlestad and the Chief* 
Titlestad had employed a tractor driver who happened to be a 
member of the Watchtower sect and therefore refused to pay any 
taxes* The Chief told Titlestad to dismiss the individual which 
he failed to do immediately due to pressure of work in developing 
the agricultural extension service in the District* The Chief 
mistook this for flagrant refusal to obey the order and angry 
words were exchanged in Kgotla though within a short while the 
matter blew over - except for the tractor driver who lost his job 
and was sentenced to corporal punishment in the Chief’s customary 
court. After receiving his punishment his raw and bleeding back 
was treated by Titlestad1s wife.
There were a handful of members of the sect in Mogobane and the DC 
asked Titlestad to remove all Watchtower literature that came in 
the mail (Titlestad acted as unofficial Postmaster for the village) 
but he refused to be involved in such practices,
‘The Watch Lower sect refused to recognise secular government and 
all that it entailed. The Colonial Government of this period 
actively encouraged the Chiefs to deal strongly with members of 
the sect who could be tried in the Chief’s customary court for 
civil disobedience and sentenced to corporal punishment. The 
sect did not flourish*
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CHAPTER 10 
TITLESTAD (CONTDo)
Of all the crop^ grown on the Scheme* only three have been grown 
consistently from the beginnings maize* beans and sorghum* all of 
which are staple foods of the Tribe© Of the three maize proved to 
be the major income earner as irrigated maize can produce green 
maize up to six weeks before the local crops with a result that 
there always was a substantial demand which yielded good profits®
The balance of the maize, usually about 600 bags, was sold locally 
or used to replenish the Tribal grain reserves in times of drought0
It was found that it did not pay to grow sorghum under irrigation 
but, being a tribal staple food, it was considered necessary to 
grow it under dryland conditions, not to replenish the Tribal 
reserves but rather for seed purposes and to be sold to the Tribe®
The largest crop of non-staple food grown on the Scheme was wheat 
which averaged about 400 bags per season but this crop was 
discontinued in the early sixties due to low yields© Up till then 
most of the crop was exported though some Mogobane villagers had 
developed a taste for it by preparing it in the form of a porridgeG
A limited variety of vegetables such as cabbage, tomatoes, pumpkins, 
watermelons and onions were grown for selling in the nearby towns©
Potatoes were a crop which sometimes produced good yields and 
sometimes virtually nothing. The cause of the latter was usually 
frost (planted too late) or waterlogging (ground improperly 
levelled and prepared). It was not to be till 1975 that improved 
seed potato varieties and better prepared land allowed consistently 
successful crops to be harvested.
Onions could be a very favourable crop to grow as there were times 
when the prices became very high indeed, though at times the price 
could drop to below the cost of production. Titlestad grew the 
first crop of onions in 1954, a large variety which produced an 
excellent crop of almost 20 tons. All of the onions were sent to 
the Johannesburg Market but there were no buyers as the onions 
were "too large". Eventually they were sold to some mine compounds 
at a price just above cost. The following year a smaller variety 
was planted on a slightly greater acreage producing about 20 tons 
again. This time the market price was so low that costs again 
were barely covered©
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Linseed was grown very profitably during the mid 50(,s but after 
several changes in Agricultural Officers the crop was discontinued* 
Lucerne was the only fodder crop to be grown successfully* When it 
was first planted, however, 80 acres were sown which proved to be 
a problem to harvest and market as there was not sufficient capital 
to buy a baler.
In 1956 an experimental 10 acre area was planted under cotton and 
the crop proved to be the best quality yet produced in Southern 
Africa* A premium price was paid for it and guarantees were given 
to purchase all cotton produced at a premium price provided the 
quality remained the same.
Cotton then was seen to be the crop which would make big profits 
for the Scheme and plans were made to have a large scale planting in 
the next season. The Tribesmen were encouraged to grow cotton on 
lands around the dam but not on the Scheme itself. They were 
promised good financial rewards.
However tne next cotton harvest was a virtual total failure as there 
was a high infestation of boil worm and other pests. There was not 
sufficient capital to purchase dusting machines. After a lot of 
difficulty, PDT was purchased and had to be applied by dusting it on 
plants from perforated bags, but it was too late and too insufficient 
co save the crop.
The Tribesmen made no further attempts to grow cotton and all the 
cotton crops on the Scheme for the following three years failed due 
to insect, hail and waterlogging. Thereafter, cotton growing was
discontxnuedo
Experimental orchards of date palm and oranges were planted in the 
early 1950’s but they were neglected after Titlestad left and by 
1975 only a few orange trees were left standing. Between the years 
afcer Titlestad left the Scheme in 1957 and when the Botswana 
revelcpment Corporation took over in 1974, very little further 
experimentation is recorded as having been done.
Some two years before Titlestad arrived at the Scheme the Forestry 
Officer persuaded the Chief to allow a poplar plantation to be 
started on about 10 acres but this was not expanded for several 
vears, as Bydendyk, the first Agricultural Officer at the Scheme, 
was implacably .gainst the plantation and persuaded the Chief that 
the plantation would utilise valuable grazing land.
The Tribe began to appreciate the value of the poplar plantation 
after the first thinnings which produced straight poles that were 
ideal for hut building and cost only a couple of shillings each*
The Chief allowed the plantation to be expanded a further 20 acres 
during Ticlestad's period in office*
The Forestry Officer, who was based in ICanye, employed a permanent 
staff of about 5 tribesmen to maintain the poplar plantation* For 
reasons best known to himself he employed several tribesmen who 
had been fired by Titlestad and Maganu for being c‘lazy*' workers 
on the Scheme* Modibedi, who was foreman in charge of the 
plantation, had a hand in the recruitment of these men v/ith a 
result that a certain amount of bad feeling developed between 
Titlestad and Maganu on the one hand and Modibedi on the other*
In 1953 Titlestad received a letter advising him that
responsibility for the plantation had been transferred from the
Forestry Department to the Department of Agriculture* he
immediately called a meeting of all the plantation workers and
dismissed all but Modibedi9 which caused a certain amount of
consternation. Shortly after this Modibedi started acting
strangely and he accused Maganu of witchcraft. He said Maganu
was seen to spit a spell on his (Modibedi*s) house and also
claimed that Maganu arranged for a witchdoctor to send a cobra
into his house to bite him, Unfortunatexy the snake did not attack
1him and escaped, Maganu denied any involvement in witchcraft but 
Modibedi?s mental condition deteriorated until he finally left the 
Scheme,
In a discussion with the case writer Titlestad claimed that from 
1953 to 1957 the plantation was better managed than it had been 
when under supervision of the Forestry Office]?, and it brought in 
a substantial amount of revenue to the Tribe. However, after 
Titlestad’s departure in 1957 the plantation deteriorated through 
neglectP and since1974 when the Scheme was taken over by the 
Botswana Development Corporation, the plantation has been totally 
ignored.
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Both these methods are traditional means of dealing with one’s 
enemies» The spitcing is usually done in the following manner; 
a witchdoctor provides certain herbs which are chewed and then 
spat at the door or in the yard of the person to be bewitched.
A curse usually is uttered at the same time*
The marketing of produce from the Scheme was the responsibility of 
the Agricultural Officer posted at Mogobane# The Tribe set the 
policy for the marketing of produce: firstly as the Scheme was
the Tribe’s, it was to be run for the benefit of the Tribe and it 
was, therefore, decided that Tribesmen may purchase the produce at 
about 20% below regular market price# This policy was adhered to 
till the Scheme became insolvent and was taken over by the Ministry 
of Agriculture in 1969#
On a few occasions non-tribesmen traders purchased quantities of 
produce from the Scheme, usually maize, using a tribesman as a 
"front" but such deals were soon exposed by fellow tribesmen#
The basic method of marketing evolved by Titlestad continued for 
about 20 years but its efficiency was to deteriorate after his 
departure in 1957- in the early years there were very limited 
sales at the Scheme itself, although as time went by more hawkers 
and traders came to the Scheme to purchase their supplies# The 
local villagers bought very little except for green maize# Once 
a week an ox-wagon load of produce was sent to Lobatse and 
Ramotswa and this was increased to twice a week during the green 
maize season* Titlestad made a point of sending two or three 
samples of the first fruits of each crop free of charge to the 
Chief who would then announce to the Tribe that such-and-such a 
crop was available for purchase.
Titlestad delegated the responsibility for the marketing and 
handling of cash to Maganu, uho proved to be most conscientious#
All loads of produce leaving the Scheme had to be checked and, 
in the case of the Scheme’s weekly sales trips, the returned 
goods plus cash reconciled against what had been taken.
The efficiency of Maganu9s tight control became evident when 
Titlestad9s successors assumed much of the responsibility for 
handling the cash, checking the loads of produce and overseeing 
the men guarding the crops in the fields. One Agricultural Officer 
was suspected of improper use of cash while others were somewhat 
lax m  che control of sales and checking the guards at night, with 
a result there was a marked reduction in cash income. In later 
years it was said that on occasions certain prominent tribesmen 
would drive up with their trucks and demand that they be loaded 
with maize (uncounted) saying that they would pay "when it had 
been sc.*.d" *
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The local Indian trader in Mogobane told the case writer that the 
relative lack of control by each successive Agricultural Officer 
after Titlestad®s departure became evident by the amount of cash 
the workers on i_ha Scheme had to spend in his shop* At times they 
had "excessive” amounts of money to spend* mainly on flashy 
clothes. For example, in 1957 the trader purchased over 150 more 
bags of maize from the villagers than he usually did in a good 
season and an inspection of the maize revealed that much of it was 
the hybrid variety which was grown solely on the Scheme»
During Titlestad’s twelve years on the Scheme, he managed to retain 
a good working relationship between the various parties involved 
in or having interests in the Scheme: the Resident Commissioner,
the DC, the Director of Agriculture, the Principal Agricultural 
Officer and the Chief®
Most of the above Administrative Officers considered it necessary 
to be concerned with the development of the Scheme and as each 
officer was transferred to the area, each new one would try to 
influence the work on the Scheme, Some of the people concerned 
had only a rudimentary knowledge of agriculture (e.g. DC’s) or, 
in the case of agriculturalists,no practical knowledge ofirrigation.-. 
Some were inclined to regard the Scheme as an experimental centre 
(e.g. the planting of date palms "because they make a lot of money 
elsewhere in Africa") while others considered that it should be 
an agricultural training centre (several abortive attempts were 
made). Through all this Titlestad managed to steer a path which 
kept the Scheme running profitably, using all the meagre profits 
for badly needed capital improvements.
On a few occasions he clashed with the Principal Agricultural 
Officer with regard to what crops should be planted but on the 
whole he managed to get his way.
The Chief took a close interest in the affairs of the Irrigation 
Scheme and had the greatest respect for Titlestad’s abilitya 
Titlestad on his part kept the Chief informed of progress at the 
Scheme and always corsuited with the Chief before planting.
Invariably the Chief accepted Titlestad’s recommendations, though 
often not without questions or suggestions.
The Agricultural Officer’s responsibilities included a monthly 
report to the Director of Agriculture with copies to the Chief and 
the DC. It also was his responsibility to draw up the Annual 
Estimates in conjunction with the DC which were then verified 
by the Agricultural Department.
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Titlestad ensured that Maganu was lcept fully in the picture with 
regard to decisions reached and forward planning. As time went by 
Maganu took over more and more responsibility for the day—to—day 
running of the Scheme which allowed Titlestad to build up 
agricultural extension service that he had instituted on his own 
initiative in the District* From the early 1950*s Maganu was left 
in charge of the Scheme much of the time. Titlestad would draw up 
the programme for a week or more with Maganu and then leave him to 
it, monitoring it whenever necessary,
A clerk was employed to assume responsibility for maintaining all 
the records of the Scheme, and to do the bookkeeping under the 
supervision of Maganu.
By 1954 Titlestad has sufficient confidence in Maganu to increase 
his outside work by undertaking the supervision of the Experimental 
Station in Lobatse about 25 miles from Mogobane. The Scheme 
continued to run smoothly under this system, and Maganu managed to 
maintain the operation of the Scheme on a profitable basis.
Early in 1956 after the new Resident Commissioner visited the 
Scheme he asked the Government Secretary to write the following 
memorandum to the Divisional Commissioner South, concerning his 
doubts about the Scheme:
SAVINGRAM
FROM: THE GOVERNMENT SECRETARY, MAFEKING
TO: THE DIVISIONAL COMMISSIONER, SOUTH R.P. Fawcus
No. 2042 IV (Date) 7th February, 1956
After a recent visit to Mogobane the Resident Commissioner 
expressed some doubts as to basic conception of the tribal farming 
project.
2. It is understood that in the beginning the aim was to set 
aside an area where food could be grown cheaply for purchase by 
the Bamalete people. Recently, however, the emphasis has changed 
and efforts are now being made to turn it into a profit-making 
concern. Government and the Native Administration are, however, 
subsidising the scheme in a substantial way.
3. At present expenditure and revenue pass through the Tribal 
Treasury accounts and it is understood that the Chief is afraid 
they will lose control if this system is changed. Nevertheless 
it is important if the scheme is to be run as a profit-making 
concern, that proper farm accounts should be kept.
4* The Resident Commissioner would be grateful if you would call 
a meeting of the Director of Agriculture, District Commissioner, 
Gaborone, Treasurer, Auditor and any of the Tribal Authorities who 
you consider should attend to discuss:
(a) The system of accounting at Mogobane, which should if 
possible be re-organized with effect from the 1 st 
April, 1956, and
(b) the future of tne scheme
The Director of Agriculture is asked to arrange for Mr* 
Titlestad to attend also.
5. The possible course appears to be as follows:
(a) to continue with the present policy of running the
farm as profit-making;
(b) to lay down the whole area to matchwood poplars;
(c) to cut the area up into irrigated holdings for
allocation to suitable members of the Tribe who might 
be required to pay rents to the Native Treasury;
(d) to allow the area to revert to the Tribe.
6. Grateful if you will examine the various possibilities and 
submit your proposals cn the future of the scheme*
A copy of the above Memorandum was sent to Titlestad via the 
Director of Agriculture, who asked for his comments. Titlestad 
replied that the Scheme was not being subsidised and to prove his 
point he extracted figuresfrom the schemes financial statements 
over the past 9 years. These revealed that the total expenditure 
had been £22894 cf which £4161 was capital expenditure. The total 
revenue was £23477. Besides building, equipment, fences, etc. 
and about 200 acres developed for irrigation and 50 for dryland 
farming, there was also 14i acres of poplars, some citrus trees 
and 34 trek oxen. Titlestad pointed out that it would be a 
’’•financial loss" to grow poplars under irrigation. He also noted 
that:
1 . To cut the Scheme up into irrigable holdings for
allocation to members of the Tribe, would require more 
supervision (Government?) than is required under the 
present policy. Only a few members would benefit.
This gain is now had by the Tribal members employed 
by the Scheme.
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2* "To hand the area over at present to tribal, planning 
and supervision would result in a failure within a 
few years.
In August 1958, Titlestad’s activities in the District kept him 
from Mogobane for much of the time and the Director of Agriculture 
stipulated that while the Scheme should remain under Titlestad’s 
control, it should be supervised by the Agricultural Officer based 
in Lobatse. In effect this required that the Lobatse Officer 
visited the Scheme about once a week#
A few months later it was decided to transfer Titlestad permanently 
by which time he had been on the Scheme for 12 years. Before 
leaving Titlestad ensured that all the loose ends were tied up and 
on his suggestion the Tribe promoted Moganu to Agricultural 
Advisor chough his duties would remain very much the same as when 
he worked under Titlestad.
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CHAPTER 11 
FROM PROTECTORATE TO INDEPENDENCE
The new Agricm cural Officer was a young Hollander who, it turned 
out, had no irrigation experience. He disliked the job, did not 
enjoy "living in the bush" and could not work with the staff on 
the Scheme. A member of the staff described him as being 
difficult, lazy, office-bound and having little concern about 
security or general efficiency. He gave very little direction to 
Maganu and had little contact with the workers. He could speak no 
Setswana and most evenings and weekends found him in Lobatse 
visiting the Nurses® Home.
After he had been at the Scheme a few months the Principal 
Agricultural Officer instructed him to carry out a fertilizer 
experiment on 12 experimental plots of equal size, having one 
control plot, but the results were dubious as the control plot had 
better yields than the 12 experimental plots. An investigation 
revealed that some of the plots were larger than others.
One year after his posting to the Scheme he was asked to resign 
or be dismissed. The next Agricultural Officer was Coetzee, a 
young Africaans-speaking South African, who also did not have much 
irrigation experience. As there had been some misunderstanding as 
to what Maganu®s responsibilities were, the DC and the senior 
Agricultural Officer, together with Coetzee, drew up "Rules and 
Regulations for Officers concerned with Mogobane Scheme" some of 
which are given below.
AGRICULTURAL LIVESTOCK OFFICER
1• He shall have access to all records and revenue collected
at Mogobane.
2. He shall be entirely responsible for the Tribal Advance
account.
AGRICULTURAL ADVISOR
1. He shall sit with the Agricultural Livestock Officer and
a scheme Foreman as a member of the Board of Appeal available 
to employees on the scheme dissatisfied with dismal
2* He shall, with the District Commissioner and a member of
the Agricultural Department, provide annual estimates for 
submission to the Tribal Finance Committee.
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3 . He shall be responsible for the equipment and sales of
crops but no actual expenditure or sale of crops will be carried
out without the agreement of the Agricultural Livestock Officer, 
Mogobane,
4* He shall be responsible for the collection of revenue and
in this capacity he shall have access to revenue books on the
Scheme and cash collected.
In spite of these Rules and Regulations, Coetzee insisted on 
attending to some of the cash sales, which upset Maganu. Maganu 
found it difficult to balance the cash against vegetables produced; 
moreover he considered Coetzee•s action to be a reflection on his 
capabilities. This caused the relationship between Maganu and 
Coetzee to deteriorate which in turn, communicated itself to the 
workers who were feeling sore that Coetzee had altered the work 
schedule from the daily piecework system to a regular 8 hour day. 
There was a noticeable drop in work output, less attention given 
to repairs and maintenance of machinery, and the incidence of 
theft started to increase.
At the end of 1959 the Director of Public Works reported to the 
Director of Agriculture that the outlet to the Dam outlet was 
damaged through neglect (siphons had to be installed to get the 
water out of the dam into the canal), that the canals were badly 
overgrown, large quantities of silt and stone in the canals, and 
there were many broken canal joints, wires, bridges, etc. He 
noted that cattle were seriously damaging the lining of the canal 
and suggested that fences be erected along both sides of the canal 
to protect it. There is no record of immediate steps being taken 
to rectify the faults listed above.
It was at about this time that Maganu broke his arm when he had a 
bad fall from a trailer. Unfortunately the bones were badly set 
and he never regained full use of his arm. In 1962 the Divisional 
Commissioner South met Maganu at the Scheme, saw his crippled 
arm ana recommended that he claim compensation from the Tribe 
(his employer) as he assured Maganu that the Administration could 
allocate funds to the Tribe to meet this claim. Maganu followed 
his advice and compensation was agreed upon. Before it was paid 
out the new, and somewhat unpopular, DC advised the Chief that 
Maganu could only claim compensation if he were so incapacitated 
that ne could not continue worn, which meant that if he wished to 
claim tne compensation he would have to resign. When this was 
put to Maganu he was upset, l ut on considering his deteriorating
relationship with Coetzee he decided to accept tne compensation 
and resign.
Subsequent to K. .ganu’s departure, the workers found working 
directly under Coetzee to be difficult and their work input 
reportedly showed a marked decrease. They found Coetzee8s (South 
African) attitude to be objectionable and they felt he somehow was 
responsible for Maganu8s departure (they were aware of the 
difficulties between the two men). As far as the case writer has 
been able to ascertain the relationship between the workers and 
the management never recovered the same level of co-operation and 
mutual respect that had been evident during Titlestad8s period of 
office.
During Titlestad8s 12 years at the Scheme he had managed to make 
a very moderate profit in most years and it was estimated that 
"the capital value of the improved 180 acres irrigation plus 43 
acres of dryland and other fixed assets amount to at least £8500 
after repaying the £2000 loan". However in the period immediately 
after Titlestad8s departure, namely, January, 1959, to December 
31, 1 9 6 1, the profitability took a nosedive and by the end of this 
period there was an accumulated loss of R5 338 (£2694) •
Early in 1962 a meeting was held between the Tribe and members of 
the Department of Agriculture to discuss the future of the Scheme. 
It was agreed that the Scheme was severely undercapitalised and 
that funds should be sought to alleviate the situation, though no 
specific proposals were agreed to in this connection. It was also 
agreed that the policy of the Scheme should be to make a profit 
rather rhan to supplement the Tribe8s food supplies, and in order 
to achieve this more attention would have to be given to cash 
crops (e.g. lucerne), a fertilizer programme introduced and the 
labour force would have to be reduced, employing only fit 
labourers.
It was revealed that there were no records available on the cost 
of production and income from each crop, though it was noted that 
Titlestad had kept detailed costings on all the crops produced 
during his 12 years at the Scheme. Some months after he left the 
Scheme a Treasury official removed the records together with the 
other papers. Repeated enquiries by the Agricultural Department 
failed to trace these records. No comparable records had been 
kept by the Agricultural Officers who succeeded Titlestad.
1In 1961 the currency changed from pounds sterling to rand 
£1-0-0 = E2 00
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When the adverse financial situation at Mogobane v/as brought to 
the attention of the Director of Agriculture, he immediately 
ordered an enquiry and requested recommendations to rectify the 
situation,, The Principal Agricultural Officer headed the enquiry 
and prepared the following report:
THE DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE 30th May, 1962
AN ENQUIRY INTO THE OPERATION OF THE 
MOGOBANE IRRIGATION SCHEME
1 • General
In accordance with your instructions I visited Mogobane 
on the 10th and 11th April to carry out an enquiry into the 
operation of the Irrigation Scheme, and to try and discover v/hy 
the scheme was not showing more profit and in some years even 
making a loss.
In this connection the most important point to bear in 
mind is that from the time that the scheme was started, until very 
recently, it was not intended that it should do more than pay its 
way. The objects of the scheme were stated to be to safeguard the 
Bamalete Tribe from famine in bad seasons, and provide employment 
for members of the tribe, particularly those who were unable to 
obtain other employment.
As a result of this policy there has been an emphasis on 
the production of food crops, notably maize in summer and wheat in 
winter, without regaid to their profitability under irrigation, 
and it has been necessary to employ a large labour force, because 
many were unable to perform a full day’s work.
Another factor which has caused to reduce the profits of 
the scheme has been that, in times of shortage, produce has been 
sold to members of the tribe at subsidised prices.
With the scheme being expected to pay for its own 
development and being run regardless of profit it has in the past 
been very definitely under capitalised and has not been running 
at full efficiency. An example of this has been that, with only 
1 tractor, it has often not been possible to take advantage of the 
right condition for carrying out cultural operations, and there 
have been delays in, for example, planting or weeding. This has 
resulted in reduced yields and also caused to reduce the profits.
The same has also applied to the use of fertilizers and 
insecticidal sprays, which for the purpose of keeping costs as low 
as possible have not been applied* This again has resulted in 
reduced yields and profits*
There is no doubt that the scheme has achieved its original 
purpose, but it has placed a burden on the Tribe Treasury* As a 
result the policy has now been changed, and it has been agreed 
that in future it should supply the tribe with revenue rather than 
supplement food supplies.
In line with this policy the labour force has been reduced*, 
and only fully effective labourers employed, more emphasis placed 
on cash crops and a fertilizer programme introduced* It is likely 
that this change in policy will result in increased annual 
expenditure and probably initially in increased capital expenditure.- 
However once the scheme is running at full efficiency this 
increased expenditure will be more than fully covered by the 
greatly increased revenue.
Cost of Production
It has not been possible from the records available to 
arrive at the costs of production of the individual crops. This 
is unfortunate for it would be highly desirable to be able to 
discover which crops were being produced at a profit and which at 
a loss.
I was informed that books giving this information were at 
one time kept, but that they had been removed. I recommend that 
these books be returned and that in future accurate costs for each 
crop be kept. This should be quite possible with a full time 
clerk attached to the scheme.
The estimates for 1962 give a figure of R6,800 as the 
expected expenditure, not including special expenditure, and this 
makes the overall production cost per acre R30, over the 228 acres 
under crops.
Although this figure gives as to the return that should be 
expected from a crop it is not entirely satisfactory* during the 
year, in some cases only one, and there are also perennial crops, 
(sic) and the figure of R25 is used for annual crops this should 
be a fair guide to profitability.
3 • Crops A a Summer Crops
(i) i^aiz6» This crop has en and still is the major summer 
crop grown. Very poor results have been obtained with average 
yields at only 7 bags per acre and therefore cash returns at only
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R211per acre. The fact that the scheme has in the past relied to 
a great extent on maize to bring in revenue has largely been 
responsible for the low cash returns that have been obtained. The 
main trouble has been of poor germination and the resulting poor 
stands, for the plants that are present grow well and carry good 
cobs. This poor germination is particularly noticeable in years 
when there is insufficient rain to enable pre—planting cultivations 
to be carried out or to germinate the seed. Under these 
conditions, two irrigations have to be carried out for ploughing 
and to germinate the seed and, as much of the soil at Mogobane 
caps very badly after irrigation, the shoot is 'unable to break 
through the surface.
This tendency to cap is less marked on the loam and sandy 
loam soils, of which there are said to be some 40 acres. It is 
therefore recommended that in the future maize production be 
confined to these soils, and that different cultivation methods, 
such as ridging, be tried to see if they result in better 
germination.
It is essential that maize yields be improved considerably 
if the crop is to continue to be grown. If they cannot be, then 
serious consideration should be given to cutting out maize 
production altogether.
(ii) Cotton. Because of the trouble experienced from insect 
pests the policy has been to grow the crop for 3 years and then 
leave a gap of 4 years before growing it again. In these days 
when sprays or dusts for dealing with all cotton pests are 
readily available and reasonably cheap, such a system of cropping 
is quite unnecessary. This is particularly the case, as the 
worst pest is said to be American boll worm, which can be 
completely controlled by DDT, one of the cheapest insecticides.
All other pests can be controlled with Sevin, the price of which 
has recently been considerably reduced.
If the crop is fertilized according to its requirements 
and sprayed regularly it should be possible to produce 2,000 lbs. 
of seed cotton per acre. At an estimated price of 5 cents per 
lbs. this would give a cash return of R100, a very much greater 
return than it would ever be possible to obtain with maize.
1I;: was subsequently noted that this figure did not include the 
sale ot green maize whicn can double the cash return provided 
that little theft takes place.
It is therefore recommended that at least 20 acres of cotton be 
grown on the scheme every year, and that a regular programme of 
spraying and fertilizing be adopted«
(iv) Beans0 This crop is used mainly as a green manure* In 
view of the fact that following this practice means that some of 
the land on the scheme is non productive every summer, its value 
is questionable. There is no evidence either way to show that 
green manuring is or is not necessary, and if it were possible to 
do so it would be preferable to maintain fertility with kraal 
manure. If however it is considered desirable to continue green 
manuring then it is recommended that a crop such as hemp, which 
provides a large bulk of green material for ploughing in, be 
used instead of beans.
B. Winter Crops
(i) Wheat. This has been the major winter crop and, as with 
maize, disappointing results have been obtained from it. Yields 
have been in the region of only 5 bags to the acre, which at a 
price of R5 per bag, gives a cash return of only R25 per acre.
It is difficult to say why results from wheat have been so 
disappointing, but it is possibly because the crop has received 
only very small dressings of fertilizer. These dressings have 
been increased for the present crop and it will be interesting 
to see what results are obtained.
However, if wheat is to be grown it is essential that better 
yields be obtained, and every effort should therefore be made to 
try and discover the reasons why such poor results have been 
achieved so far, and to put this right.
(i:L) Linseed. This promises to be one of the most lucrative 
winter crops, and it fetches R1 8 per bag and yields 3 bags per 
acre. Only 7 acres of linseed have been sown in the present 
season as compared with 120 acres of wheat, but I did not 
discover the reason for this. Should there be no insuperable 
difficulties in doing so, it is recojiimended that the acreage under 
linseed be increased at the expense of that under wheat*
C. Permanent Crops
(i) Lucerne. Once established this crop gives 6 cuts per year*, 
each yielding approximately 1 ton of hay. This hay is sold for 
R17 per ton for the best qual p.7 for the poorer quality,
with tlie aveo. age being about R 14. Lucerne therefore gives a 
gross annual return of R84.
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Using the figure of R30, as being the cost of production, gives 
an annual profit from the crop of R54, hut as lucerne requires 
much less labour for its production, than the other crops grown 
on the scheme, it is much cheaper to produce, and the annual 
profit from it is estimated to be in the region of R70 per acre.
The policy is to expand the amount of land under this crop up to 
a maximum of about 70 acres, but difficulty is being experienced 
in achieving this expansion, because seed has been almost 
impossible to obtain. Every effort should be made to overcome 
this difficulty, by tapping every possible source of supply, 
because lucerne can and should be the main revenue earner for 
the scheme.
(ii) Poplars. Approximately 30 acres of poplar trees have 
been planted on land that is not used for irrigation, because it 
is subject to seasonal flooding, and these provide a very useful 
supplementary income for the tribe from land that could not be 
used for any other purpose.
The trees are felled after 15 years and sold to match factories 
in South Africa and Rhodesia. A yield of approximately 100 tons 
per acre is obtained which realises R680. As all the establishment 
and maintenance costs are covered from the sale of thinnings, for 
hut poles or for wood wool, this figure represents pure profit.
I believe that all land suitable for poplars, within the 
boundaries of the scheme, has now been planted up, but there is 
land outside the scheme which is said to be suitable,
It is therefore recommended that the Tribal Authorities be 
persuaded to allow poplars to be planted on this land. Planting 
should be carried out in such a manner so that 1 block would be 
felled every year, and provide an annual income.
D. Dryland Crops
(i) There are some 48 acres of land on the scheme,
which cannot be irrigated, and the main crop grown on this land 
is sorghum. Although the revenue from it is small, if this land 
is to be used at all, sorghum is the crop most suited to the 
conditions. Care should be taken, however, to ensure that 
dryland production does not conflict with the production of 
irrigated crops, which should receive the first priority.
Beans. This crop is used as a rotation crop with
sorghum and generally ploughed in.
(iii) Sunflowersa This crop has not been grown on dryland 
at Mogobane, but it is recommended that it. be tried particularly 
as it is doubtful i£ there is any justification for growing the 
crop under irrigation®
4• Crop Rotation and Maintenance of Fertility*
There appears to have been no laid down cropping programme at 
Mogobane and crop rotation has been on a purely ad hoc basis.
Land has been winter fallowed when it has not been possible to 
plant a winter crop, and there has been r.o regular sequence of 
green manuring. In addition manure application has depended on 
supplies being available in sufficient quantities, but this is 
understandable because manure is not produced on the scheme and 
has to be bought.
It is therefore, recommended that a regular crop rotation be 
introduced.
5. Cattle.
As mentioned earlier all the manure required for the Mogobane 
Irrigation Scheme has to be bought from outside, and it is 
therefore suggested that consideration be given to introducing 
cattle, which could supply this manure.
No attempt should be made to breed at Mogobane, but young store 
cattle should be bought in and fattened, using the crop residues, 
which at present go to waste, and also the lower quality lucerne 
hay. Under this system these cattle will not only provide the 
manure essential to the scheme, but will also bring in extra 
revenue.
Accounts
I must admit to be rather mystified by the method of accounting 
for the scheme, because the estimates and the profit and loss 
account seem to bear little relation to one another. I would 
prefer to see the latter set out more in the manner as the 
former, with actual expenditure, on the various items, being 
listed and balanced against actual income from the sale of crops. 
This however is because the profit and loss account does not 
convey much to me, and I appreciate that no alternative method 
may be acceptable.
The estimates as they s^ .and, however, do not present a correct 
picture of the profitability of the scheme. For instance the 
estimates for 1962 show half the cost of a tractor, and the
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whole cost of a lucerne shed charged against one year, whereas 
all that should be charged is depreciation*
From examination of recent records I have not been able to 
discover what the figure for accumulated deficit, shown in the 
estimatesr represents for it is not shown as a liability in the 
statement of affairs* I am assuming therefore that it is 
included in the Bamalete Ioannas this appears to vary from year 
to year, and if this is the case then it is more than fully 
covered by assets and does not represent a loss.
As stated I found the accounts very confusing and therefore 
recommend that someone competent be detailed to look into both 
the method of accounting and method of estimating and try and 
produce something more easily understandable.
I also recommend that the accounts for the Mogobane Irrigation 
Scheme be kept separate from the Tribal accounts, so that when 
the scheme makes a profit this can be put into a reserve fund, 
so that losses can be covered when these occur. I notice at 
present that when losses are made these are carried forward to 
the following year, but any profits that are made are not. Once 
the reserve fund had built up sufficiently repayments of the loan 
would be made.
Conclusions
I estimate that once the scheme is running at full capacity, and 
provided that no natural hazards such as the drying out of the 
dam occur, it should be possible to produce a revenue of at 
least R12,000 per year from the sale of crops and livestock.
Wien poplars are felled and sold this revenue will be considered 
greater.
The annual recurrent expenditure to produce this revenue would 
not be greater than R1 0,000 and would more likely to be in the 
region of R8,000, so the profit would be from R2,000 to R4,000.
I therefore recommend that the Tribe should continue to finance 
the scheme for having borne the losses they should be given the 
opportunity of reaping the gains.
B.L. BATWELL
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1The subsidy provided by the Tribal Administration to cover 
each year’s deficits. It was not a loan.
The above Report was circulated amongst various Administration 
Officers but not to the Tribe, and the only evident practical 
development that came of it was that the accounting system was 
more streamlined.
Meanwhile attempts were made by Coetzee to obtain a lucerne 
baler in order to develop this cash crop to its fullest 
potential* As there was ro capital available he managed to 
negotiate a deal with a trader in Lobatse in which the Scheme 
agreed to purchase a R1200 baler from him and would pay with an 
agreed amount of lucerne bales* After several months of 
delivering lucerne to the trader it transpired that neither the 
Scheme nor the trader had kept any tally of the bales supplied* 
It took some time to sort this matter out to everyone’s 
satisfaction.
For some years the Department of Agriculture had not distributed 
any Annual Reports but in 1963 the new Director of Agriculture 
reinstituted the practice. Concerning the Scheme, in his 1962/ 
63 Report he stated that,
MIn the year under review a small loss was made mainly due to 
breakdowns of old-wcrn-out machinery which there are not funds 
to replace* The Tribe unfortunately cannot be persuaded that 
if they put more capital into the scheme it will be a real 
money-making concern, and are reluctant to do so when they see 
losses continuing. A contributory factor to the losses however 
is that produce is sold to members of the Barnalete Tribe at 
beljw value•••.••"
The Annual Report for the following year was virtually the same. 
In spite of the 1963/64 rains being poor and the dam not filling 
till the end of the year, the Scheme managed to make a small 
profit in the financial year ending December, 1964. This 
encouraged the tribe to have more confidence in Coetzee and he 
managed to get the tribe to agree to put the Scheme on a 
busiresslike footing for which a plan was drawn up for an 
estimated total expenditure of R18,000 and revenue of R30,000 
per year6 Loans would have to be raised but he persuaded the 
Tribe that with such fat profits the Tribe could repay them" 
within two years.
The Tribe faxled to raise any loans through the Administration 
as it was considered that the proposals were unrealistic. The 
Tribe felt let down at the turn of events.
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In 1964* a young English Agricultural Officer, Tony Challis 
replaced Coetzee at Mogobane© Challis found the Scheme to be 
very run down as the upkeep of the canals, furrowsv sj.lt trays, 
fences, etc©, had been almost totally neglected® Much of the 
machinery was in a bad state of repair and a considerable amount 
of money would be required to get the Scheme on the right footing® 
All his pleas to the Tribe fell on deaf ears as the 
Administration,s credibility with the Tribe had reached an all- 
time low® The Tribe was not prepared "to throw good money after 
the bad"®
In 1965 a young Afrikaans-speaking South African Jerry Snyman, 
replaced Challis. He was a hard worker and during the next 
four years made every effort to make the Scheme profitable with 
the limited means at his disposal® He involved himself in the 
community, learned to speak Setswana and was always ready to 
offer a helping hand for those in need® Within a year he was 
held in high regard by the people of Mogobane, and he retained 
that regard during the four years of his posting at the Scheme.
Shortly after Snyman moved to Mogobane a meeting was covened in 
the Bamalete Tribal office to discuss the future of the scheme 
as the state of affairs at the Scheme was causing grave concern. 
Below is a copy of the Minutes of the Meeting, held on 30 August, 
1965. The meeting was chaired by Mr. Taylor, the Agricultural 
Officer® Both Challis and Snyman were present® Present were 
members of the Agricultural Department, the Chief and leading 
members of the Tribe, including Maganu.
It was agreed that the scheme at present, is unsatisfactory 
in that it is not functioning efficiently and is not economically 
viable.
The Chairman put it to the meeting that there are four 
alternatives.
(a) to continue as at present, suffering losses, with 
eventual disintergration inevitable.
(b) to cut losses and close the scheme now.
(c) to raise money to repair structures, level fields, 
construct drains, and purchase equipment and to run 
it as a business concern with the object of making 
a profit for the tribe0
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(d) to raise money as in (c) but to put it into 4-2 to 5
acre tenancies starting with 8 tenants on 37 acres as 
a pilot scheme.
11 It was pointed out that it would probably be easier to raise 
the necessary funds under scheme (d) than under scheme (c) and that 
under scheme (d) there would be a known income from water rates 
whilst under scheme (d) the income would vary with crop yields and 
markets from year to year.”
"The meeting was quite clear that alternatives (a) and (b) 
were not desirable and that money should be raised and the scheme 
made viable. Scheme (d) was considered but it was felt that the 
success of the Scheme should be assured before tenants are 
installed, particularly with regard to water availability."
"It was agreed that, as a first step, scheme (c) should be 
instigated and to do it the Chairman with Messrs Challis and Snyman 
would draw up detailed estimates to cover the years to the full 
repayment of any loan, which estimates would be passed to the 
Bamalete Tribal Authority for consideration. Thereafter 
application for finance should be made to Oxfam and if not forth­
coming to the National Development Bank then, the scheme should be 
run as a successful commercial venture and to do so a "beJ ow the 
line” form of accounting be introduced."
The case writer could find no trace of the estimates under Scheme
(c) ever being prepared or sent to funding agencies. Snyman 
started the new accounting system in December 1966, and thereafter 
presented detailed monthly accounts to the Chief, Council, DC and 
Department of Agriculture.
The Department of Agriculture’s 1965/66 Annual Report stated that:
3rOver the last two years attempts have been made to put rhe 
Scheme on a proper economic and managerial footing but the future 
of the Scheme is still in doubt."
"In 1965/66 the dam filled in the season. Farming operations 
howeverf were hampered by the lack of proper equipment, the late 
rains which caused waterlogging and the lack of people to work on 
the Scheme. Much of the work normally done by machine had to be 
done by hand or, as in the case of manuring, neglected. The poplar 
trees yielded well and about 80 tons of logs were sent to 
Jonannesburg to be made into matches. Lucerne is one of the more
dependable crops but it was dogged by breakdowns and expensive 
repairs to machinery and in the end did not make a profito The 
sorghum grew we1 1 but had to be thrashed by hand and made a loss 
of R300 on 24 acres. Vegetables were a paying proposition despite 
transport and marketing difficulties, a good variety of vegetables 
were planted and a worthwhile profit made. Maize was the really 
money spinner, 49 acres were planted at a cost of R330 - high 
because of watchmen to stop pilfering - and produced a revenue of 
R962 from the green cobs0 The cotton suffered from drowning in 
the heavy February rains and was not really a success due to lack 
of fertiliser - bad relations with the supplier due to unpaid bill 
- 20 acres finally survived and produced 29 bales of first grade 
cotton. Pests were a difficulty as the February rains made 
spraying a physical impossibility and a great deal of crop was 
lost to American Bollworms."
By the end of 1965, the Scheme's accounts reflected a small profit 
mainly due to income derived from the sale of poplar logs.
In September 1966, Bechuanaland Protectorate gained its 
independence and became the Republic of Botswana. There were a 
number of major changes in Administration: a Central Government
was set up with Local Government infrastructure in what had been 
each Tribal Reserve. The Local Government Administration in the 
Bamalete Reserve became known as the South East District Council 
with elected Councillors, who took effective control of all 
matters which had been handled by the Tribal office, which 
included the Mogobane Irrigation Scheme.
The transfer of the Irrigation Scheme from the Tribe to the 
Council was discussed at a special Kgotla meeting at Romotswa. A 
number of speakers expressed their fear that this was a ruse for 
Government to expropriate the Scheme from them. Others were not 
happy about tribesmen from other tribes who were living in the 
newly drawn District boundary "having a share"in the Scheme.
After some discussion the people were persuaded to accept that 
the District Council would be responsible for the Scheme.
Strictly speaking the Mogobane Irrigation Scheme now was the 
responsibility of the District Council. However, the strong 
Tribal attachment to the Scheme meant that any major decisions 
regarding the scheme and iii.L orma L ion regarding its development 
always was put to the Kgotla as well as to the Council.
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Snyman found it very difficult to find anyone to give much thought 
to the problems of the Scheme as most people who were members of 
the Scheme Committee (which hardly ever met anyway) were deeply 
involved in the changeover from Tribal Administration to Local 
Government Administration. In April, 1966 he had written to the 
Tribal Treasurer (later to be the Council Treasurer) requesting 
that an urgent meeting be called to discuss the present situation 
of the Scheme and to draw up the next season’s programme.
In August he wrote again explaining that the new season had already 
started and no meeting had been called. He stated that there was 
no fertilizer, no mower or baler for the lucerne, only one tractor 
was working and the trailer was beyond repair which meant that no 
produce or manure could be transported.
The Treasurer was also experiencing problems as he did not have 
the funds to continue supporting the Scheme, nor could he meet 
current financial obligations with the result that he was under 
pressure from a number of creditors who were threatening court 
action. Somehow he managed to stall for time and paid them off 
over an extended period.
About this time the Ipelegeng Programme - "Food for work” - v/as 
started throughout the country to combat prevailing drought 
conditions. People were put to work on the Mogobane Scheme which 
saved the Council a certain amount of money but not sufficient to 
significantly relieve the situation.
The Scheme operated at a net loss of almost R2,000 for the year 
ending December 31, 1966, a rather difficult year as mentioned in 
the Ministry of Agriculture’s Annual Report;
Mogobane Irrigation Scheme 1966/67
"This v/as a disastrous year for the scheme, with 35 inches 
of rain and little drainage, cultivation v/as at times impossible; 
the crops suffered from wet feet and many of them yellowed and 
died. Weeds became a major problem, and there was very little 
that could be done about it.”
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CHAPTER 12
TRANSFER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
There continued to be considerable concern about the future of the 
Scheme among both the Council and the Ministry of Agriculture©
A few meetings were held but they produced little of consequence 
as everyone realised that without capital the Scheme could not 
continue to operate, that it was under capitalized and that the 
management (supplied by Government in the form of the Agricultural 
Officer) was not very efficient. The Tribe relied heavily on 
Government to make a success of the Scheme and knew of no way 
around the problem of liquidity© The Ministry of Agriculture made 
initial enquiries about raising a loan or grant to obtain the 
necessary capital to put the Scheme on a sound footing but initial 
results were not very promising.
The Ministry was reluctant to see the Scheme close down especially 
as everyone agreed that it had a very substantial production 
potential and could be a centre for agricultural training. The 
idea of taking the Scheme over from the Tribe was discussed within 
the Ministry and it soon was generally agreed that this would be 
the best way of operating the Scheme. A proposal was made that a 
soft loan be raised from Cxfam which had shown interest when 
tentatively approached on the subject.
It was realised that as it was a Tribe Scheme it was essential that 
the Tribe continue to derive some benefits from it and these 
benefits would have to be worked out. The suggestion was 
tentatively discussed with the Chief whose reaction was somewhat 
dubious. He reluctantly agreed that it might be the only answer 
but added that the Tribe would have to make the decision.
Finally in January, 1967, Coetzee was instructed to write to the 
Chief and District Council that the Ministry would like to 
officially take over the Mogobane Irrigation Scheme as from April 1 s 
1967, and to kindly ask the Chief and Councillors to agree to this 
proposal•
In March a Kgotla meeting was called to discuss the matter.
The Ministry of Agriculture offered to lake over the Irrigation 
Scheme for 5 years and run it as a private company with Council 
holding two of the five shares issued. It was further proposed 
that at the end of 5 years the Council would receive the Scheme 
back as a profitably run operation including all improvements.
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Among the tribesmen there was a fear of "expropriation” by 
Government and there was much discussion mainly revolving around 
suspicion that Government was planning to take their land* After 
several hours the final decision was unanimous, that the Tribe 
would not hand the Scheme over* When this decision was communicated 
to the Ministry it was viewed very seriously and it was decided 
that pressure should be brought to bear on the Tribe to get it to 
change its mind* After some negotiations it arranged that the 
Minister himself would speak at a specially convened Kgotla meeting*
In order to bring more pressure to bear on the Council the 
Agricultural officer reported to the Council that no machinery 
whatsoever was operational at Mogobane, including the tractor, and 
there was no means of threshing the wheat* Further, the dam was 
badly silted up and should be cleared if it were to store 
sufficient water for year-round irrigation*
During this period there was considerable confusion concerning 
with whom the Government should negotiate* Strictly speaking it 
should have been with the Council (most but not all Councillors 
were Bamalete), but the Tribe still regarded the Scheme as theirs 
and not the Council’s. The minister of Agriculture, in this 
instance, spoke at the Kgotla but ultimately the final discussion 
and decisions were made at the Council Chambers, though net with­
out some hard feelings on the part of the tribesmen. Some sub­
sequent meetings concerning the Scheme were held at the Chief’s 
Kgotla.
When the Minister of Agriculture spoke at the Kgotla ne said that,
trIt is the aim of the Government to wage a ^ar against hunger 
among the people of Botswana; to develop among the youth of 
Botswana a liking for farming and to teach them scientific ways of 
farming. On account of a lack of money from the Bamalete Treasury 
to sustain the development of the Scheme, the Scheme was somewhat 
delayed. It is for this reason that the Botswana Government felt 
it necessary to take over the Scheme. For the Scheme to be 
started again a sum of £ 1 0 ,0 0 0  (R20,000) is needed. A committee 
needs to be elected to see to the day to day running of the Scheme, 
and the money that will be raised from the Scheme will be used for 
the maintenance of the Scheme and any surplus will go into the 
Tribal l-Leasu— y. It should be clearly understood that Government 
is not going to take any money accruing from the Scheme. If we 
are agreed on this issue, what needs to be done is to sign an 
agreement empowering us to run the Scheme."
During the discussion that followed* a number of speakers expressed 
a fear that Government was trying to deprive them of Tribal Land# 
Others felt unc°rtain about the whole situation# After considerable 
discussion which entailed another Kgotla meeting* the Tribe finally 
agreed to let the Government take over the Scheme for 5 years*
One week later the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of 
Agriculture visited the Chief to confirm the details of the 
decisions reached and to define the basis of the Agreement between 
the Tribe and Government* To ensure there were no misunderstandings 
he wrote the following letter to the Chief on his return to 
Gaborone.
Dear Sir*
You will recall that I met you on the 3rd May in your office
. 1at Ramotswa and that Messrs« I. Mokgotsi and Motsumi were present* 
You reported that the Bamalete Tribe were agreeable to hand overt 
the Mogobane Irrigation Scheme to Government for a period of five 
years, on the following conditions:-
(a) That the Dam should be cleaned out as soon as possible 
and that in any event, the Scheme should not be handed 
back to the Tribe by Government with the Dam in its 
existing condition.
(b) That the main irrigation canal and furrows should be 
repaired.
(c) That the two tractorsf the thresher* the baler and 
trailer be handed back to the Tribe after five years in 
good condition (the thresher, baler and trailer at 
present being decrepit and probably irreparable).
(d) That the fertility of the soil should be maintained ar.d 
improved.
(e) That a Committee be formed appointed by the Regent2to 
keep a watching brief over the Scheme.
(f) That the existing labour on the Scheme to be retained 
and dismissals to take place only after the Committee 
has been consulted.
(g) That the actual land should be returned to the Tribe.
-i Tribal elders.
2 Chief.
(h) That after the five years no outstanding debts be 
passed on to the Tribe unless the Tribe specifically 
agreed to accept these debts*
(i) That a small percentage of the profits of the Scheme 
be paid into a Development fund to be used for 
Development at Mogobane*
(j) That a small percentage of the profits should be paid
to the revenue of the District Council*
(k) That all the above should be incorporated in a written 
agreement to be signed by the Regent of the Bamalete 
and the Minister of Agriculture*
Will you please confirm that is an accurate record of the 
decisions taken by the Kgotla.
Yours faithfully,
Permanent Secretary,
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
The Chief acknowledged that the letter reflected an accurate 
record of the discussions held in his office and requested that 
the Agreement be drawn up and signed as soon as possible.
After five months of waiting for the Agreement to be drawn up, 
the Council sent a delegation to the Director of Agriculture to 
find out what was causing the delay as the deficit of the Scheme 
was increasing alarmingly and currently stood at R3 400. They 
told the Director of Agriculture that the Council could not 
continue to operate the Scheme. The Director replied that the 
delay was caused by the Attorney General’s Office which had not 
yet drawn up the legal document. He stated that Government could 
not help them meet the deficit but suggested that the sale of 
crops presently standing should clear the deficit, and, in order 
to relieve the pressure 011 the Tribe still further, he agreed that 
his Ministry would pay all labour employed on the Scheme. (He did 
this in the expectation that the Oxfam funds would materialise 
within a month or two). By the end of 1967, the Scheme was facing 
a deficit of R4 090.
By May 1968, the legal Agreement still had not been drawn up and 
the application for a loan from Oxfam was still under negotiation 
(the requirement in the meantime had jumped from R20,000 to 
R39v000) a Txiis caused the Agriculture some concern as
the Ministry had paid out R2 189 for wages and R280 for diesoline 
besides having used the Ministry’s tractor and farming equipment
on the Scheme. There was no indication as to when the Agreement 
might be finalised nor when Oxfam might give the loan. The 
Director of Agriculture then directed that all revenue from crop 
sales on the Sememe should revert to Government in order to offset 
the wages. For political reasons it was considered that the Scheme 
should not be temporarily closed down, even though the loan and 
Agreement were not yet finalised.
Fortunately for the District Council the revenue from crop sales 
which they received from December 1967 to May 1968 just about 
covered their accumulated deficit on the Scheme.
At this stage Snyman was transferred and Beavers replaced him as 
Agricultural Officer at Mogobane, where he was to remain till 
after the Ministry toolc over the Scheme. He had virtually no 
practical experience in irrigation farming.
In August 1968 the first draft of the Agreement appeared and was 
circulated among the interested parties for comments. The Tribe 
accepted the Agreement as it was based on the conditions agreed 
to in April of the previous year. However, someone in 
Agriculture suddenly realised that the Agreement would not be 
compatible with the R39 000 Oxfam loan which was all but 
finalised at that stage: it was to be, 12 year "soft" loan to be
vised to repair and improve upon the existing facilities, to 
purchase capital equipment and to develop and expand the irrigable 
area. It would not be possible to complete this in the 5 year 
lease period in the Agreement, nor could the Ministry guarantee 
repayment of the loan if it were not entirely under their control 
for the 12 year repayment period.
A few weeks later a Kgotla meeting was called at which the 
Permanent Secretary, accompanied by the Deputy Director of 
Agriculture, addressed the meeting. He told the Tribe that 
Government wanted to get the Scheme properly developed and viable. 
Oxfam had offered a R39 000 loan to do the necessary development 
but this had to be paid back over 12 years. Therefore, they 
requested that Government be allowed to run the Scheme for this 
period with surplus revenue being paid into the Bamalete Treasury. 
Government proposed that a Mogobane Scheme Management Board be set 
up with two members being nominated by +:he Tribe and four by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. He assured the Tribe that"the Ministry’s 
nominees will be experts and not anyone from a different tribe" 
and probably would include the Director of Agriculture and his 
Deputy Director. They also assured the Bamalete that Government 
did not intend depriving the Bamaj ete of any part of their already
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small Reserve,
The Chief explained to the tribesmen that the Council could not 
continue running the Scheme at a loss, and ?.n order to make 
profits much money would have to be invested in repairing the dam, 
fences, canals etc,, as well as buying new machinery. Only 
Government could do this and the Agreement with Government would 
ensure that at the end of 12 years the Scheme would be handed back 
to the Tribe as a profitable enterprise. Some of the tribesmen 
then spoke about their suspicion and distrust of Government taking 
over their land but at the end of the meeting the Tribe finally 
agreed to hand the Scheme to the Management Board for a period of 
12 years.
Four months later, in February 1969* there was a meeting of the 
Senior Bamalete Tribesmen who elected Paragwane (the Clerk of the 
Scheme) and Makgweng (the salesman at the Scheme) to be the two 
Tribal representatives on the Management Board and advised the 
Director of Agriculture accordingly. The Director of Agriculture 
then requested a meeting with the Senior Bamalete Tribesmen at 
which he stated that he was not satisfied with the nominees, and 
only if the Tribe insisted would he accept them. The Tribesmen 
decided not to alter their nominations but added that they 
reserved the right to change the nominees over the 12 year period, 
Four months later the Assistant Minister of Agriculture met the 
Senior Tribesmen to state that the Cabinet would not accept the 
two tribal nominees as it was "improper for Board Members to be 
employees.” The Senior Tribesmen then nominated Z. Mokgosi, a 
Councillor and Sub-Chief, together with K. Kobue, Vice-Chairman 
of the Council, to be Board members. These nominees were 
acceptable to the Government.
In the following month, August 1969, Mogobane Irrigation (Pty) 
Limited was formed. The Directors were recorded as R. Harrison 
(the Director of Agriculture), B. Batwell (the Assistant Director 
of Agriculture), P. Weare ^the Senior Agricultural Officer),
Z. Mokgosi and K. Kobue. Five shares were issued, three were 
vested in Government and one each in the names of Mokgosi and 
Kobue.
Mogobane Irrigation (Ml) formally took over the Scheme including 
all the staff, numbering about 25, of whom 2 had worked for over 
t-i0 years on the Scheme, 6 o years and 7 for over 5 years.
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The Ministry of Agriculture proposed to recruit a manager for MI
or, failing that, to allocate a capable Agricultural Officer to
run it. In the four years they were to run the farm no suitably
qualified or experienced person managed the Scheme. Beavers, the
Agricultural Officer-in-Charge of the Scheme before the take-over 
became the "Manager” after the take-over but it was decided to 
transfer him as he was having difficulties with the labourers and 
it was considered that a Mouswana Agricultural Officer, Moagi, 
might be more suitable in that situation.
Moagi remained at the Scheme for the next 3 years although he had 
no experience in irrigation farming, was a poor administrator and, 
it was said, drank too much.
CHAPTER 13 
MOGOBANE IRRIGATION (PTY• ) LTD.
No agricultural worlc was done during the first year after the 
Company took over the Scheme, other than harvesting the previous 
season’s crops. Most of the year was spent in removing the silt 
from the dam, raising its wall, repairing canals, silt traps, etc., 
as well as levelling the land to prevent waterlogging during 
heavy rains.
In November 1970, when the first Annual Accounts were presented 
to the Board of Directors, they were concerned at the "excessively 
high” labour costs. A letter was written to the District Council 
stating that "we feel that if the Company is to survive it will 
be necessary to make cuts in our permanent labour force in the 
very near future”, and went on co request that the services of 
six "old, sick and lazy” workers be terminated. The Council duly 
agreed to the request.
The repair work continued into the second year during which time 
the first crops were planted under the Mogobane Irrigation (Pty) 
Ltd. (Ml) regime. The crop for this year (1971) and the next two 
years were very disappointing for a number of reasons: 
mismanagement, poor marketing, planting too early or too late, 
waterlogging (ground not properly levelled)„ hail, frost, 
machinery breaking down, pests and theft. The Indian trader in 
Mogobane noted once again certain of the employees on the Scheme 
had a let more money to spend which he guessed did not relate to 
their wages.
By September 1973, the Directors finally realised there were only 
enough funds to keep MI solvent for a few more months and that 
there was not the slightest possibility of making the Scheme 
viable, let alone recovering any funds to repay the Oxfam loan.
The Ministry of Agriculture approached the Botswana Development 
Corporation (BDC) to ask if they could take over the Scheme as 
the Ministry was having "management problems”: BDC officers
inspected the Scheme and saw disappointingly little in the way 
of crops under cultivation except for about 10 acres of onions 
which seemed to be a promising crop.
^Botswana Development Corporation is wholly owned by the 
government of Botswana. "Its focus of activity (is) the promotion 
of business investments within Botswana which are economically 
beneficial to the country as a whole, either by itself or in 
association with technical and financial partners.” (5th Annual 
Report) It is active in all sectors of the economy.
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There was a considerable amount of what had been valuable 
machinery lying around the farm in a bad state of repair, A 
hammermill, which evidently had never been used, was completely 
hidden in the overgrowth of grass. Some important parts were 
missing from it. The canals and silt traps were badly damaged 
in several places — or else filled with rocks# Most fences were 
damaged or flattened. The storeroom held a few handtools, 
fertilizer bags and other odds and ends with a possible total 
value of about R100.
The BDC officers were not impressed with what they saw but they 
agreed that the Scheme should have potential, especially as 
Botswana imported most of its vegetables and large quantities of 
grains# The Ministry wanted BDC to take over their shareholding 
in MI and shoulder responsibility for the Oxfam loan, but BDC 
would have none of this and would only agree to form another 
company which would lease the Scheme from MI while adhering to 
the Agreement reached between the tribe (Council) and MI except 
that the lease period should be extended to 15 years. BDC made 
it quite plain that in fact they would rather not have anything 
to do with the Scheme but were only becoming involved because it 
was politic to do so. The Ministry of Agriculture reluctantly 
accepted BDC*s terms tut the matter of responsibility for the 
Oxfam loan was passed on to the Cabinet which, eighteen months 
later, finally agreed that Government should accept responsibility 
for its repayment.
Mokgosi, one of the Tribal Directors of MI, told the case writer 
that none of the above negotiations were mentioned to the Tribal 
Directors of MI until agreement had been reached with BDC. This 
caused some consternation within the Tribe as they considered they 
should have been consulted in the early stages of negotiations 
instead of being asked to ratify the Agreement. A special Kgotla 
meeting was called for BDC to put forward its proposals.
The Kgotla was told that BDC would make the Scheme succeed as 
"they had enough money to do it”. It was stated that BDC would 
form its own company, which would lease the Scheme from MI. This 
meant that the whole original Agreement between the Tribe and MI 
would be honoured but there would be a clause in the lease 
Agreement between MI and BDC allowing MI to terminate the lease 
if it considered that BDC was not developing the Scheme "in a 
right and proper manner”. BDC on the other hand would only agree 
to becoming involved if the 12 year lease of the Scheme to MI
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were extended 15 years as 4 years already had been wasted •
The BDC spokesman stated that everyone knew about the problems of 
the past and how the irrigation scheme had failed but now BDC was 
going to make it succeed - tribesmen could earn good wages, there 
would be plenty of food and everyone would be happy, etc*, etc* 
Also, when the Scheme would be finally handed back to the Tribe 
it would be a flourishing, veil developed project.
The Tribe saw this proposal as yet more erosion of their ownership 
of their Scheme ("expropriation by Government" as more than one 
tribesman saw it9) The people were not satisfied with the state 
of affairs and doubted if BDC could succeed where the Ministry 
had failed* They also complained that the Ministry had not kept 
the Council informed of the Company’s problems nor discussed the 
possibility of BDC’s participation* They felt there had been a 
general lack of consultation* When all the questions had been 
answered an old man stood up and told the people how in the late 
19309s he could remember when the irrigation Scheme was first put 
to the Tribe under this selfsame tree where the Kgotla now was 
meeting - except that the tree had been smaller then - and the 
Tribe was told by the District Commissioner how they would grow 
a lot of crops even in drought years, have plenty of food, be 
rich, and everyone would be happy. Nothing came of their promises 
because Government failed to get the Scheme going properly. Then 
in the 1940*s the Tribe was asked to give more land to the 
irrigation Scheme as they would grow lots of crops, have plenty 
of food, etc., etc. However, this too did not come about and in 
1969, after many years of poor harvests and little activity, the 
Agricultural Department said they would run the farm as a private 
company with the Tribe as partners. Everyone would have plenty 
of food, be rich, etc., etc. Again it failed. Now BDC came with 
the old story. The old man concluded by saying that he just 
wanted to remind the people of the history of the farm and he 
wished BDC every success.
The final outcome of the Kgotla meeting was that the Tribe 
reluctantly agreed to MI subletting the Scheme to BDC’s company 
with a three year extension to the original lease Agreement.
In November 1973 the proposal was discussed by the South East 
District Council which strongly urged that the following steps 
be taken as soon as possible in r to expedite this project:
i) That Mokgosi and Kobue transfer their shares in MI to 
the District Council.
ii) That eke District Council appoint two representatives 
for its interest in the Company.
iii) That a lease agreement be drawn up.
The take over was planned for January 1st, 1974, but there were 
numerous delays, the main one being the preparation of a formal 
agreement between MI and FDC.
Meanwhile MI continued to run the Scheme and the activities on the 
farm continued in a desultry fashion. The marketing of produce 
received almost no attention with a result that the 10 acres of 
prime onions were allowed to go to seed - it was suggested that 
there was no money to buy pockets to pack them in, and "at any 
rate it probably would be difficult to market such a large 
quantity”. It was estimated that the harvest could have been about 
4,000 pockets. The case writer researched the prices ruling at 
the Johannesburg Market for the period when the onions have been 
harvested and found that the prices fluctuated between 70 cents 
and R1.S9 per pocket. Railage would have cost 12 cents per pocket* 
to which should be added 10 cents for the cost of each empty 
pocket. Direct production costs were estimated to be R100 per 
acre.
While this was going on BDC formed the Farm Development Company 
(Pty) Ltd. BDC held two-thirds of the share, the balance being 
held by two white investors from Rhodesia and South Africa. The 
investors categorically stated that they wanted no Bamalete 
Tribesmen on the Board of Directors as FDC was to be run as a 
commercial operation without any pandering to Tribal needs. Other 
than those included in the lease agreement. BDC concurred.
A farm manager, Roy Eagan, was hired. Eagan was an experienced 
farmer who had, as he put it, been trained "the hard way”: he
received his technical training on occasional courses at 
agricultural colleges in the U»K. but gained most of his 
experience by working on farms where he was taught that "talcing an 
hour off work was like putting your hand in the till45. He was 
an extremely hard worker, dedicated to the land and an expert in 
irrigation and dryland farming. He had emigrated to Rhodesia 
after the war where he became one of the foremost seed production 
farmers•
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Eagan had it impressed on him that he was coming into a difficult 
situation caused by the previous management which had allowed 
various malpractices to develop unchecked* He was told that as 
this originally was a tribal project only tribesmen might be
employed*
January 1st cane and went and the lease agreement still had not 
been drawn up* It was considered that FDC could not take over 
the Scheme until the lease had been signed* As a result Eagan 
was having to sit around twiddling his thumbs* Eventually it was 
agreed that he end his wife might settle into the empty farm 
house before FDC officially took over the fariju As he could not 
yet take over the management, he spent the next couple of months 
repairing some of the machinery and offering advice where he 
thought it was needed* In general his advice was ignored - he 
was told by the foreman and the other workers that they were not 
under him.
During this period of waiting for FDC co take over, Eagan observed 
the management and general running of the farm. There was the 
foreman who did not like to take his helpful advice which was 
inclined to highlight shortfalls in management, therefore 
requiring further work input by the foreman and others. There 
was the clerk whose duties were obscure over and above record 
keeping and handling the cash - he usually started work half an 
hour late in the morning and left half an hour early in the 
afternoon* A storeman and his assistant were in charge of the 
stores which consisted mainly of hand tools, some fertilizer bags 
and other odds and ends, with a possible total value of R100. He 
noted that the combined wages of the storeman and his assistant 
come to over R60 per month. No one seemed to be responsible for 
a considerable amount of valuable machinery much of which was in 
a bad state of disrepair and left lying around the farm.
Another member of the staff was the irrigation controller whose 
sole duty, it seemed, was to open the water supply into the canal 
in the morning and then turn it off in the afternoon. Finally 
there was one tractor driver and about nine labourers, making a 
total of 14 staff altogether. Eagan was rather mystified when, 
at the end of the month, over 40 people turned up to receive 
their pay cheque. When he queried the extra numbers he was told 
they were working "elsewhere on the farm". He never managed to 
find out where "elsewhere" was because as far as he was aware he 
had been around all of the farm and not seen any evidence of them.
Eagain observed that a considerable amount of water was wasted 
everyday not only through the state of disrepair of the lining of 
the 5 mile canal but also through having to fill the whole canal 
with water (which toolc 4i hours) before any arrived at the land 
to be irrigated* The water was turned off at the dam only when 
work stopped in the afternoon with a result that tens of 
thousands of gallons ran to waste every working day and caused a 
marsh to form at the end of the canal.
The farm was situated along the bottom of a valley with tribesmen 
living on either side of it. When people on one side wished to 
visit the other side they just crossed through the farm which 
caused considerable damage to the fences. Sometimes they took 
their cattle through as well, in which case the fence had to be 
flattened or cut when they came to the one meter deep canal they 
would fill it with rocks to allow the cattle to cross over. There 
were a few bridges across the canal but these did not seem to be 
conveniently placed for those crossing the valley. Fences were 
also damaged by neighbours collecting water for themselves and 
by herdsmen watering their cattle whose hooves caused considerable 
damage to the lining of the canal.
The working hours on the farm were the same as for all government 
employees, namely from 7.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. but Eagan noticed 
few workers who actually worked the full stretch. The wages paid 
were based on industrial rates.
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CHAPTER 14 
ROY EAGAN
By June 1974 the lease Agreement still had not been drawn up and 
the shareholders of FDC, brought pressure to bear on the Ministry 
of Agriculture to allow FDC to take over effective control of the 
Scheme. The Ministry finally agreed to this, assuming the lease 
would soon be finalised. In the same month members of the Ministry 
and BDC met the staff at the Scheme to advise them of the immediate 
changes in management. Because of the past history of the farm 
BDC wanted to create a good impression from the start and so 
offered to take on all present employees with promises of increased 
wages as time went by (although BDC was not very happy with the 
industrial wages then being paid). Altogether thirteen people 
signed on.
Eagan implemented the development programme which had been drawn 
up in the light of his experience during the previous few months 
at the farm. Top priority was given to repair and replacement of 
machinery and equipment, re-organisation of work schedule and 
disciplinary controls. Within a short time there were a number of 
staff dismissals, in particular those of the Clerk and the two 
storemen. There were complaints about this in the Kgotla and one 
of the Tribal Directors of MI claimed that he was told the 
retrenchment was only temporary and the Clerk and Storemen would 
be re-employed when the Scheme became fully operational.
In order to save money Eagan carried out most of the repair work 
himself and he was proud that he had managed to get one twelve- 
year-old tractor operational after rebuilding it from front to 
back, eannabalising another tractor in the process. The cost had 
been about R800 whereas the cost of a new tractor of the same 
model was R5000. He complained about the availability and high 
cost of spares which he personally had to collect from Mafeking 
125 ton. from the farm, as he could not rely on the railways to 
drop the parcels off at his nearest siding. Parcels overshot his 
siding and it took many weeks to recover them. Another fifteen- 
year-old tractor was made operational but Eagan soon discovered 
that neither of these two tractors could be relied on to be 
operational all the time. On his recommendation a new and more 
poweriul tractor was purchased but this did not relieve the 
pressure as it was soon found that all three tractors were 
required to cope with the amount of land then under irrigation.
This situation would deteriorate if the acreage under irrigation 
were to be increased from the present 82 acres to 115 acres. He
already was experiencing serious difficulties cultivating 8? acres 
with the unreliable tractors.
Eagan patched the leaky canal and repaired the broken-down fences 
to keep the cattle out while putting in a number of styles to 
allow the people to climb over the fence without damaging it. The 
fences were mostly in a very bad state, being many years old ana 
having rotten posts and rusty wires in places. Within a few weeks 
of repair, Eagan again found the fences damaged or cut down in 
many places. He therefore ceased to continue the repair work.
The pastures also were not immune to having their fences cut at
night by people who let their cattle in to graze, and by day 
Eagan had to lock the gate to his home and garden if he and his
family went out, otherwise cattle and goats would be let in to
graze in his vegetable garden.
Eagan considered the possibility of refencing the entire farm and 
having watering alcoves in the fence to allow cattle and people 
access to the canal in selected places. But he eventually 
decided against this, partly for financial reasons and partly 
because he was not convinced that the new fences would not be 
cut.
Eagan thought about putting the fenced pastures to use under a 
fodder rotation programme but he was afraid of uncontrolled fence 
cutting - so he left the pastures idle.
The wastage of time, water and maintenance costs of the five mile 
irrigation canal was of much concern to Eagan. He estimated that 
an eight inch pipeline laid in the canal with wheelvalve at the 
exit would cost R3500. An alternative to this would be to instal 
five reservoirs at strategic points along the length of the canal 
to hold the surplus water for pumping out first thing in the 
morning. The cost of these reservoirs would be in the region of 
R300 each. Eagan decided that the latter alternative would be 
both practical and cheap to implement.
In planning the re-organisation of work schedules Eagan realised 
that the usual 24 hour irrigation regime would be too difficult 
to implement with a work force which was used to working civil 
servants9 hours. He already had tried to change the hours to 
the,,u°-uallt 10 hour farm workers* day, including some weekend 
work, but overwhelming opposition to the proposals caused them 
to be dropped. Eagan then tried a new approach: he would have
two shifts on a 13 hour total irrigation - the first shift
starting at 6.00 a.m. till 12*30 p.m. and next from 12.30 to 7.00 p.m 
As most of the irrigation would talce place during the summer months 
with long day—light hours, he forsaw little difficulty, especially 
with the proposed shorter working hours. The new programme was 
carefully explained to those involved and all seemed to accept the 
proposals as satisfactory* The new regime was to start the following 
Monday. Monday came and the first shift turned up and worked till 
12.30 p.m. shortly after which only two members of the afternoon 
shift turned up - drunk. The first shift had gone home and Eagan 
was forced to organise some of the other farm labour to complete the 
irrigation that day. The next day was a repeat performance by which 
stage he gave up in disgust and dropped all plans of flood irrigation 
He installed an expensive but efficient overhead sprinkler irrigation 
system which cost R3500 as an initial investment. The system was 
connected to a powerful pump which drew water directly out of the 
canal. He planned to extend the sprinkler system to the new lands 
he was opening up, altering the pipe layout and adding more sprinkler 
in order to rely on even fewer labourers.
Eagan founa the labour force to be extremely unstable compared with 
what he was used to in Rhodesia. He said they were "poor quality 
and unreliable, due mainly to lack of interest; they have no wish 
to improve their lot. They work only to augment their income earned 
from their holdings".
After the first rains came in October numbers of men and women 
labourers disappeared without warning. Enquiries revealed that it 
was the traditional ploughing time. Later they were to disappear 
again when the time came to harvest their crops. Another disrupting 
factor was the annual initiation ceremony for yoimg men which lasted 
for two months, usually July and August. Besides losing many young 
men for this period, he also lost some of the women who were required 
to organise parts of the ceremony.
As it was the exception rather than the rule for labourers to work 
five consecutive days in a week, Eagan tried several incentives to 
increase punctuality and productivity. On cold winter mornings when 
work should start at 7*30 a.m. many workers arrived at 3.00 a.m. so 
Eagan considered supplying a hot mug of coffee or tea at 7.15 a.m. 
as an incentive for them to start work on time; but then he gave 
consi derat ion to all their standing around during the day and thought 
that it was not worth implementing after all.
Two incentives towards regular attendance were tried but neither 
seemed to have any effect. One was to offer 3 kg. of maize meal
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for every five consecutive days worked* and the other was a cash 
bonus for working two consecutive Veeks without missing a day.
Neither system showed any positive reaction from the workers and 
were discontinued.
In order to regularise the employment of staff and their conditions 
of employment* etc., Eagan drew up Contracts of Service but after a 
while he discontinued these as in practice they became worthless bits 
of paper because the terms were totally ignored by the employees*
Eagan told the case writer, ”I have become tired of shouting my head 
off at people coming late and going home early, and now am resigned 
to the situation”.
When the farm had been managed by the State Agricultural Department, 
the scaff had taken off every public holiday of which there were 
about twelve per year* Roy reduced the number of holidays for the 
farm workers to six. This aroused considerable discontent amongst 
the workers, but they ultimately accepted the change.
There were two matters which Eagan felt very sore about but had been 
unable to change* Firstly, the staff would not work on the first 
Saturday after receiving their monthly pay - but they demanded to be 
paid for that day in any case. And secondly, on the Saturdays they 
did work, they demanded to be paid a full day’s wage, though they 
worked for only four hours. They said this was the way they always 
had been paid. Eagan gave in on these two points because he 
considered that unless he gave way on a few things he soon would have 
no labour.
Eagan found that cultivation by mules was more efficient than with a 
tractor because tractor drivers did not always align the harrows to 
travel between the plants with the result that entire rows of plants 
were ripped up instead of weeds.
One day the tractor driver said he could not continue to work under 
the foreman* and if the foreman was not fired he would resign. 
Although Eagan had been planning to fire the foreman, he did not like 
an employee "holding a pistol to his head" so he fired the tractor 
driver instead. Later he fired the foreman after which the tractor 
driver re-applied for his old post, and was accepted.
Of the original thirteen staff only six remained employed on the 
farm after one year. The permanent labour force had stabilised at 
fourteen with a temporary labour force of up to fifty during 
harvesting periods.
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Eagan gained the impression that the tribesmen continued to regard 
the farm as being theirs - which it had been in earlier years - and 
during the maize harvest some leading members of the Iribe would 
drive up with a truck and ask for it to be filled with uncounted 
numbers of green maize cobs® When Eagan asked what about paying 
for the cobs* they said they would pay after selling them® Eagan 
refused to allow this and insisted on the cobs being counted and 
paid for before being taken away* which caused a certain amount or 
ill-feeling and on a number of occasions no sale was concluded* It 
was discovered that quantities of green maize were being stolen so 
Eagan hired guards to look after the maize crops at night and over
weekends. When he finally harvested the maize, his yield around
the outside of the field was double that on the inside. The expected 
yield per acre had been 20 to 25 bags but when the harvest was 
completed, it was found to average only 7 bags per acre®
One day at the end of the maize harvest Eagan met the local trader 
who revealed that although the past rainy season had been relatively 
poor he had purchased 150 more bags of maize than he normally did* 
Eagan asked to see the maize and inspection of a number of bags 
showed they contained kernels of the type of hybrid maize which he 
had grown under irrigation - they were distinctly different from the 
maize kernels usually grown in the area. Eagan then knew where his 
maize crop had disappeared to but he did rot follow the matter up
as he felt that he had enough problems on his hands without having
court cases.
In January 1975 the first potato crop was harvested and found to be 
good, yielding about 1000 pockets of high grade disease-free potatoes* 
It was decided to sell them as seed potatoes since that would command 
a price of 50% higher than market potatoes. A Zambian buyer was 
found for the entire harvest which v/as duly prepared for shipment«
Just v/hen the shipment was ready for despatch the Zambian buyer 
cancelled the order as he had just received a consignment of seed 
potatoes from a Botswana farmer-trader (but, it transpired, grown 
in South Africa) which were badly diseased and had to be draped.
The Zambian buyer refused to take the potatoes unless the necessary 
disease-free certificate could be produced. Enquiries with the 
Botswana Ministry of Agriculture revealed that although they had the 
qualified officers to carry out the necessary inspection, there was 
no legislation to allow them to issue the certificate.
Representatives to the buyer tha the potatoes were disease—free met 
with no response so Eagan hurriedly tried to sell the potatoes in the 
nearby towns. He succeeded in selling only about 400 packets and
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gave the rest away0 When the case 'writer aslced Eagan why he had not 
tried to sell the potatoes elsewhere# for example, on the 
Johannesburg Market, he replied that he had been strongly advised 
never to sell produce, especially potatoes, on the Johannesburg 
Market as it was capricious, prices often were below cost, and he 
may even have to pay for someone to dispose of his produce if no 
buyer were found* The case writer then investigated the ruling 
prices for Grade I medium on the Johannesburg Market which were 
found to be as follows:
December 1974: R1*75
January 1975: R1.34
February 1975: R1*45
If the potatoes had been sold as uncertified (that they were disease-
free) seed potatoes a price of R3*00 per pocket could have been 
obtained from a leading seed merchant in Johannesburg*
Enquiries revealed that the railage on 600 pockets of potatoes to 
Johannesburg would have cost R72*00#
The groundnut crop was very satisfactory producing over 100 bags of 
nuts per acre* The nuts were a large red~skinned variety which were 
unknown on the South African market and difficulty was experienced 
in marketing them* A trial consignment of unshelled nuts was sent 
to a large confectionery firm in Johannesburg but their comments 
had not been very favourable: "too much sand and too many twigs in
the bags". Also the moisture content of the nuts was allegedly too 
high. However, the firm would consider talcing the whole crop at 
R10 per bag which Eagan was not very keen to do as he was convinced 
he could receive R15 per bag* While he was trying other outlets 
for the groundnuts, another buyer from the same confectionery firm 
approached him as the previous buyer had fallen sick. He offered 
R20 per bag and was prepared to draw' up a five-year contract to buy 
Eagan8s entire production. Eagan then realised that his judgement 
on the value of the nuts v/as not wrong after all and he was prepared 
to enter an agreement with the firm.
After completing the groundnut and maize harvests, there was a 
substantial quantity of highly nutritious groundnut hay and maize 
husks which Eagan tried to sell to local cattle owners for fattening 
purposes. The concept of feeding cattle in this manner was new to 
the local farmers and as none v/as prepared to pay R1e50 per bag of 
milled hay, Eagan was considering burning it just to get it out of 
the way.
Eagan found marketing to be rather difficult, firstly because the 
market in the two nearby towns was so small, second because of 
competition by South African dealers who delivered a wide range of
fruit and vegetables direct to the shops and third because he did
not like to have people bargain with him for his produce. He told
the case writer that he knew the quality and value of his produce
and if any shopkeeper tried to bargain with him he would tell them 
to "stick it" and never try to sell it to him again. He had been 
supplying the Co-operative Shop in Gaborone with 20 to 30 pockets 
)f potatoes per week for several months but one day in November 
1974, when he asked the Co-op Manager how many potatoes he required, 
the Manager replied that he had a consignment from South Africa and 
would not need any that day. Eagan left but did not call on the 
manager again. In February 1975 the Co-op Manager drove to the farm 
(70 Ion. away) with a truck to ask if he had any potatoes. Eagan 
said yes and rnmediately put the price up by 10 cents a pocket. 
Thereafter Eagan continued to sell 20 to 30 pockets a week to the 
Co-op for several months until one day the Co-op Manager said that 
he had enough on hand that day because he had received a large 
shipment from South Africa. Eagan again did not bother to return to 
the Co-op.
One year after the FDC takeover not one of the people retrenched had 
been reinstated and, the Tribal Director of MI claimed, the wife of 
the present manager had taken over the Clerk’s job. He claimed that 
there was much dissatisfaction about employment on the Scheme and 
that there were "many people who would like work there". Eagan, on 
the other hand, had complained that he could not find enough workers.
By June 1975, members of the Tribe became rather concerned at the 
-Lack of information with regard to the formal take over of the Scheme 
by BDC. Technically the Scheme was still under MI but in practice 
it had been managed by BDC for one year without any agreement being 
finalised. Their concern was communicated to BDC who, one week 
later, organized a tour of the Scheme for the Chief, the two tribal 
Directors of MI, the Council Chairman and various Councillors. After 
the tour the proposed lease was discussed. BDC officers said that 
the terms of the lease were "still being reviewed by Government."
Shortly afterwards the case writer interviewed Mokgotsi, one of the 
Directors of MI, about the current situation. He said that there had 
oeen no farther developments with regard to the lease agreement.
When asked what he knew about the shareholders and directors of 
FDC, he said that he understood that BDC was the sole shareholder 
and that two tribal MI Directors would be on the Board of FDC, though 
"this had not been finalised".
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The case writer then visited BDC and spoke to Mike Tiller who was the 
officer responsible for the project. When asked about the lease 
agreement, Tiller said that it had not been drawn up as there were 
"problems'* which had to be finalised with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
but he added that BDC was dragging its feet over the lease as "things 
were not going too wrell" on the Scheme.
At the end of the first twelve months of farming FDC prepared a 
Profit and Loss Account which showed a R20,000 loss on the turnover 
of R359000# In spite of the substantial loss it was anticipated that 
the labour, marketing and other problems would be overcome and better 
results would be achieved in the following year.
Eagan then prepared an analysis of the most successful crops he had 
grown in order to assess the priorities for the new seasonfs planting. 
He drew up the following table using what he considered to be 
conservative estimates for yield per acre and estimated selling 
prices.
Yield per selling Revenue Direct cost Return 
Commodity acre  price per acre per acre per acre
Maize 35 bags R 5.00 R175.00 R 80.00 R 95.00
GroundNuts 20 bags R15.00 R300.00 R125.00 R175.00
Potatoes 450 pocs. R 1.50 R675.00 R300.00 R375.00
Eagan then summarised his thoughts on the crops listed in the table 
as well as others which he had grown on the farm or knew about:
Maize. The return per acre was low when compared with the other 
crops but it was the only crop where the floor price was guaranteed. 
The crop could lend itself to mechanisation if grown on a large 
scale but steps would have to be taken against theft while the 
raize was green.
Groundnuts. The yield per acre was very favourable but the problem 
was the uncertain market.
Potatoesf This crop would produce a most favourable return if it 
could be marketed satisfactorily. Eagan considered that he could 
grow potatoes almost throughout the year which should solve his 
local marketing problem. If labour was troublesome he could harvest 
them mechanically.
Not including overheads, e.g. Manager’s salary, depreciation, etc.
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Onions. Eagan knew that the farm had produced an excellent onion 
crop under the previous management but from the acres grown nothing 
had been harvest' 1 due to marketing problems® He was not very keen 
to have the same experience®
Soya Beans. An experimental crop had been fairly successful, 
producing about five bags per acre, but due to the unreliable labour, 
a harvester would have to be purchased - an expense which could not 
be justified. Eagan thought that marketing also could be a problem,
Canadian Red Wonder Beans. A fairly successful crop of these beans 
was grown but no satisfactory markets could be found.
After considering the pro's and con's of the above crops he decided 
to specialise in only two crops while continuing to experiment with 
others. Eagan considered that the two crops should be maize and 
potatoes, his basic reason being that both crops could be farmed with 
a high degree of mechanisation. In any case the planned expansion 
of the irrigated lands from 82 to 1 1 5 acres would only be possible 
with mechanisation as he felt labour could not be relied on. Maize 
could be marketed without any difficulty while he considered that 
potatoes had a good chance of finding markets if he produced them 
throughout the year.
Eagan calculated that he could put 120 acres under irrigation and, 
with mechanisation, would require a permanent staff of only six 
people. Farming on this system should yield net annual profit of 
not less than R8000.
Eagan realised that a successful irrigation farm depended on most 
of the staff having a thorough practical knowledge of irrigation.
The only way he could see this happening was for about five Batswana 
to go to an agricultural college to gain the theoretical knowledge 
and then have the practical experience of working on a small but 
successful irrigation farm before talcing up duties on the Scheme®
Then "after five years the farm should be a proper success".
Eagan put forward the proposed plans for training and the cultivation 
of crops to his Board of Directors. At the same time he reluctantly 
advised them that he would not renew his two year contract as he had 
come to the conclusion that he did not have the right temDerament 
for working with the local labour.
The Board of Directors accepted the wisdom behind Eagan*s resignation 
and advertised for a manager who preferably had farmed successfully 
in Botswana for a number of years and could speak tne language of the
Within two months Eagan advised the Director of FDC that he had 
changed his mind and would be prepared to renew his contract. The 
Board of Directors agreed to keep him on particularly as the farming 
operations, coupled with marketing, had taken a definite turn for 
the better.
As the 1974 maize crop had suffered such severe depredations from 
theft, Eagan decided to take strong measures to prevent a repeat 
performance in the 1975 season. Besides the employment of guards 
in the fields, he refused to sell green mealies to any villagers in 
the valley. He reasoned that if anyone in the village were seen 
with green maize, it could only have been stolen from the farm as 
the local (non-irrigated) maize would not mature till the end of 
January at the earliest.
This decision caused much indignation amongst the Bamalete living 
in the valley as such a rule had never been made in the 30 year 
history of the Scheme. Green mealies are a much appreciated 
delicacy and many people usually bought mealies in bulk from the 
Scheme to sell at 100% profit in the townships, thereby earning cash 
to pay for school fees, etc.
The matter was brought up at a Kgotla meeting where many people were 
bitter about the situation. It was agreed that Eagan be summoned 
to a special Kgotla meeting a few days hence to explain himself.
"Botswana Daily News" reporter had attended the earlier meeting 
and then interviewed Eagan who was reported to have said he "did 
not sell maize to people from Bamalete area because if he did so, 
they would steal maize from the farm and claim to have bought it.
He said the Minister of Agriculture........ was fully aware of that".
Eagan said almost exactly the same words concerning the Bamalete 
and theft to the case writer who visited him just before he attended 
the Kgotla meeting to which he had been summoned.
Eagan duly attended the specially convened Kgotla Meeting to 
explain the new measure. At the meeting, which was attended by about 
300 tribesmen, many speakers spoke about the Scheme being a Tribal 
one and that it was there for the benefit of the Tribe even if they 
had to pay for the produce. Eagan replied by quoting statistics:
In December 1974 and January 1975 he had sold green mealies worth 
a total of R194 whereas the sales for December 1975 and half of 
January 1976 hcd totalled almost R3000 from the same acreage of 
land. He considered that these statistics justified his decision
1 —  1 ■1 ■    —Corn-on-the-cob
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not to sell green mealies to the people in the valley. Councillor 
Moganu (who had been the Agricultural Demonstrator on the Scheme 
from 1944 to 196°) said that when such far reaching decisions are 
made they should be discussed with the Tribe before being implemented. 
After some further discussions Eagan agreed to retract his ruling 
on the sale of green mealies.
On the day after the Kgotla Meeting the "Botswana Daily News" 
published the news item in which Eagan was quoted as saying that he 
would not sell maize because the Bamalete would steal.jnaize, etc.
This report incensed a number of tribesmen who took the matter to 
the Kgotla as they considered that Eagan was saying all Bamalete 
were thieves.
Mr. Molefe, a Tribal Elder and Council Secretary, tried to defend 
Eagan, for whom he had a lot of respect as a hardworking and 
dedicated farmer, by suggesting that the "Daily News" often mis­
quoted people and caused trouble. At the time of writing the 
matter was still sub judice in the .Kgotla.'
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APPENDIX 1
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN BECHUANALAND PROTECTORATE/BOTSWANA
In 1885 the British Government somewhat reluctantly assumed the 
protection of Bechuanaland as international events in Southern 
Africa at the time forced their hand. The British Government under­
took to protect and administer the country until the Protectorate 
became self governing in 1966 when the new Government changed the 
Territory's name to Botswana.
The capital of Bechuanaland Protectorate originally was in Vryberg 
about 200 km. south of the border but in 1896 it was moved to 
Mafeking which is 25 km. south of the border. It was not till 
Independence that the capital was moved to Gaborone.
The central administration consisted of the Resident Commissioner 
who was assisted by a Government Secretary and a small Secretariat, 
and a number of departments, each with its head. The Resident 
Commissioner, the Secretariat and the department heads (e.g. 
Agriculture, Veterinary, etc.) were based in Mafeking. The 
Resident Commissioner was subordinate to the High Commissioner for 
the United Kingdom in South Africa, who also was High Commissioner 
for Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland. The High Commissionerpwas based both in Pretoria and Cape Town , about 450 1cm. and 1400 1cm 
from Mafeking respectively. He was the legislating authority 
though certain powers in this respect were delegated to the 
Resident Commissioner.
The Resident Commissioner was advised in his conduct of the affairs 
of the Protectorate by an European Advisory Council and by an 
African Advisory Council, over both of which he presided.
The European Advisory Council consisted of 8 members, elected by 
enrolled voters, and met in Mafeking twice a year. The African 
Advisory Council consisted of 36 members who were chiefs, headmen 
and tribal elders. This Council met once a year in Lobatse and
*1 . "  *..— ■ I , —  . ,
This note is based on material originally prepared by Mr. E. Brian 
Egner, ror many years a DC under the Colonial Administration from 
1958 to 1966, who also served the Botswana government from 1966—75 
until his retirement in 1975.
When the South African Parliament was in session he moved with 
his Secretariat to Cape Town.
119 -
invariably was an occasion for frank debates in which the Adminis­
tration often came in for criticism.
The District Commissioners (DC’s) also met once a year at a 
conference in Mafeking to discuss their common problems with the 
Resident Commissioner. The DC’s were the main tool for indirect 
rule as applied in Bechuanaland.
Bechuanaland was divided into 10 districts, six of which were tribal 
reserves while four were in non-tribal territory. A DC was placed 
in charge of each district where he lived in the tribal capital, 
with the exception of the DC of Gaborone who lived in a government 
reserve near the railway but outside the area of the Bamalete and 
Batlokwa tribes which came within his district. At each district 
headquarters there were a number of departmental Officers and 
Protectorate Police.
The day-to-day administration of the African population was in the 
hands of traditional and hereditary Native Authorities. The Tribal 
Administrations obtained their finances by a rebate from the central 
Government of 35% of the basic Native Tax. They also taxed the 
tribesmen on property or income, and they collected rents on trading 
stores, etc.
_  IPO
In colonial davs, the DC was the principal representative of the 
Central Govt* in his district. Because of lack of communications, 
funds, staff etc,, he was trusted and expected to govern his 
district, making virtually all day-to-day decisions on his own 
initiative, and operating under only the broadest of policy/guide— 
lines from his headquarters. It was a completely decentralised 
system, where the motto was "trust the man on the spot".
Until the early 1960’s the convention persisted that even the 
Resident Commissioner "requested" the DC’s permission to pay a 
visit to his district. At least from the early 1 SCO's the entire 
responsibility for law and order, administration of justice^ of 
human life, and property, internal security, social and economic 
development, and political relationships between groups in the 
society was borne by district commissioners, directly in the State 
Land districts (towns of Lobatse and Francistown, Ghanzi district, 
Kgalagadi district and Chobe district) and more or less indirectly 
in the tribal areas, depending on the character of the chief and 
tribal administration.
Initiative and leadership in e.g. school and dam or road building 
could come either from the chief, the DC or (especially in 
education and health development) the local missionary.
But the free regimental labour or cash levies on tribesmen required 
to implement such development projects were normally exacted from 
the people by the chiefs, whose popularity sometimes suffered as 
a result, even though they were often acting under direct pressure 
from the DC, who stayed in the background when such "tribal" 
matters as forced labour or development levies were being critised, 
thereby preserving his own reputation for benevolent impartiality.
This gentle manipulation of the chiefs by the colonial authorities 
under the system known as "indirect rule" had at least partially 
discredited the chieftainship as an institution by the time 
Independence came, thereby rendering it a fairly easy matter for 
the new national government to take over the powers of the chief­
tainship.
PRE—INPEPENDENCE
The new national government found a completely decentralised system 
of administration when it took over in 1966* This system was still 
almost entirely run by authoritarian expatriates who were used to 
exercising real political power• Many of them were quite unable 
to give up overnight the decision—making prerogatives which now 
properly belonged to the elected representatives of the people#
Inevitably, and rationally, the national government, whose first 
priority task was to establish its own rule, set in train a 
thorough process of centralising all decision—making in Gaborone# 
This meant demolishing the power of the District Administration 
transferring the most able DC*s to Gaborone, stripping the 
districts of "resource personnel", and, simultaneously, taking 
away the powers of the chiefs, through whom the colonial District 
Administration had exerted its powers.
By 1970 the centralising moves which were initiated in 1966 had 
achieved their purpose of firmly establishing the new national 
government in control of the machinery of government.
By 1970 it also became obvious that whilst centralisation had 
achieved its political purpose, it was bringing many administrative 
inefficiencies in its train#
The districts, which had once been the place for the ambitious 
man who wanted to build a career, had now become a backwater; the 
District Administration was stripped of power, without competent 
personnel, and morale was at its lowest ebb.
The same situation existed in all other departments of Government - 
the district level officers had been stripped of decision—making 
power; decisions demanding detailed local knowledge were being 
taken by personnel stationed in Gaborone; the best officers from 
the districts had been brought in to swell the ever-growing head­
quarters staff; and morale in the districts had fallen about as 
low as it could get.
To sum up the 1970 situation, most of the real power and most of 
the able administrators were concentrated in Gaborone. Apart 
from che Office of the President, which concentrated upon co­
ordinating the activities of the various centralised ministries 
in oaL/orone, financial powei the allocation of resources was
held by tne totally centralised and largely expatriate—manned 
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, which at that time
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POST-INDEPENDENCE
did not have a single planning officer or senior administrator 
who had served outside the capital«
Having established its full control over the machinery of govern­
ment by 1970, the BDP^ Government quickly turned its attentions 
toward remedying the inefficiencies of centralisation, which had 
been reflected in a growing discontent on the part oi the rural 
people, who had in fact been receiving less than their share of 
attention from the truncated district-level civil service since 
independence.
The adoption of an active policy of rural development in the 
early 1970*s meant in fact the end of the era of excessive 
centralisation and a partial return to a decentralised system 
where real and important decisions would again be taken at the 
district level.
In 1970 a Presidential Circular defined the role of the post­
independence District Commissioner:
- The DC remains the principal representative of Government 
in the district on all policy matters.
- As Chairman of the District Development Committee he is 
responsible for the effective implementation of national and 
district development plans, including local authority plans.
- He is also responsible for the efficient conduct of public 
business and for the Coordination of departmental 
activities*
- And he is responsible for the maintenance of law and order 
including the implementation of laws, circulars and 
instructions.
Whilst the DC still retains a multitude of statutoryfunctions 
(e.g. liquor licences, inquests, marriage) and still in most 
districts has a full load of judical work, the emphasis since 
1970 has definitely been on his role as an agent of change, the 
coordinator and activator of all development work in his districts, 
He has been assisted since 1971 by a District Officer (Develop­
ment) normally an economist (posts still filled by expatriate 
volunteers), who acts as full-time secretary of the District 
Development Committee (DDC).
-  1  s  2  -
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The success of the DDC system in increasing rural development 
expenditures through better planning at the district level is 
illustrated by these figures of district council capital develop­
ment expenditures since 1 9 7 1:-
R
Year ended 31.3.72 60,000
31.3.73 240,000
31.3.74 1 ,000,000
31.3.75 6,000,000
31.3.76 6,000,000 (est)
i.e. a hundredfold increase in three years.
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BECHUANALAND9S "WAR EFFORT"
The "War Effort" was part of the Colonial Administration’s drive 
to greater productivity to support the British Empire*s involvement 
in the Second World War.
In September 1940, Bechuanaland9s "War Effort" was taking shape.
The Resident Commissioner toured the country talking at the Kgotlas 
of all tribes, where he stated that in order to help the War 
Effort (i) people must be made to plough and plant more land; (ii) 
men should go to work in South Africa to produce more gold; and 
(iii) physically fit men should be ready for call up.
The Chief Agricultural Officer wrote to the Government Secretary 
outlining the Agricultural effort:
The Government Secretary,
MAFEKING
Subiect : AGRICULTURAL WAR EFFORT -
b e S h u a n a l a n d  P r o t e c t o r a t e  .
- 12’7 - 13th September, 1940®
Reference: G’ uvido’s telegram 127 of 13»9*40•
and your urgent letter of 1 4 *9.40*
I beg to inform you that the agreed agricultural 
effort in this Territory is briefly as under
(1 ) That the communities in the best grain growing areas
are ploughing special "War Lands" to increase grain supplies which 
might be used:
(a) to feed the armies of the North and so help the war 
effort,
(b) be added to the tribal grain reserves, or;
(c) be sold and the proceeds of such sales used for what­
ever purpose the tribe might decide upon*
(2) Such additional ploughed areas are to be located so
as not to dislocate family life* It is thought better to have a 
whole lot of special "War Lands" scattered throughout each reserve, 
so that no matter how the rains fall at least some of these lands 
will benefit, than to attempt the cultivation of larger areas 
situated at only a few centres*
(3) At each centre it is contemplated that the ploughing
and planting will be done by a mass effort from all cultivators, 
whose own holdings are situated near to where each particular "War 
Land" is* The weeding, thinning, cultivation, bird scaring and so 
forth will be done by rotation of family groups, each being 
responsible for a few days* work. The harvesting and threshing will 
be a collective effort similar to the ploughing and planting. Where 
necessary, seed will be obtained by purchase by means of an advance 
from the tribal treasury. In some areas where suitable seed is not 
now available it has been arranged that the Chief Agricultural 
Officer will obtain this at cost from other areas.
(4) Government is making available all agricultural 
demonstrators possible, who will act under the Chief as general 
organiser of the effort. The idea being to get some degree of 
improved effort from the multitute rather than a perfected return from a few.
(5) The growth of kaffir corn, millet and beans is in 
most areas being undertaken, since these grains are far more likely 
to crop than maize, and it is believed are more suitable for rations for the Northern African soldiery.
Russell England
CHIEF AGRICULTURAL OFFICER.
- 128 -
Two months after instigating the War Lands programme, the CAO 
reported to the Resident Commissioner: "All tribes are giving the
scheme their full support, and there is no reason to believe that 
our aim will not be achieved, and that once achieved, will not 
continue to increase to the future benefit of the agriculture of 
the Territory".
In the meantime, the Chiefs asked if the Administration would 
guarantee to purchase all the surplus grain that would be produced 
on the War Land. The request was referred to the High Commissioner 
who refused to give any such guarantee, saying that the grain would 
have to be sold through "normal channels", viz., traders and any 
Administration Departments which may require it, e.g. prisons or 
hospitals«
Within six months it was clear that the War Lands programme was a 
virtual total failure throughout the country. The official reasons 
given were that the people were lazy, unmotivated, too busy with 
their own lands, nobody delegated to look after the weeding, bird 
scaring and harvesting, etc. The CAO proposed to the Resident 
Commissioner that the men and women be "strictly regimented" in the 
different tribal areas to work on the War Lands and added, "it is 
believed that if this plan were carried out the production from 
Wan Lands will be greatly increased." When the Chiefs heard about
the proposals they rejected it out of hand.
The Administration continued to put pressure on the tribes to pre­
pare sufficient War Lands for the next season but though the 
Chiefs showed some co-operation, the people showed a marked lack 
of enthusiasm. The Bamalete decided not to cultivate any War Lands 
buc rather that for eacn male adult one bag of grain be donated to
the tribal grain reserves, a proposal which was accepted by the
Adminisuration and a number of other tribes followed suit.
3 (a)
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APPENDIX 3
RESIDENT COMMISSIONER'S OFF ICE , 
M A F E K I N G .
No* 2042 II 31st January, 1945*
Sir,
I am directed by the Resident Commissioner to refer to my 
letter No, 2042 of 28th October, 1942, enclosing a draft of an 
Agreement with the Bamalete Tribe for a loan of £2000 for the 
purpose of clearing, stumping, ploughing and levelling the land at 
the Mogobane Dam, which was to be brought under irrigation*
2, The question of the additional funds required for the 
purpose of installing concrete irrigation canals, channels and^ 
distributaries was dealt with in my letter No© 2042 of 2nd April, 
1943, and connected correspondence.
3* The work of clearing was put in hand in 1942 and 135 acres
were cleared of timber, of which 95 were stumped, very roughly 
levelled and ploughed. It became clear, however, that hand- 
clearing, particularly stumping, was slow and very expensive, and 
that without mechanical assistance it would be "uneconomical to 
continue with this method. It was proposed therefore that a tractor 
and grader required by the Public Works Department for the canals 
should be utilised for this purpose and the services charged to the 
Bamalete loan, thus the work could be carried out expeditiously and 
efficiently and the necessary levelling, which was a big undertaking, 
could be completed before the Public Works Department started 
installing the canals, etc.
4* There has been considerable delay in obtaining the tractor
and grader (see my letter No 175/3 of 7th January, 1944, and 
connected correspondence exiding with High Commissioner9s despatch 
No. 6809 of 27th September, 1944) and the implements have not 
arrived even yet. In the meantime permission was granted, owing to 
the serious food position, for a temporary irrigation scheme costing 
£250 (see paragraph 16, etc., of my letter No. 2042 of 2nd April, 
1943). This scheme was installed and crops were planted in 1943 
and Loan funds utilised for the purpose of preparing the ground for 
the crops, and ultimately for planting and reaping. It was antic­
ipated at the time that the implements and cattle, etc., of the 
Agricultural Department would be available and that certain expen­
diture would be required on labour and manure, etc., leaving a 
sufficient balance to cover the hire of the tractor for the clearing 
and stumping and final levelling. It was found necessarv, however, 
to augment the implements loaned by the Agricultural Department by 
the purchase of certain new implements and owing to the delay in 
receiving the tractor and grader it became necessary to make 
provision in the current year's estimates of the Tribal Treasury 
for continuing the agricultural activities of the scheme and to 
carry into this year's estimates some of the revenue derived from crops planted in the previous year with loan funds.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY 
TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, 
CAPE TOWN.
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5o Experience of the year's working has also shown that, owing
to liability to flooding, which it is difficult without considerable 
expenditure to stop, it will be necessary to abandon the intention 
of irrigating the 70 acres near the darn (out of the total of 300 
acres) for the growing instead of fodder crops such as lucerne, 
pasture and hay grasses* Thus the area to be used for the 
production of grain and to be brought under regular irrigation will 
be 230 instead of 300 acres.
6® The picture therefore is as follows:-
Cleared of timber and stumped and
rough levelled .....o.......••••.« 165 acres
Residue ..•••& »•<>.••............... 135 acres
Expenditure:
On clearing, stumping and preparation 
of ground; purchase of oxen
implements, etc. (development) ••••• £ 12 49:1 6 : 1 0
On the cultivation of crops 
(production)  ..... ••••..o... 690: 0 : 0
Total costs ....  1869:16:10
Unspent Balance ••••• 130: 3: 2
2000: 0 : 0 .
Revenue received from crops
planted   •••• 440: 6: 1
Unspent balance of loan 130: 3: 2
Oxen, implements, etc. on hand(purchased 
from sum of £1249:1 6 : 1 0 shown above 
for development) 1 9 2:1 9 : 4
Total Revenue, assets, etc. ... £ 763: 8: 7.
To this sum of £763:8:7. must be added a proportion of the estimated 
revenue from maize planted last year which will be received during 
this financial year and has been included in the Native Treasury
Estimates for the current year, amounting to £338.
7. The Public Works Department and Agricultural Department 
have together estimated the amount of money which will be required 
to debush and stump the 135 remaining acres and to carry out the 
final levelling and terracing of the 230 acres. Each operation 
will cost £4 an acre making a total of £1,460.
8. Had the tractor and grader been available in the first 
instance it is clear that the loan of £2,000 would have been 
sufficient for the operations required, but as stated above, the 
clearing by hand has proved expensive and slow. Moreover, it was 
anticipated when the original scheme was drawn up that much of the 
clearing and ploughing would be done by individual plot holders
(see pages 3 and 4 of Annexure A enclosed with Government Secretarv'cletter No. 2042/1 of 13th March, 1942).
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9# Labour was to have been supplied by the Tribe, but alter the
officer in charge had tried for some weeks to cope with the work with 
seventeen children, the eldest of whom was not more than fifteen years, 
which was the best labour the Tribe could produce owing to absence of 
most of the men on the mines or in the African Pioneer Corps*, it 
became clear that hired labour would have to be employed.
10. The money spent, however, on the operations which have
hitherto been conducted must be regarded in the circumstances as 
having been usefully employed, not only on account of the actual food 
which has been produced but because it has been the means of encour­
aging the Tribe to take an interest in irrigation* Up to eight months
ago the Tribe entertained a strong suspicion and dislike of the whole 
scheme. There has, however, been an improvement in recent months in 
their outlook, to which the preparation of the Estimates in full Kgotla and explanations by the District Commissioner, Mr. Lawrenson, 
who has skilfully drawn the Tribe into the planning, have contributed
not a little. The question remains as to how the final clearing and
levelling should be financed.
11. Whilst it is true that the Tribe will ultimately benefit by 
the scheme it must be admitted that the Agricultural Department has 
learned valuable lessons from the scheme regarding the planting of 
crops under irrigation in local conditions and these will ultimately 
prove of value elsewhere in the Protectorate. It would not seem 
equitable to call on the Tribe to pay from their own resources for the 
experience which Government has gained. The experiment has had many 
set-backs. No officer of the Government has had much experience of 
irrigation, and consequently mistakes were made, heavy storms caused 
the flooding from the dam of much land under cultivation and a 
consequent loss of crops and adequate supervision by a short-staffed 
department with numerous other important duties demanding attention 
was a constant source of worry to the Principal Agricultural Officer. 
During the present drought the conditions have become equally difficult 
since the level of the water in the dam has fallen below the temporary 
outlet, and the permanent outlet (at the bottom of the wall) cannot be 
used until the permanexit concrete canal is installed. This has been 
delayed by che failure to secure the services of a man qualified to do 
concrete work. Every effort is, however, being made to complete the permanent scheme as soon as possible.
12. Since the arrival of the Director of Livestock and Agricul­
tural Services, who has had wide experience in irrigation, the whole 
system is being overhauled and there is every prospect of its being 
placed on a sound basis. In the circumstances it is suggested that, 
after deducting the value of the assets (cattle, etc.) namely,
£192:19:4. and the unspent balance of the Loan, namely, £130:3:2 the 
rest of the money required to complete the scheme may be met by a free 
grant from the Colonial Development and Welfare fund.
13« In order that the Bamalete may place their operations on a
sounder basis, in accordance with advice given by the Director of 
Livestock and Agricultural Services, they have requested that the 
repayment of the first and second instalments (of £200 this year and 
£200 next year) may be deferred. The re-organisation will involve 
the purchase of some oxen and additional plant, and His Honour strongly supports the request.
I have the honour to be,
Sir*
Your obedient servant,
G* E. Nettelton,
GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
-  132 -  
APPENDIX 4
Equipment:
BAMALETE NATIVE ADMINISTRATION: 
MOGQEANE IRRIGATION SCHEME„ 
Estimates ~1 947 1_943
EXPENDITURE®
SALARIES
1 Agric. Demonstator £10 per month
2 Night Guards, 1 Day Guard, 2 herds £2s6/~p.m.
1 Learner Demonstrator £ 1 * 6 / -  p.m.8c 1 5 / -  rations
CROP PRODUCTION:
Wheat 160 acre s': To be planted May/june 1947 
pToughing, Irrigation, Cultivation 8c Planting 160
Seed Fertilisers and Manures ... «»* 325
Reaping and Threshing Irrigation •.© 300
Additional labour, bird scarers, etc. 40
Maize 160 acres: To be planted Dec/january 1943 
Ploughing', Irrigation, Cultivation 8c Planting 175
Seed Fertilisers and Manures ... 230
Irrigation, cultivation, reaping 8c threshing 320
Additional labour, bird scarers, etc. __40
Miscellaneous:
B^'acres green maize ... • • • 25
2 acres potatoes ... ... 40
2 acres pumpkins ... ... 8
1 acre monkey nuts ... 10
10 acre headlands leaf fir corn ... 45
Contingencies: ... ... 250
Maintenance of irrigation furrows ... 1QQ
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
"Buildings: Mealie crib 8c threshing floor £ 30 
Extension of Produce Shed 100
Labourers quarters 200 330
Kaffir corn a mealie thresher £ 60
1 Double furrow plough 30
2 Single furrow ploughs 30
1 Tractor „.„ 450
12 overalls, 12 gum boots,
12 overcoats ... 50 620
Summary of Expenditure
Salaries £ £82Crop Production
wheat ... ... 825
maize ... .,. 755
miscellaneous ... , ^28
Contingencies ... ... 250
Maintenance of irrigation furrows ... Too
Capital Expenditure ... ,.. 930
£ 282
825
765
128
250
100
950
£330 0
232
1718
250
100
£3300
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BAMALETE NATIVE ADMINISTRATION:
MOGOBANE IRRIGATION SCHEME
Estimates 1947 - 48 
REVENUE.
Maize Crop 1946/47 160 acres
1600 bags @ 25/- per bag ... ... £ 2,000
Wheat Crop 1947 160 acres
800 bags @ 35/- per bag ... ... 1,400
Miscellaneous:
Green maize, potatoes, etc. ... ... 200
£ 3,600
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAPC Auxiliary African Pioneer Corps.
ARC Assistant Resident Commissioner
AO or A & LO Agricultural 8c Livestock Officer 
CAO Chief Agricultural Officer
DA District Administration
DC District Commissioner
DLAS Director of Livestock and Agricultural Services;
also known as the Director of Agriculture 
DPW Director of Public Works
GS Government Secretary
HC High Commissioner
PAO Principal Agricultural Officer
PWD Public Works Department
RC Resident Commissioner*
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